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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with freedom of speech in early imperial Rome. The 
creation of the principate meant that the emperor held absolute power based on 
military force, but there is no comprehensive survey of how this affected 
freedom of speech. This study therefore examines relevant primary sources, 
approaching the question through three areas – controls imposed by the emperor 
through law and force majeure, self-censorship and peer pressure among the 
elite, and popular political protest. Most of the evidence presented is literary, 
reflecting the interests and concerns of the elite authors and their intended 
audience, though where relevant reference is made to inscriptions, graffiti and 
dipinti. 
The thesis considers the hierarchical, status-conscious nature of Roman society, 
arguing that concern for social standing affects all communication. Although 
there are incidents of control imposed by the emperor or his representatives, 
peer-to-peer pressure has a greater impact upon freedom of speech. 
Communication is affected by the status of the speaker, the audience and the 
occasion. The distinctions between “public” and “private” speech differed 
significantly from modern conceptions. This means that protocols arose for 
dealing with potentially offensive subjects – insult, criticism and obscenity – so 
that offence was minimised and social relations could continue harmoniously. 
This argument is developed by an exploration of political communication 
between senate and emperor, especially the importance of the differing 
relationships between the emperor and individual senators. The study concludes 
by exploring informal and popular protest at Rome, through gossip, 
demonstrations at ludi and munera, and through graffiti and pamphleteering. 
Even here, concerns for status and personal relationships with the emperor 
explain the forms protests take. 
This study aims to extend existing work and re-examine assumptions commonly 
made about freedom of speech, or its lack, in early imperial Rome.   
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Introduction 
Here one of the guinea-pigs cheered and was immediately 
suppressed by the officers of the court. (As that is rather a hard 
word, I will just explain to you how it was done. They had a large 
canvas bag, which tied up at the mouth with strings: into this they 
slipped the guinea-pig, head first and then sat upon it.) 
‘I’m glad I’ve seen that done,’ thought Alice. ‘I’ve so often read 
in the newspapers, at the end of trials, “There was some attempt at 
applause, which was immediately suppressed by the officers of 
the court,” and I never understood what it meant till now.’1 
Life is hard in Wonderland. Heads (and whiskers) are under threat and judicial 
rules are invented on an ad hoc basis. While the reader knows that officers of the 
court in the “real” world do not put protestors into canvas bags and sit on them, 
“sentence first, then verdict” is, sadly, not only found in fantasy. Freedom of 
speech is a perennial concern, and Lewis Carroll draws attention to universal 
human experiences. Any news bulletin contains reports of politicians placed 
under house arrest for criticising their government, or people prosecuted for 
stating their religious beliefs, or remarks condemned for giving general offence.
2
  
That sense of relevance first sparked my interest in freedom of speech at Rome. 
Here was a topic that not only reflected concerns in the modern world, but 
affected scholarly readings of the ancient sources. Elite Roman interest – even 
obsession – with libertas during the early principate shows careful and constant 
thought about how they expressed themselves. Ovid, Seneca, Martial, Quintilian, 
                                                 
1
 Carroll 1865: 158. 
2
 This was written on 20
th
 August 2012, when the lead stories on the BBC news included: on-
going protests at the prison terms imposed on the Russian punk band Pussy Riot 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19307077 , Julian Assange addressing the media about his 
asylum claim to Ecuador http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19319140 , an eleven year old girl 
arrested for blasphemy in Pakistan http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19311098 .  
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Epictetus, Tacitus, Pliny, Suetonius, Juvenal, all explicitly and by implication 
address questions of freedom of speech and control. Other authors, especially 
Cassius Dio, provide additional evidence. The period in question is one of rapid 
political change and encompasses the rise of a system of autocratic rule – and for 
the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the emperor’s position was 
effectively a monarchy.
3
 The voices that survive to tell us what it was like to live 
under the early principate record their experiences of a complex, hierarchical 
society where they must contend with vested, powerful interests. Their response 
to these pressures affected their literature, their history, their everyday 
communication. Unless we understand what constraints there were on how they 
expressed themselves – and how those constraints operated - we cannot engage 
fully with what they have to say about their world. 
There are anomalies in the way modern scholars think about this problem. It is 
striking how often one finds the assumption that “dissident” or “offensive” works 
were suppressed and those representing an “official” view of events were 
privileged.
4
 The implications are rarely explored. How, precisely, such a system 
of reward and harm could be imposed, or official representations enforced is left 
unexplained. That the Romans themselves had no word for “censorship” which 
matches the modern concept has caused astonishingly little concern. Rudich 
notes the discrepancy, but glosses it as “a phenomenon which, despite its 
demonstrable existence in a particular historical context, apparently lacked an 
accurate verbal designation”.5 He interprets this as the Roman elite’s “failure to 
articulate a fact of life”. The willingness of modern scholars to articulate it for 
them is alarming.  
                                                 
3
 For the purposes of this study, I follow the view of the emperor as, at least potentially, an 
absolute ruler put forward for example by Millar 1977, Brunt 1977. 
4
 E.g. Syme 1960. Kenney 1982 is not alone in assuming that literature was produced to please 
the princeps and that this was resisted by “opposition circles”.  Sailor 2008: 3 assumes 
censorship. Hoffer 1999: 162-4, 168-73 assumes censorship was lifted under Nerva and Trajan. 
Lendon 1997 assumes fear of censorship without discussing the topic directly.  
5
 Rudich 2006. Quoted p. 7. 
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Paul Veyne describes history as “a journey into otherness”, but when we think 
we have a map, it is tempting to stop looking for the route.
6
 For example, Tacitus 
describes the trial of Aulus Cremutius Cordus in AD 25. The charge was “novel 
and till then unheard of”, for “publishing a history which eulogized Brutus, and 
styled Cassius the last of the Romans”.7 The author committed suicide and his 
book was burned. This looks like literary censorship, something recognisable 
from modern parallels such as Stalinist Russia or Nazi Germany. Other incidents 
appear to conform to present ideas of censorship, with authors executed or 
exiled, and their books burned or banned.
8
 There are, however, discrepancies 
which do not fit the modern model. Dio thinks the charge against Cremutius 
Cordus was irrelevant, trumped up by desperate political enemies.
9
 His history 
was reinstated by Gaius.
10
 Under Domitian, it was circulating freely. That did not 
mean it had survived in full, as Quintilian finds a bowdlerised form perfectly 
acceptable.
11
 Cremutius’ situation – and the attitudes the Roman sources reveal – 
do not parallel modern concepts of censorship. This is why an investigation into 
freedom of speech in early imperial Rome as the Romans themselves understood 
it is necessary: it provides context for the literature and history of the early 
principate.  
Since the scope of the study needs definition, the “first Augustan settlement” of 
27 BC, when Octavian became known as “Augustus”, provides as clear a starting 
point for the creation of the principate as any – certainly Dio presents it in those 
terms.
12
 By the early second century, the position of the princeps had stabilised 
and become generally accepted, so this study ends in AD 117 with the death of 
                                                 
6
 Veyne 1987: 2. 
7
 Tac. Ann. 4.34-5. Cremutius Cordus postulatur novo ac tunc primum audito crimine, quod editis 
annalibus laudatoque M. Bruto C. Cassium Romanorum ultimum dixisset. 
8
 The Appendix to chapter 1 provides a complete list of examples of book burning and penalties 
against authors for the period of this study. For self-conscious authors, see for example Tac. Dial. 
2-3 where Maternus is encouraged to tone down his play Cato, and refuses. 
9
 Cass. Dio 57.24.2-4. 
10
 Suet. Calig. 16.1. 
11
 Quint. Inst. 10.1.104. 
12
 Cass. Dio, 53.16-19. 
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Trajan. Some additional evidence has been included from the Republican period, 
but only when it adds to the understanding of freedom of speech during the main 
timeframe.  
Elaine Fantham helpfully defines modern “censorship” as the examination of a 
work of art or of literature to “suppress what is regarded as unsuitable on 
political, religious or moral grounds”.13 She suggests that modern censorship is 
aimed at suppressing a communication, while in the ancient world the person 
communicating would be suppressed. Secondly, modern censorship often works 
to avoid unsuitable material being circulated whereas ancient censorship was 
reactive once a work was produced. She then goes on to discuss the office of the 
censor at Rome, showing that censors acted as tax assessors and played an 
important role in defending and defining morals in the Republican period, before 
they were “replaced by the unchallenged supervision of the principate”. The 
office of censor, held by the princeps, could be exploited for imposing a moral 
agenda.
14
 However, there is no question that this automatically related to 
overseeing “censorship” of literary texts. Rudich dismisses censorship under the 
Julio-Claudians on the grounds of “total arbitrariness”. This is because there was 
no Index of banned books, and a work approved by one emperor might be 
prosecuted under his successor. However, this frames censorship in modern 
terms.
15
 Moses Finley, in a wide-ranging article, describes the technological and 
social circumstances of literary production in the ancient world.
16
 This leads him 
to dismiss censorship as an irrelevancy: “Merely an occasional off stage 
diversion.” Within his own narrow definition, he may be correct but restricting 
“censorship” to “literature” is unhelpful for understanding freedom and control 
of speech in the context of early imperial Rome.  
                                                 
13
 Fantham 1977: 41. 
14
 M. Johnson 1997; Jones 1973. 
15
 Rudich 1997: 13.  
16
 Finley 1977.  
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One way of resolving this conceptual problem is to move the parameters away 
from “censorship” and engage with broader aspects of freedom of speech. Article 
19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this 
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and 
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 
media and regardless of frontiers. 
In this formulation, freedom of speech is presented in terms of someone’s right to 
form their own opinion, share it with others, and to hear other people’s ideas. 
Those who are not in a position of power need protection to allow them to do 
this.  
The dangers of free speech were an active concern in the ancient world, and Ahl 
discusses the evidence for how to address an absolute ruler safely.
17
 He uses 
material from both literature and textbooks of rhetoric to challenge the view that 
the Roman elite were terrified into silence. Instead, he demonstrates that their 
rhetorical training allowed them to employ “figured speech” or emphasis. This 
maintained the speaker’s safety by ensuring that remarks could be taken as 
positive, even flattering, by the main addressee, while leaving room for an 
alternative interpretation if someone so chose. Omission could be as important as 
what was actually said, because it left the audience room to draw their own 
conclusions. Ahl uses modern parallels to demonstrate that taking offence at 
figured speech damaged the person concerned, rather than the speaker. So, for 
example, showing anger at a reference to an historical tyrant revealed an 
emperor’s autocracy because it acknowledged the comparison was possible. 
Ahl’s insistence that speeches in the ancient world were intended to be 
understood on more than one level is helpful, as is his consideration of freedom 
of speech in the terms used in the ancient world. He argues that managing speech 
                                                 
17
 Ahl 1984. 
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was normal and desirable. The Roman elite did not consider it weak or shameful 
to use such rhetorical techniques to avoid giving offence, so creating another 
disjunction between ancient and modern attitudes.  
Scott’s influential study is concerned with how speech alters with social setting. 
He argues that “inferiors” adapt their speech in the presence of “superiors” and 
vice versa.
18
 He makes the sensible point that it is normal to deal politely and 
cautiously with those who have the ability to hurt us, or our families or friends, 
either physically or by withholding desired benefits. Scott’s view is that people 
have a deep seated psychological need to tell the truth to their equals, however 
risky that may prove. He argues strongly that this is a universal human 
experience, and not something which is culturally determined. Suppressing what 
someone wants to say, dissimulating their true feelings, is hurtful to their 
conception of themselves, to what Scott calls their “dignity”. Scott develops the 
idea of theatricality and performance where there is a difference in the relative 
power of the speakers, with the dominant dictating the lines. This leads him to 
argue for a “public transcript” – the “open interaction between subordinates and 
those who dominate” where it is “in the interests of both parties to tacitly 
conspire in misrepresentation”.19 In other words, both parties know that there is a 
gap between the reality of a situation, and the way it is spoken about, but collude 
to prevent that becoming obvious. This is contrasted with the “hidden transcript” 
which is a kind of code subordinates use to reveal what is “really meant” without 
bringing down retribution upon themselves. Scott argues that because 
subordinates behave in particular ways – over humbly, evasively, saying what 
they think those in power want to hear – it is normal for superiors to dismiss 
them as childish or unreliable. Scott provides examples from modern cultures 
and history, with a particular focus on black slavery in America. His study is 
closely argued and ground breaking, providing a sense of the questions we need 
to ask about speech between those with and without power. It also makes clear it 
                                                 
18
 Scott 1990.  
19
 Scott 1990: 2. 
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will be necessary to consider carefully whether “universal” examples really do 
transfer comfortably to the Roman world. Antebellum slavery in the American 
South may not exactly transpose to the experiences of slaves in Rome, especially 
imperial slaves and freedmen. 
Vassily Rudich and Shadi Bartsch, though they do not mention one another, 
share some common ground in their work.
20
 Rudich draws upon his own 
experiences of censorship in Russia, where an early article was suppressed for 
implying criticism of the Soviet system.
21
 This makes him unsentimental about 
the effects of absolute power and influences his belief that the rise of autocratic 
rule profoundly affected modes of expression. Dissimulatio was an essential 
survival strategy for those who opposed the emperor Nero, but it came at a high 
psychological cost. Rudich’s theory is that literature under the principate, indeed 
elite communication generally, was carried out through a kind of code, which the 
rhetorically educated understood. Such language was interpreted according to 
someone’s own political sympathies and different people would understand the 
same thing in different ways. As a result, meaning became unstable and fragile. 
An innocent speech could be maliciously interpreted against the author’s 
intention, leading to disgrace and possible prosecution. This creates a world of 
ever more complex subtexts, depending on audience response rather than the 
author’s intention. This leads to the “rhetoricised mentality” where form is more 
important than content and manner is privileged over matter. Rudich argues for 
an increasing disjunction between acta and verba during the early principate, 
with corresponding psychological stress placed upon the Roman elite. The 
imaginative reconstruction of a world different from our own is admirable, but 
Rudich’s reliance upon historical psychology creates problems of method. For 
example, he suggests that Seneca absented himself from a senatorial debate in 
order to avoid giving an opinion. “It may easily be imagined that he simply failed 
                                                 
20
 Rudich 1993, 1997; Bartsch 1994. 
21
 Rudich 1993: xi-xiv. 
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to attend the meeting, giving as his excuse his poor health.”22 We can imagine all 
we like, but in order to draw meaningful conclusions, speculation needs to be 
confined to the known facts. 
Bartsch follows Scott in her view of the theatrical nature of elite Roman 
communication, adapting his theories of scripted discourse and the resulting 
tension between appearance and reality. An elite Roman needed to realise which 
“script” the emperor wanted him to follow and respond appropriately. 
Misjudgement could lead to disgrace or death. She believes that the result of this 
artificial situation was the development of “doublespeak”, where authors could 
deliberately subvert the “real meaning” of their work, disguising criticism so as 
not to draw imperial ire.
23
 The audience have corresponding responsibility for 
uncovering a “hidden message” in a text. This had the effect of devaluing 
apparently positive terms, which could be understood to imply their opposite. As 
a result, it was difficult to praise someone and sound sincere. Both Bartsch and 
Rudich share an interest in the practical problems of dealing with a powerful 
superior, though Bartsch’s theatrical model distinguishes her study from 
Rudich’s more politicised approach.24 The idea that interpretation and audience 
response mattered more than authorial intention, creating a climate of 
irrationality and fear, has been highly influential.  
It is, however, not without its problems. There is a risk that attempting to decode 
what Roman authors “really meant” becomes ever more abstruse and inward 
looking, without advancing the discussion.
25
 Perhaps in reaction, recent work has 
                                                 
22
 Rudich 1993: 54. The debate was about the execution of the slaves of the murdered prefect 
Pedanius Secundus, described by Tac. Ann. 14.42-5. Rudich believes Seneca’s psychological 
turmoil arises from failure to consistently oppose slavery. For a critique of Rudich’s use of the 
term dissident see Campbell 1994. 
23
 Bartsch 1994.  
24
 Meckler 1995. 
25
 E.g. McHugh 2004 argues that in Tac. Ann. 4. 34-5 Cremutius Cordus’ defence speech is an 
exercise in “figured language”, to demonstrate that Cremutius expressed his sentiments too 
overtly and paid a deserved price. This is ingenious, and may be correct, but if so, Tacitus’ 
subtlety has escaped detection for two thousand years. 
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begun to give authors greater credit for directing responses to their work. 
Anderson argues that Martial guides the reader’s emotions so that they will not 
become angry: “Martial thrusts the accountability for the accusation of offence or 
injury … back upon the accuser.”26 Innes acknowledges the importance of 
Bartsch’s work, but questions her conclusions. Bartsch argued that Pliny’s 
Panegyricus engaged with problems of sincerity because terms of praise had 
come to imply their opposite. She believes that he did this by saying that public 
and hidden transcripts were indistinguishable under Trajan – in other words by 
claiming that people could now say what they liked, wherever they pleased, 
regardless of who was listening. Innes doubts that Pliny could ever have intended 
to achieve so much with one speech, or on such an occasion. She believes that 
his insistence on truthfulness is a rhetorical device, intended to bring a new color 
to the tired themes of imperial panegyric.
27
 In the same volume, Gibson moves 
away from Bartsch’s and Scott’s approach which sees discrepancy between 
public and hidden transcripts as consistent and universal. Gibson argues that the 
problem is political and particular, not literary and general: Pliny is struggling to 
make a distinction between Domitian’s reign and Trajan’s which does not exist 
in reality.
28
 Freedom of speech is explored in Rutledge’s introductory chapter to 
a volume on politics and literature in imperial Rome.
29
 He suggests, surely 
correctly, that both political and social factors need to be considered and that 
there is a “nexus of complex dynamics at play in Roman society”. He engages 
with questions of concern to any study of freedom of speech in early imperial 
Rome – the nature of libertas, problems of definition, political and social 
limitations, derision and abuse. He provides an overview of much of the relevant 
source material, and raises questions about Roman attitudes. This is, inevitably, 
limited by the constraints of space, and the present thesis has the luxury of scope 
to expand these themes. It draws rather different conclusions about the impact of 
                                                 
26
 Anderson 2011, quoted p. 213. 
27
 Innes 2011: 78-9. 
28
 Gibson 2011: 116-20. Problems with praise will be discussed in chapter 4. 
29
 Rutledge 2009. 
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status on freedom of speech, the role of individual principes and legal response 
to libel and slander. 
Rutledge’s chapter introduces a series of studies into individual authors. These, 
like other modern studies, describe situations where one party addresses someone 
in a position of greater power than themselves. It has become clear that this 
cannot safely be referred to as “censorship” and this thesis will describe 
restrictions on speech in terms of “suppression” and “control”. Suppression is the 
attempt to prevent speech, or the circulation of a text, entirely. Control is more 
nuanced and refers to the attempt to limit or shape what is said. The top-down 
type of control that we have considered so far, where inferiors temper their 
remarks to those in power is not the only factor to consider. Despite the focus of 
the studies discussed above, speakers – or authors – are not only concerned with 
addressing their superiors. A member of the Roman elite was also concerned 
with how his peers responded. This is an area where cultural norms play a far 
greater part in deciding what is acceptable, made more complicated because the 
rules do not remain static. Paul Chambers provided a modern comparison for this 
fluidity, when he made a joke on Twitter about blowing up Robin Hood Airport.
 
30
 The Crown Prosecution Service charged him with making a malicious 
electronic communication. Their failure to accept his tweet as humorous reminds 
us that conventions of acceptable speech arise from social consensus, depend 
upon the cultural context, and are constantly being renegotiated. This type of 
control will be referred to as “censure”, because it arises from fear of social 
disapproval. The status-conscious, competitive world of the Roman elite gives 
censure particular impact. Individuals were sensitive about their reputation, and 
did not tolerate perceived insult, while the distinctive role of patronage affected 
contemporary attitudes towards freedom of speech. This suggests that the 
preconception that issues of control in the early principate are solely political 
                                                 
30
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-19009344. He was acquitted. There are other similar 
examples because Twitter and Facebook are such new media for communication, so that norms 
of acceptability are still being established. This point will be explored further in chapter 3. 
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needs to be reassessed. Censure among the elite requires far more consideration 
than it has been given. 
The third category of control is self-censorship. That occurs where someone does 
not say – or write – something through fear of negative consequences. This 
naturally leaves few traces, but it will be discussed where the evidence permits. It 
can arise either from fear of a powerful superior, or of reluctance to offend one’s 
peers. 
Studying freedom of speech provides its own challenges, because successful 
suppression means that there is no evidence to find. For example, Ovid never 
tells us why he was exiled, confining himself to dark hints about carmen et 
error.
31
 The younger Julia’s exile in AD 8 may or may not be connected and 
Fantham notes that Augustus “was successful not only in ensuring that Julia, like 
her mother, died in exile, but also in obliterating any memory of her except her 
disgrace”.32 Where evidence remains opaque, this needs to be acknowledged and 
conclusions made with appropriate humility. A past society has to be approached 
through the concerns and intentions of those living at the time, in this case a pre-
industrial, hierarchical, slave-owning culture. People in the ancient world must 
be seen as individuals who lived their lives on their own terms. If the ancient 
sources do not support our preconceptions, or if they privilege social attitudes we 
would find unpleasant, even abhorrent, that is not the source’s problem. It is the 
historian’s job to hear and – as far as possible – reflect those voices from the 
past.  
The primary sources are bolstered by archaeological evidence, graffiti, dipinti, 
and  inscriptions, reflecting the experiences of the plebs, slaves and freedmen as 
well as the elite. Secondary material covers law, anthropology, socio-linguistics, 
archaeology, sociology, and cultural psychology. As a result of so much material, 
                                                 
31
 Ov. Tr. 2.207. 
32
 Fantham 2006: 116. 
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the discussion risked becoming superficial and ill-defined. I therefore decided to 
focus on what the Romans themselves had to say about freedom of speech. That 
means that most of the evidence discussed comes from the contemporary written 
sources. Some obvious caveats will spring to mind, since it is necessary to give 
due weight to genre and context, even where possible to the author’s intention. 
This is the world of the elite Roman male, or his educators, and the sources must 
be used on that understanding. Other evidence is included where it deepens 
understanding of issues that the elite sources found frightening, perplexing, 
embarrassing – or which they did not address at all. This is an ancient historian’s 
enquiry into freedom of speech in early imperial Rome, buttressed by other 
disciplines when that adds relevant information.  
Freedom of speech encompasses legal, political, and social aspects. This thesis is 
therefore arranged thematically, rather than through a linear argument. Related 
ideas are developed through five chapters, which provide the material for 
drawing conclusions about the extent of freedom of speech in early imperial 
Rome, the factors that affected it, and the impact that those had. The first chapter 
surveys the legal evidence for control of speech at Rome. It discusses aspects of 
freedom of speech controlled by law and the judicial processes available to 
suppress speech. It considers how far such laws were enforced and the penalties 
for transgression. This chapter introduces the concept that relationships between 
individuals and the workings of patronage are essential to understanding freedom 
of speech in the early empire. This is not a world of hard and fast rules, but one 
where decisions are mediated in accordance with the perceived needs of the 
senior parties involved. This key theme will be developed through the thesis. 
The second and third chapters provide a complementary exploration of censure. 
Together they address social controls that impacted upon freedom of speech. The 
argument is mainly confined to elite society because of the available evidence. 
The importance of reputation for maintaining social standing is developed as a 
second key theme. Since insults, jokes and obscenities occurred in some social 
settings and some types of literature, contexts where this material was acceptable 
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will be examined. It will be suggested that issues of status caused the elite 
considerable anxiety even on occasions when freedom of speech was apparently 
licensed, for example at convivia and the Saturnalia. The third chapter takes the 
inverse of the same question, examining attempts to control insult when it was 
not licensed, and outlining strategies the elite used to avoid giving and taking 
offence. This chapter will also explore Roman concepts of public and private, 
using this to explain why some aspects of freedom of speech were understood 
rather differently from the modern, western world. 
The fourth chapter turns to political freedom of speech. This examines the 
relationship between the emperor, individual senators, and the senate as a body. 
It will explore how this developed during the period under question, considering 
the emperor’s position within the senatorial elite and its effect upon freedom of 
speech. It builds on themes that have emerged from the earlier discussion of legal 
process, etiquette and status to explore how senators expressed praise and blame 
and the impact this had on their libertas. It will argue that by the early second 
century, the senate and the emperor had reached an accommodation. Provided 
that the emperor spoke and acted tactfully, senators were content to maintain the 
appearance of free speech. 
The fifth and final chapter moves the scope of the enquiry to popular protest. It 
looks at how freely the non-elite, especially the urban plebs, could speak and 
considers popular demonstrations at theatres, amphitheatres and circus. The 
effect of gossip and rumour on political protest, and that of graffiti and dipinti 
will be considered. It will be argued that the impact of popular demonstrations 
should not be overstated and nor should elite sensitivity to popular humour. Once 
again, themes of status, patronage, and individual response can be shown to 
impact strongly upon freedom of speech. 
Some promising lines of enquiry have had to be omitted, because of the 
constraints of time and the permitted length of the thesis. Freedom of speech 
among the military is only included when it affects political events at Rome. This 
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is in accordance with the decision to focus on elite literary evidence. The military 
form a distinct social group, and any useful discussion would need to include 
epigraphic and archaeological evidence from across the empire. Religious 
freedom of speech has been investigated only very cautiously, because of its 
complexity in terms of the ancient world. In order to be meaningful, discussion 
would need to incorporate magic, superstition, and astrology as well as state and 
imperial cult. Epigraphical, archaeological and anthropological evidence would 
all need to be addressed.  
Damnatio memoriae – the obliteration of an offender’s name from public record, 
sometimes with other penalties – may seem a surprising omission. However, this 
was used as a form of social sanction, rather than as a genuine attempt to remove 
all traces of a person’s existence. Flower argues that its intention was to punish 
an individual, while taking care to preserve his family’s status and wealth.33 The 
point seems to be, in fact, that damnatio memoriae denied an individual the 
acknowledgement of his contribution to the elite community. That penalty was 
meant to be remembered, and act as a deterrent to other potential transgressors. 
This has therefore been touched on only lightly. The decision was made to 
include evidence pertaining to the military, religion and damnatio memoriae only 
when they illuminate the main area of discussion. This allows the legal, political 
and social factors affecting freedom of speech to be explored more fully, without 
diluting or confusing the argument. So, now that the scope and aim of the thesis 
has been set out, let us follow Lewis Carroll’s excellent advice, and begin at the 
beginning, by considering the options available to a Roman seeking legal redress 
against someone who had offended him. 
                                                 
33
 Flower 1998; 2006. 
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1: The legal basis for action against slander and 
libel  
1.1. Introduction 
Reconstructing the legal processes by which a Roman of the first century AD – 
whether emperor, senator or ordinary citizen – could seek redress against 
someone who defamed him is not an easy task. There are two related problems.  
Firstly, there is the lack of contemporary legal evidence. Since the nearest, 
Gaius’ Institutes, dates from the second century, the legal sources may not 
accurately reflect the practice of the earlier imperial period.
34
 The second 
difficulty concerns the historical sources, some of which are more nearly 
contemporary. Suetonius, Tacitus, Pliny and Cassius Dio all describe 
prosecutions for defamation.
35
 The problem is that they avoid technical language 
and their accounts do not give enough information to allow legal processes to be 
reconstructed with confidence. Since Tacitus and Pliny were both senators and 
must have been present at trials under Domitian, we can assume this was not 
disinterest in legal niceties but a literary choice. This question will need further 
consideration, but for now the issue remains that their evidence does not offer a 
judicially accurate account of prosecutions for defamation. 
Scholars have tackled this challenge undaunted but as yet there is no consensus.
36
 
The scant and ambiguous nature of the evidence creates a temptation to 
reconstruct legal processes through assumptions about individual cases. That 
risks creating a situation where conjectures build on one another so that the 
                                                 
34
 See Harries 2007: 2–4 on the complex nature of evidence for Roman law, and danger that later 
sources create a misleading impression of seamless development, similarly Robinson 1997: 102-
4. Johnston 1999: 12-29 is more sanguine, suggesting much of value is preserved within the legal 
sources, providing that other relevant evidence is used to set them within their historical context.  
35
 For the historical references to cases of defamation cited in the text, see the Appendix. 
36
 E.g. Bauman 1967 and 1974 attempts to recreate legal processes for individual trials while 
Rudich 2006: 8-17 dismisses legal process as irrelevant under an autocracy.  
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evidence becomes increasingly obscured and complicated. The challenge 
therefore is to clarify the legal processes and to consider how far the laws were 
applied in practice. This chapter will attempt to meet that challenge by a 
straightforward survey of the available evidence, both legal and historical, and by 
considering what may safely be concluded and what it is not possible to elucidate 
further. 
The sources do not distinguish between written insults (libel) and spoken insults 
(slander). In some cases, such as that of A. Cremutius Cordus in 25, written texts 
were used to provide definitive proof of defamation. Insulting remarks, made 
before witnesses, also led to prosecution, for example that of Votienus Montanus 
in 24. Accusations might also be brought when verses were recited but no text 
apparently circulated, such as the case of Antistius Sosianus in 62. This reflects a 
society which does not necessarily privilege the written word over the spoken.
37
 
Nor did the ancient concept of a “published” work parallel a modern one, since 
recitation functioned as a form of publication and written copies circulated easily 
and informally.
38
 This study will therefore refer to all cases of verbal injury, 
whether libel or slander, as “defamation”.  
Any discussion of defamation in the first century AD must include the 
development of the law of maiestas.  The charge of “diminishing the maiestas 
(greatness or majesty) of the Roman people” causes a particular difficulty 
because there is no clear definition within the ancient sources.
39
 Since a 
corresponding English term is lacking, maiestas will either be left untranslated or 
rendered as “treason” in order to accentuate the seriousness of the charge and its 
                                                 
37
 E.g. Plin., Ep. 3.5.7-16 describes his uncle’s daily routine, in which listening to works read 
aloud was as important as reading. Parker 2009 argues sensibly against modern tendencies to 
over-privilege oral culture, maintaining that books – read aloud and privately – were central to 
elite literary society. 
38
 For example Plin. Ep. 3.10.4 asks Vestricius Spurrina and Cotta not to circulate the biography 
of their son ahead of formal publication. Quint. Inst. 1 Praef. 7 wants to publish an “official” 
version to replace “pirate” copies of his works. For a discussion of the Roman concept of 
“publication” see Kenney 1982 15-22. For Roman literacy see for example Harris 1989. Horsfall 
1991: 62-5 suggests Harris over privileges the need for formal education. 
39
 For discussion of the meaning of maiestas see e.g. Mackie 1992: 88-92; Bauman 1967: 1-15.  
  




 The nature and definition of maiestas will be fully 
discussed in section 6.  
1.2 Gaius’ Institutes  
Gaius’ Institutes dates from the mid second century AD and is a text book 
introduction to Roman law. Gaius sets out the principles of what constitutes 
iniuria:  
iniuria autem commititur non solum cum quis pugno puta aut 
fuste percussus vel etiam verberatus erit, sed etiam si convicium 
factum fuerit, sive quis bona alicuius quasi debitoris sciens eum 
nihil sibi debere proscipserit, sive quis ad infamiam alicuius 
libellum aut carmen scripserit, sive quis matrem familias aut 
praetextatum adsectatus fuerit, et denique aliis pluribus modis. 
Outrage (iniuria) is committed not only by striking a man with the 
fist or a stick or by flogging him, but also by raising a clamour 
against him, or if, knowing that he owes one nothing, one 
advertises his property for sale as a debtor’s, or by writing 
defamatory matters in prose or verse against him, or by following 
about a matron or a youth and in short in many other ways.
41
 
Gaius conceives iniuria as anything which either harms someone in a way that 
was considered personally degrading, or which damages their reputation and so 
lowers their status in the community. Harries points out that the Roman idea of 
disgrace was both a moral and legal one, so that professions such as brothel-
keeping, performing for pay or training gladiators incurred infamia and limited 
one’s legal rights.42  
                                                 
40
 When considering the seriousness of treason charges, it may be worth noting that in the United 
Kingdom the death penalty was only abolished for treason in 1998 (Crime and Disorder Act). 
41
 Gai. Inst. 3.220.  
42
 Harries 2007: 6.  
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Gaius’ evidence is that iniuria is an offence against the plaintiff’s dignity and 
how that is inflicted is less important than the resulting affront the victim feels. 
The open-ended nature of the offence means that no list of possible insults can be 
definitive.  
Since any action which lessens the defendant’s status causes iniuria, no 
distinction is made between physical and verbal injury. Defamation therefore 
includes spoken insults and those made in writing, regardless of whether prose or 
verse is used.  
Gaius next considers whether it is possible to suffer iniuria on behalf of someone 
else: 
pati autem iniuriam uidemur non solum per nosmet ipsos, sed 
etiam per liberos nostros, quos in potestate habemus, item per 
uxores nostras, quamuis in manu nostra non sint; itaque si ueluti 
filiae meae, quae Titio nupta est, iniuriam feceris, non solum filiae 
nomine tecum agi iniuriarum potest, uerum etiam meo quoque et 
Titii nomine.  
A man is deemed to suffer outrage not only in his own person but 
also in the persons of his children in potestate and his wife.  
Accordingly if you commit an outrage on my daughter (in 
potestate) who is married to Titius, an actio iniuriarum lies 
against you not only in her name but also in mine and Titius’.43
  
A slave cannot suffer iniuria unless the outrage is so shocking it is intended to be 
an insult against the owner. This happened frequently enough that the praetor had 
issued a formula for the eventuality in his edict.
44
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 Gai. Inst. 3.221. 
44
 Gai. Inst. 3.222. 
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The praetor issued a formula when the plaintiff first approached with the case 
and appointed a iudex to hear the case and decide on the penalty.
45
 However, 
some cases were worse than others and Gaius explains the principles of 
aggravated outrage: 
atrox autem iniuria aestimatur uel ex facto, uelut si quis ab aliquo 
uulneratus aut uerberatus fustibusue caesus fuerit; uel ex loco, 
uelut si cui in theatro aut in foro iniuria facta sit; uel ex persona, 
uelut si magistratus iniuriam passus fuerit, uel senatori ab humili 
persona facta sit iniuria.  
An outrage is regarded as aggravated (atrox) either by the actual 
deed, for an example wounding or flogging or cudgelling a man, 
or by the place, for example if an outrage is inflicted in the theatre 
or the forum, or by the person, for example if an outrage is 




Gaius’ evidence therefore sets out the principles that defamation is a form of 
iniuria, which can be suffered on behalf of someone else, and that some cases of 
defamation are more serious than others.  
1.3 Ulpian  
The Digest of Justinian is a compendium, completed in AD 533 as part of a body 
of definitive civil law. It selected and summarised earlier rulings and has 
particular value because it names its original sources. These include the third-
century jurist Ulpian, whose discussions of legal problems are especially 
thorough. Most helpfully, when Ulpian considers iniuria, he quotes the Augustan 
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 Gai. Inst. 3.224. For discussion of how the formulary system worked in practice, see e.g. 
Johnston 1999: 112-3. 
46
 Gai. Inst. 3.225. 
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M. Antistius Labeo, so that we can be reasonably confident that this reflects the 
legal position in the first century. His definition states: 
specialitur autem iniuria dicitur contumelia … iniuriam autem 
fieri Labeo ait aut re aut verbis: re, quotiens manus inferuntur, 
verbis autem, quotiens non manus inferuntur, convicium fit.  
But, specifically, “outrage” (iniuria) is defined as insult 
(contumelia). … Labeo says that outrage is inflicted either by act 
or by words: by act, when a physical attack is made; by words, 
whenever no physical attack is made, it is abuse (convicium).
47
 
Ulpian concludes from Labeo’s definition: 
omnemque iniuriam aut in corpus inferri aut ad dignitatem aut ad 
infamiam pertinere. 
Every outrage is either inflicted on the person or is concerned 
with someone’s dignity (ad dignitatem) or disgrace (ad 
infamiam).
48
   
That there were problems in defining the offences that caused iniuria is 
suggested when Ulpian quotes Labeo’s comments on the praetor’s edict. This 
says: 
                                                 
47
 Dig. 47.10.1.pr.-1. The OLD definition of convicium includes “insulting talk, abuse, mockery” 
so Labeo is most specific about verbal assault as a form of iniuria here. 
48
 Dig. 47.10.1.2. 
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quod autem praetor ait “quid iniuriae factum sit, certum dicat,” 
quemadmodum accipiendum sit? certum eum dicere Labeo ait, 
qui dicat nomen iniuriae, neque sub alternatione, puta illud aut 
illud, sed illam iniuriam se passum. 
When the praetor says, “Let him specify what was done to cause 
outrage,” how should that be understood? Labeo says that a 
person specifies when he gives the name of the outrage, without 




This suggests that the open-ended nature of iniuria and lack of precise definition 
has created potential for abuse by people bringing vague charges. The praetor has 
acted to stem this by insisting that any allegations must specify the offence that 
gave rise to the claim. 
Labeo is credited by Ulpian with defining atrox iniuria in much the terms Gaius 
uses: 
atrocem autem iniuriam aut persona aut tempore aut re ipsa fieri 
Labeo ait. persona atrocior iniuria fit, ut cum magistratui, cum 
parenti patrono fiat. tempore, si ludis et in conspectu: nam 
praetoris in conspectu an in solitudine iniuria facta sit, multum 
interesse ait, quia atrocior est, quae in conspectu fiat. re atrocem 
iniuriam haberi Labeo ait, ut puta si vulnus illatum vel os alicui 
percussum.  
Labeo says an outrage is aggravated by virtue of the person, or the 
time or its very nature. Outrage is aggravated by virtue of the 
person, when inflicted on a magistrate, one’s parent or patron. It is 
aggravated by time if it is inflicted at the games or in full view; 
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for Labeo says that it is of great importance whether the outrage 
be perpetrated in view of the people or in private, the former 
being aggravated. He also says it matters greatly whether the 
insult is committed in view of the praetor or in private, because it 
is much more serious if done in full sight. He says it is aggravated 
by its very nature if a wound be inflicted or someone receive a 
blow in the face.
50
 
Since Ulpian’s conclusions about iniuria draw on Labeo’s opinion and are so 
closely related to Gaius’, we can have confidence that atrox iniuria was defined 
in these terms during the first century.
51
 However, rather than specifying the 
aggravated nature of insults committed in the theatre and forum as Gaius does, 
Labeo gives a more wide-ranging definition. An insult committed in public sight 
(in conspectu) is more serious than if it happens without witnesses (in 
solitudine). If there is public knowledge of the outrage, then the plaintiff’s 
reputation is affected more adversely, and so an insult that is witnessed becomes 
atrox.  
Also familiar from Gaius, but explicitly set out is concern for the relative social 
standing of both victim and perpetrator of the outrage. The Digest discusses part 
of the praetor’s edict: 
generaliter vetuit praetor quid ad infamiam alicuius fieri. … quod 
ait praetor: “si quis adversus ea fecerit, prout quaqua re erit, 
animadvertam,” sic intellegendum est, ut plenior esset praetoris 
animadversio, id est ut quodcumque eum moverit vel in persona 
eius qui agit iniuriarum actionem vel eius adversus quem agitur 
vel etiam in re ipsa, in qualitate iniuriae, non audiat eum qui agit.  
                                                 
50
 Dig. 47.10.7.8. 
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 Dig. 47.10.1.3-9. Ulpian expands Gaius’ account of iniuria suffered on behalf of someone else 
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The praetor bans generally anything which would be to another’s 
disrepute (a list of banned actions follows, including someone who 
writes a lampoon or issues or sings something which dishonours 
another person) … When the praetor says that “If someone act to 
the contrary (of the list of banned actions) I will deal with it 
according to the nature of the issue,” this should be understood to 
mean that the praetor can consider carefully so that if there is 
anything in the character of the plaintiff or of the defendant or in 
the nature of what was done or in the particulars of the outrage 
that troubles him, he will not hear the plaintiff.
52
 
This makes explicit that the facts of the case and the characters of both parties 
will be taken into account. This part of the edict cannot be securely dated, since 
each edict was technically only valid for the praetorship for which it was given 
and the Digest provides no clue as to date. This could make the evidence 
problematic but in practice the next praetor usually adopted his predecessor’s 
edict and there was considerable continuity. After c. AD 129 it was consolidated 
and fixed as the edictum perpetuum. The edict shows which areas of legal 
practice were of ongoing concern since the praetor was not necessarily a legal 
expert, and consulted jurists for advice.
53
 Since Labeo had discussed status with 
regard to atrox iniuria these principles probably were applied from the Augustan 
period and provide further evidence of contemporary concern with relative social 
status and its effect on prosecutions for iniuria. 
The evidence so far considered from Gaius and Ulpian refers to cases of iniuria 
brought before the praetor. These were civil cases, in which the object of the 
court proceedings was to seek redress for the insult. There is no surviving 
evidence to show how reputation and social standing affected cases brought 
before the praetor in actual practice. This is probably due to the fact that the 
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praetor dealt with cases brought by and against those of lower social status than 
senators and prominent equites during the imperial period.
54
 The defamation 
trials that interest the historical sources are high profile cases, which have 
political implications and deal with the elite. These cases were usually heard in 
the senate and owed their processes to criminal rather than civil law. 
1.4 Lex Cornelia de iniuriis  
There was certainly a criminal law that dealt with iniuria since Sulla’s lex 
Cornelia de iniuriis of 82 BC offered redress for victims of assault.
55
  Ulpian’s 
account of the legislation begins with provisions against physical attack: 
lex Cornelia de iniuriis competit ei, qui iniuriarum agere volet ob 
eam rem, quod se pulsatum verberatumve domumve suam vi 
introitam esse dicat.  
The lex Cornelia de iniuriis applies to someone who wishes to 
bring action for insult on the ground that he declares himself to 




He goes on to list the interested parties who may not act as iudex in such a case, 
before restating the provisions and discussing definitions of the terms in some 
detail.
57
 After this he goes on to include defamation within the scope of the lex 
Cornelia de iniuriis: 
si quis librum ad infamiam alicuius pertinentem scripserit 
composuerit ediderit dolove malo fecerit, quo quid eorum fieret, 
etiamsi alterius nomine ediderit vel sine nomine, uti de ea re agere 
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liceret et, si condemnatus sit qui id fecit, intestabilis ex lege esse 
iubetur. eadem poena ex senatus consulto tenetur etiam is, qui 
epigrammata aliudve quid sine scriptura in notam aliquorum 
produxerit: item qui emendum vendendumve curaverit.  
If anyone should write, compose or publish a writing pertaining to 
the disgrace or disrepute of another or viciously bring it about that 
any of these things be done, whether the publication be in 
someone else’s name or anonymous, then action may be brought 
over the issue, and if the culprit be condemned, he shall be 
excluded from participating in making wills under the statute. The 
same penalty is extended by senatus consultum to anyone who 
produces epigrams or anonymous writing defaming another, as 
also to one concerned to traffic in such things.
58
 
Modern scholars have questioned whether Sulla’s original lex dealt with 
defamation as well as physical assault, pointing out that the evidence for 
prosecution under the lex Cornelia de iniuriis in the Republican period is 
meagre.
59
 Ulpian’s detailed description of its provision against assault, and 
forcible entry are all, as Crook points out, logical for legislation made to address 
the troubled situation of the late Republic.
60
 Sulla’s legislation did not include a 
separate lex de vi to deal with cases of violent assault; the lex Lutatia de vi 
created the first quaestio de vi in 78 BC.
61
 However, as Mousourakis observes, 
there is a difference between “private” violence, which affected individuals, and 
“public” violence, which threatened the state through politically motivated 
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 Dig.  47.10.5.9-10. 
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 Alexander 1990: 127, 333 lists only two trials which used the lex Cornelia de inuiriis and the 
second of these, that of C. Sempronius Rufus, may have been under the lex Plotia de vi. Gruen 
1968: 263 discusses the lack of evidence for the lex Cornelia dealing with defamation in the 
Republic, observing “a proliferation of hypotheses is fruitless”. 
60
 Crook 1967: 252-3. 
61
 Cic. Cael. 70. There is also evidence for a lex Plotia de vi in around 63 BC from e.g. Sall. Cat. 
31 and Cic. Fam.  8.8. See Hough 1930 for a discussion of the possible chronology of this 
legislation. 
  
                                                                                         31 
 
organisation and arming of gangs.
62
  The importance of distinguishing between 
personal assault and that of a seditious nature is suggested by the later lex Julia 
de vi publica and lex Julia de vi privata which formally differentiate between 
violence against individuals and the state.
63
 It seems probable then that Sulla’s 
lex de iniuriis, as described by Ulpian, dealt with physical assault against 
individuals and the lex Lutatia de vi represents a refinement in legal provision 
against violence four years after Sulla’s legislation.  
The lex Cornelia de iniuriis originally fulfilled a contemporary need to provide 
against housebreaking and assault, and it is true that there is no evidence of its 
use against defamation. However, Smith makes the sensible point that, despite 
difficulties of interpretation, Ulpian states clearly that the original lex included 
libel.
64
 A senatus consultum, supplementary to the lex, then extended it. The 
historical sources supply information that can be used to bolster the material 
supplied in the Digest and date this to Augustus’ principate. Suetonius reports 
that Augustus took action against pseudonymous and anonymous publications: 
etiam sparsos de se in curia famosos libellos nec expavit et magna 
cura redarguit ac ne requisitis quidem auctoribus id modo censuit, 
cognoscendum posthac de iis, qui libellos aut carmina ad 
infamiam cuiuspiam sub alieno nomine edant.
 
 
[Augustus] did not even dread the lampoons against him which 
were scattered in the senate house, but took great pains to refute 
them; and without trying to discover the authors, he merely 
proposed that thereafter such as published notes or verses 
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 Mousourakis 2003: 228 n. 199. 
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 Dig. 48.6-7. Though later authorities are quoted so that this may not accurately reflect the 
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 Smith 1951: 173-6. The principle that Ulpian’s evidence should be trusted is sound, although 
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chapter 5. 
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Suetonius uses the verb censuit for Augustus’ suggestion that pseudonymous 
libels should be suppressed. This is used for decrees issued by the senate, and 
since they usually complied with imperial requests in doing so, Suetonius’ 
evidence suggests that this was when an SC was issued to extend the lex 
Cornelia.
66
 Suetonius’ account is not tied to a specific date, but the authorities 
were sufficiently disturbed by anonymous and pseudonymous pamphleteering in 
AD 6–9 that rewards were offered in order to find the offenders and information 
was laid.
67
 It is a logical step for anonymous defamation to be treated as a 
criminal rather than a civil offence, and the Digest quotes Paul’s explanation that 
anonymous libel is more suitable to investigation by a court of enquiry than by 
civil proceedings because of the difficulties of proof.
68
 Bauman therefore 
suggests that both Suetonius and Ulpian refer to the same senatus consultum and 
that it was passed in about AD 6 to meet problems caused by widespread 
circulation of libelli by anonymous and pseudonymous authors.
69
  
Such pamphleteering seems to have caused particular concern, centred around 
potential unrest encouraged by the elite. Dio describes “bulletins” (βιβλία) 
associated with the plot of Publius Rufus in AD 6: 
ὁ δ᾽ οὖν ὅμιλος, οἷα ὑπό τε τοῦ λιμοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ τέλους τοῖς θ᾽ 
ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ἀπολωλόσι κεκακωμένος, ἤσχαλλε, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν 
καὶ φανερῶς νεωτεροποιὰ διελάλουν, πλείω δὲ δὴ. βιβλία νύκτωρ 
                                                 
65
 Suet. Aug. 55. 
66
 Rowe 2002: 64-5 points out that eventually the jurists cite not the SCC but the imperial oratio 
that prompted it because the senate was understood to act in accordance with the emperor’s 
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ἐξετίθεσαν. καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐλέγετο μὲν ἐκ παρασκευῆς Πουπλίου τινὸς 
Ῥούφου γίγνεσθαι, ὑπωπτεύετο δὲ ἐς ἄλλους: ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ῥοῦφος 
οὔτε ἐνθυμηθῆναί τι αὐτῶν οὔτε πρᾶξαι ἐδύνατο, ἕτεροι δὲ τῷ 
ἐκείνου ὀνόματι καταχρώμενοι. καινοτομεῖν ἐπιστεύοντο. καὶ διὰ 
τοῦτο ζήτησίς τε αὐτῶν ἐψηφίσθη καὶ μήνυτρα προετέθη: 
μηνύσεις τε ἐγίγνοντο, καὶ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐταράττετο, 
μέχρις οὗ ἥ τε σιτοδεία ἐπαύσατο, καὶ μονομαχίας ἀγῶνες ἐπὶ τῷ 
Δρούσῳ πρός τε τοῦ Γερμανικοῦ τοῦ Καίσαρος καὶ πρὸς Τιβερίου 
Κλαυδίου Νέρωνος, τῶν υἱέων αὐτοῦ. 
Now the masses, distressed by the famine and the tax and the 
losses sustained in the fire, were ill at ease, and they not only 
openly discussed numerous plans for a revolution, but also posted 
at night even more numerous notices. Word was given out that all 
this had been planned and managed by one Publius Rufus, but 
suspicion was directed to others; for as Rufus could neither have 
devised nor accomplished any of these things, it was believed that 
others, making use of his name, were planning a revolution. 
Therefore an investigation of the affair was voted for and rewards 
for information were announced. Information began to be offered, 
and this also contributed to the commotion in the city. This lasted 
until the scarcity of grain was at an end and gladiatorial games in 
honour of Drusus were given by Germanicus Caesar and Tiberius 
Claudius Nero, his sons.
70
 
Whether or not it is correct to conflate the libelli of Suetonius’ account with 
Dio’s βιβλία, there is other evidence for pamphlets attacking elite targets. A liber 
deriding Claudius’ claim that he had pretended stupidity as a survival strategy 
had the Greek title μϖρων επανάστασις and Suetonius describes it as having an 
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 When Sejanus was incensed by fictitious speeches published in 
the names of ex-consuls, the implication is that these are sophisticated 
publications, demonstrating literary talent as well as malice.
72
 The danger of such 
libelli/βιβλία is underlined when Dio describes a similar incident in AD 12:  
καὶ μαθὼν ὅτι βιβλία ἄττα ἐφ᾽ ὕβρει τινῶν συγγράφοιτο, ζήτησιν 
αὐτῶν ἐποιήσατο, καὶ ἐκεῖνά τε, τὰ μὲν ἐν τῇ πόλει εὑρεθέντα 
πρὸς τῶν ἀγορανόμων τὰ δὲ ἔξω πρὸς τῶν ἑκασταχόθι ἀρχόντων, 
κατέφλεξε, καὶ τῶν συνθέντων αὐτὰ ἐκόλασέ τινας. 
And learning that some vituperative pamphlets were being written 
concerning certain people, [Augustus] ordered search to be made 
for them; those that were found in the city he ordered to be burned 
by the aediles, and those outside by the officials in each place, and 
he punished some of the writers.
73
 
These βιβλία ἄττα ἐφ᾽ ὕβρει τινῶν συγγράφοιτο appear to have a clear parallel 
with Suetonius’ libelli famosi. There is an official search, the offending material 
is destroyed and authors punished. The exact process remains unrecoverable, but 
the incident clearly demonstrates the extent of imperial concern. The difficulty of 
controlling anonymous or pseudonymous works, especially when there was a 
concerted effort to circulate them, explains why criminal law was extended for 
use against them.  
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1.5 The Twelve Tables  
The Twelve Tables, generally agreed to have been produced in the mid fifth 
century BC, form the earliest Roman law code. The text has not survived and the 
fragmentary evidence makes it difficult to reconstruct the Twelve Tables with 
certainty, let alone confidently interpret them. A particular difficulty arises from 
an apparent conflict in the surviving evidence between whether they provided 
redress for insults, or protection against magical curses. There is a further 
question over the penalty imposed for this offence. 
Crawford argues for a reconstruction of the Twelve Tables through the 
identification of original elements. He suggests that Twelve Tables 8.1 reads:  
 qui malum carmen incantassit … <quive> occentassit  
carmenve condisset 




Johnson et al offer an extended reconstruction in translation: 
 Whoever enchants by singing an evil incantation… 
If anyone sings or composes an incantation that can cause dishonour or 
disgrace to another … he shall suffer a capital penalty.75 
Their evidence for the phrase malum carmen incantassit comes from Pliny the 
Elder:  
non et legum ipsarum in duodecim tabulis verba sunt: qui fruges 
excantassit, et alibi: qui malum carmen incantassit? 
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And are these not the words of the Twelve Tables themselves 
“Whosoever shall have enchanted the harvest,” and elsewhere, 
“Whoever enchants by singing an evil song?”76 
However, Cicero’s evidence suggests that defamation was penalised: 
XII tabulae cum perpaucas res capite sanxissent, in his hanc 
quoque sanciendam putaverunt : si quis occentavisset sive carmen 
condidisset, quod infamiam faceret flagitiumve alteri. 
 The laws of the Twelve Tables, although they impose a capital 
penalty on very few offences, considered this ought to be 
penalised among such offences: if anyone sings or composes a 
song that can cause dishonour or disgrace to another.
77
 
Since Cicero records that the crime causes someone to suffer infamia and 
flagitium, Crawford suggests he is confusing the legislation in the Twelve Tables 
with the later scope of iniuria. This confusion is reflected in the Augustan 
sources, which also offer evidence that the Twelve Tables provided against 
defamation. Crawford believes that they were misled by Cicero, and this 
confusion is encouraged further when Cicero observes that: 
quamquam id quidem etiam duodecim tabulae declarant, condi 
iam tum solitum esse carmen; quod ne liceret fieri ad alterius 
iniuriam, lege sanxerunt. 
And yet as much as this is also formally shown by the Twelve 
Tables, namely that by that time the composition of songs was 
regularly practised: because it is expressly enacted that this may 
not be done to a neighbour’s detriment.78   
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Crawford suggests that this led to the Augustan belief that making insulting 
songs was liable to prosecution and quotes Horace:
79
 
      quin etiam lex 
poenaque lata, malo quae nollet carmine quemquam 
describi; vertere modum, formidine fustis 
ad bene dicendum delectandumque redacti 
and at last a law was carried with a penalty, forbidding the 
portrayal of any in insulting songs. Men changed their ways and 
terror of the cudgel led them back to goodly and gracious forms of 
speech.
80 
si mala condiderit in quem quis carmina, ius est 
iudiciumque 
If a man writes insulting songs against another there is a right of 
action and redress by law.
81
 
Crawford includes Porphyrio’s commentary in his evidence, which supports 
Horace’s assumption that malicious verses can be prosecuted. It is less clear that 
this is a helpful addition since Porphyrio’s assumptions may arise from the 
internal evidence and not independently. Crawford adds the observation by the 
Augustan jurist Labeo that “abuse is iniuria” (convicium iniuriam esse).82 
The problem centres around what was meant by carmina which cause infamia 
and flagitium.  Is this a matter of damage to someone’s reputation, as in later 
cases of iniuria, or does it mean physical harm? Rives makes the sensible point 
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that the legislation should be considered in the context of its own time and 
purposes. He suggests that the conundrum becomes clearer if “we do not think of 
(The Twelve Tables) as laws against magic”.83 Rives’ suggestion is therefore that 
the Twelve Tables offered redress against “malediction” – any kind of dangerous 
speech.
84
 Defamation and magic were not presented as alternatives, but as points 
on the same spectrum. Watson, similarly, argues that “the uttering of abuse and 
the act of pronouncing a curse were thought of as closely related”.85  
However, this still does not answer the question of whether there was a 
difference between carmina and convicium. Removing the term “magic” does 
not make the problem of definition disappear; it is necessary to understand what 
carmina meant to the original legislators. Rives contends that fruges excantassit 
and carmen incantassit are parallel phrases with technical meaning.
86
 They 
describe the alteration of a physical state  – “chanting out” in order to remove 
crops from a field or “chanting against” someone in order to harm them. 
Fortunately, there is evidence of other carmina, such as one Cato records for 
curing a dislocation or fracture to support this definition: 
harundinem prende tibi viridem P. IIII aut quinque longam, 
mediam diffinde, et duo homines teneant ad coxendices. incipe 
cantare: “motas uaeta daries dardares astaries dissunapiter” usque 
dum coeant.  
Take a green reed four or five feet long and split it down the 
middle, and let two men hold it to your hips. Begin to chant: 
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 Rives 2002: 271. 
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“motas vaeta daries dardares astaries dissunapiter” and continue 
until they meet…87  
This shows that a carmen was chant, aided by a physical ritual, which its 
practitioners believed would bring about a physical change. Moreover, we can 
have confidence that these chants remained constant over long periods of time. 
Iona and Peter Opie found evidence of wart charms recorded in Pliny’s Natural 
History and still used in twentieth-century England, while the modern children’s 
counting rhyme “eeny meeny miny moe” preserves a centuries-old shepherds’ 
chant.
88
 There is therefore no reason to question that Cato preserves an ancient 
carmen.  
The Elder Pliny examines the question of whether or not words (verba) and 
incantations (incantamenta carminum) are effective and refers to Cato’s cure 
with apparent scepticism in his detailed list of literary and anecdotal carmina. 
These include love charms, healing charms, and Caesar’s chanting to ensure a 
safe journey.
89
 It is clear from Pliny’s list that such carmina were part of 
everyday life. Even the sceptical Pliny respected the power of words, discussing 
the importance of using exactly correct incantations in sacrifices. After all, 
Roman law required the accurate use of formulae and deviation meant a court 
case would be dismissed. Religious rites, too, required exactly the correct 
wording, or they were considered void.
90
 The underlying conviction that words 
have a force that is both arcane and mundane is discernable in the Twelve Tables 
and survives into the imperial period.
 
 
Cicero’s evidence probably also preserves a reference to carmina. Crawford 
argues that the earliest uses of occentare have no connection with magic and 
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denote insult. This view is supported by Smith, who accepts Fraenkel’s argument 
that Cicero is quoting directly from the Twelve Tables.
91
 However, Rives 
observes that in Plautus, the locked-out lover Phaedrus sings at the door bolts to 
encourage them to open up.
92
 Such a carmen has more in common with the 
charm preserved in Cato than with defamation and makes it probable that 
occentassit also denotes chanting.
93
 Since carmina bring about physical changes, 
an ill-intentioned person could use them to cause harm rather than healing. Pharr 
describes cases where prosecutions for the use of potions hinge on whether or not 
the supplier acted with malicious or helpful intentions; there is a need to 
distinguish explicitly between malum venenum and beneficum venenum.
94
 This 
parallel helps us understand that when the Twelve Tables carefully specifies that 
the use of malum carmen should be prosecuted, it is marking the distinction 
between “good” and “bad” types of carmina.  
I suggest that the evidence is so confusing because not one, but two conflations 
have arisen over time. Firstly, the line between “cursing” and “insulting” is an 
extraordinarily fine one. It is not surprising that these concepts were not properly 
defined and did not need to be. An insult is indeed on the same spectrum as a 
curse. The difference is that a curse produces physical consequences. Pliny’s 
account of the farmer defending himself against charges of “chanting out” his 
neighbours’ crops by producing his happy workers and orderly equipment in 
court provides a good example of how such a charge would be brought in 
practice.
 95
 If someone came to court and argued that they were the victim of a 
malum carmen they would, ipso facto, show that they had been affected by 
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supernatural chanting and not an insult. Since a malum carmen affects the victim 
physically, it gives rise to conflation between carmina and iniuria and explains 
why Cicero and Horace both understood that the Twelve Tables legislated 
against defamation.  
Secondly, there is a later conflation between carmina and “magic”. “Magic” is 
notoriously difficult of definition; Kippenberg demonstrates that there was a 
small difference between “illegal” magic and “legal” religious rites. The chief 
distinction between state sanctioned rituals and “magical” ones was that magic 
was performed in secret. Such secrecy created a threat to public order and 
security and he argues that this is why, from the late Republic onwards, 
legislation targeted secret rites.
96
 This gives a useful working definition for 
understanding what later Roman legislators considered as “magic”. Kippenberg 
suggests that there was an evolution in “magic” or artes magicae between the 
fifth century and the imperial period.
97
 This was partly due to eastern influences 
and means that later legislation, such as the lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficiis 
is not necessarily beneficial in reconstructing the concepts that informed the 
Twelve Tables.  
There is a further difference in that, as Liebeschuetz observes, magic became an 
increasingly politicised charge under the empire.
98
 It gave the prosecution an 
advantage in that it automatically blackened the character of the defendant. There 
are numerous examples where the sources report that magic is a factor as well as 
insult. The case of M. Scribonius Libo Drusus in AD 16 hinged on a paper with 
mysterious marks against the names of senators and members of the imperial 
family in Libo Drusus’ own handwriting. The expulsion and execution of 
astrologers and magicians in the immediate aftermath indicates the strength of 
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 Clutorius Priscus’ trial in AD 21 has elements of a charge 
against magic since Priscus wrote and recited a poem anticipating the demise of 
Tiberius’ son Drusus and was prosecuted and executed.100 The charges brought 
against Mamercus Aemilius Scaurus in 34 included addiction to magic rites.  
We should not allow later conflation between mala carmina, artes magicae and 
iniuria to obscure the original legislators’ intention. This was simple and 
practical. They wanted to provide redress for someone who was physically 
harmed by a malum carmen. This makes sense in context and there is sound 
evidence that belief in such carmina survived into a much later period. The 
conflation also explains confusion over the penalty described in the Twelve 
Tables. Crawford rejects the idea of capital punishment outright, because of the 
lack of evidence that the death penalty was ever applied for singing insulting 
songs.
101
 However, if the penalty is actually for using carmina to someone’s 
detriment, the dangerous and uncontrollable nature of such supernatural actions 
makes the severe penalty entirely plausible. Other references to beating to death 
with cudgels are military in context, but practising harmful magic is a capital 
offence in later law codes and indeed in many other cultures.
102
 Smith, sensibly, 
suggests that since the penalty for defamation in the Twelve Tables was so 
ferocious, the praetor’s edict had modernised this and treated defamatory speech 
as iniuria to avoid untoward severity.
103
 Smith dates this development to the end 
of the second century BC and Cicero’s evidence is sufficient to suggest, despite 
Crawford’s reservations, that the penalty was indeed a capital one. 
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Ultimately, little is to be gained by trying to press the fragmentary evidence too 
far, but it is most likely that the Twelve Tables provided for action against the 
use of ill-intentioned carmina which caused someone physical harm. This was 
subject to capital punishment if proven because of the frightening nature of such 
a supernatural phenomenon and the risk of further damage. The effect on the 
victim was understood to be serious, causing them to suffer infamia or flagitium. 
Changing concepts both of “magic” and iniuria meant that by the late Republic, 
Cicero believed that the Twelve Tables treated defamation as equivalent to 
physical assault and explains why there is an apparent conflict in the evidence 
about the original legislation.  
1.6 Maiestas and perduellio 
Tacitus tells us that defamation was prosecuted as maiestas for the first time 
under Augustus:  
nam legem maiestatis reduxerat, cui nomen apud veteres idem, 
sed alia in iudicium veniebant, si quis proditione exercitum aut 
plebem seditionibus, denique male gesta re publica maiestatem 
populi Romani minuisset: facta arguebantur, dicta inpune erant. 
primus Augustus cognitionem de famosis libellis specie legis eius 
tractavit, commotus Cassii Severi libidine, qua viros feminasque 
inlustris procacibus scriptis diffamaverat. 
For [Tiberius] had resuscitated the lex Julia de maiestate, a statute 
which in the old jurisprudence had carried the same name but 
covered a different type of offence – betrayal of an army; 
seditious incitement of the populace; any act, in short, of official 
maladministration diminishing the “majesty of the Roman 
nation”. Deeds were challenged, words went immune. The first to 
take cognizance of written libel under the statute was Augustus; 
who was provoked to the step by the effrontery with which 
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Cassius Severus had blackened the characters of men and women 
of repute in his scandalous effusions.
104
    
The charge of diminishing the greatness (majesty) of the Roman people 
originated in either 103 or 101–100 BC with the lex Appuleia de maiestate of L. 
Appuleius Saturninus.
105
 Whichever date is correct, Saturninus’ lex established a 
quaestio court, which acted as a “board of enquiry” to investigate allegations, 
with a presiding praetor and jury. There was a fixed penalty for conviction. The 
recent trials for perduellio or military treason of those generals and senators 
believed to have colluded with Jugurtha provided precedents for Saturninus’ 
legislation.
106
 This was introduced amidst a climate of political unrest and 
faction, and Saturninus may have intended his quaestio to check the influence of 
the optimates in jury trials.
107
 The exact number and scope of further laws are 
debated. Q. Varius Hybrida extended the definition of treason to those that allied 
against Rome during the Social War and there is discussion as to whether or not 
Varius’ was a permanent quaestio.108 Sulla’s lex Cornelia de maiestate set up a 
standing quaestio and probably extended Varius’ law. Cicero provides secure 
evidence that Caesar passed a lex Julia de maiestate when he complains of 
failure to apply its penalties properly.
109
 It is not clear whether a second law was 
passed during Augustus’ principate. Allison and Cloud discuss the evidence in 
the legal sources, which has been used to suggest that he did, and argue that this 
is so much later in date that it cannot be interpreted with any confidence.
110
 Nor 
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is there secure, contemporary evidence for a new lex de maiestate in Augustus’ 
principate.
111
 Since Tacitus says that Augustus acted against libellous writing 
“under the appearance of the lex Julia de maiestate”, it seems likely that an SC 




Tacitus, in the passage cited above, explains that maiestas used to be “a different 
type of offence”, of military treason or encouraging the people to rebel. There is 
therefore a conceptual difficulty caused by the conflation of perduellio (i.e. 
military treason) and maiestas (i.e. diminishing the majesty of the Roman 
people). Bauman crystallises the problem as a “failure” to distinguish between 
what he describes as “perduellio-type” crimes and defamation. For Bauman, this 
means that Roman authors “seem quite unable to achieve a stable position either 
terminologically or conceptually” between the two offences.113 Since Ulpian’s 
definition of maiestas is confined to military treason and makes no mention of 
defamation, Rogers deals with the difficulty by arguing that there were two 
different and legally distinct categories of maiestas and perduellio.
114
 His 
position is refuted by Chilton and by Allison and Cloud, but testifies to the 
enduring problem of the indeterminate nature of maiestas.
115
 This problem 
occurs from the very origins of the legislation since it appears that Saturninus 
provided no clear definition for maiestas; Lintott points out that it is “impossible 
to be sure what the original legislator intended it to mean”. We can be confident 
that it was used for treason and military incompetence (instead of perduellio) and 
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reliance on much later legal authorities, makes his position untenable. Griffin 1997: points out 
that the contemporary SC de Cn Pisone patre uses only the term maiestas, not perduellio. 
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probably against tribunes or magistrates who opposed the will of the people.
116
 
That Sulla did not succeed in defining the charge more narrowly is illustrated 
when Cicero congratulates Appius Pulcher on escaping charges of ambitus 
(corruption). In Cicero’s view his enemies would have been wiser to allege 
maiestas because the open-ended nature of the accusation made it easier to 
prove. 
verum tamen est maiestas, etsi Sulla voluit, ne in quemvis impune 
declamari liceret, ambitus vero ita apertam vim habet, ut aut 
accusetur improbe aut defendatur. 
There is something indeterminate about a maiestas charge, even 
though Sulla wanted a situation where no one could be attacked 
verbally (declamari) without any penalty being risked by the 
accuser, whereas corruption has obvious meaning, as it is either 
the defence or prosecution are acting dishonestly ….117  
It is however far from clear that this ambiguity would have concerned a Roman 
lawyer. Cicero provides a definition of maiestas: 
maiestatem minuere est de dignitate aut amplitudine aut potestate 
populi aut eorum, quibus populus potestatem dedit, aliquid 
derogare. 
Treason (maiestas) is a lessening of the dignity or high estate or 
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 Lintott 1992: 95-6. 
117
 Cic. Fam.  3.11.2. Cicero rather regrets the lost opportunity to defend Appius Pulcher against 
such a preposterous charge. Smith 1951: 176 argues that this is proof that Sulla tried and failed to 
define maiestas. 
118
 Cic. Inv. Rhet. 2.17.52-5. Quoted 2.17.53. 
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However, he assumes that when it comes to a trial the defence will provide a 
counter-definition and the prosecutor must argue that their version is the more 
valid: 
item infirmabitur, si turpis aut inutilis esse ostenditur eius 
descriptionis approbatio et, quae incommoda consecutura sint, eo 
concesso ostendetur – id autem ex honestatis et ex utilitatis 
partibus sumetur, de quibus in deliberationis praeceptis 
exponemus – et si cum definitione nostra adversariorum 
definitionem conferemus et nostrum veram, honestam, utilem esse 
demonstrabimus, illorum contra. quaeremus autem res aut maiore 
aut minore aut pari in negotio similes, ex quibus affirmetur nostra 
descriptio.  
The definition of the opponents may also be attacked if we show 
that to approve it is dishonourable and inexpedient, and point out 
what disadvantages will follow if their definition is accepted (this 
is based on the concepts of honour and advantage which we shall 
expound in giving the rules for speeches before deliberative 
bodies); and if we compare our definition with that of our 
opponents and prove that ours is true, honourable and expedient 
and theirs is the opposite. Furthermore we shall search for cases of 
greater or less or of equal seriousness to support our definition.
119
 
The unknown but contemporary author of the Ad Herennium describes maiestas 
in similar terms and gives comparable advice to Cicero’s: 
cum definitione utemur, primum adferemus brevem vocabuli 
definitionem, hoc modo: “maiestatem is minuit, qui ea tollit, ex 
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quibus rebus civitatis amplitudo constat. quae sunt ea 
…?  suffragia populi et magistratus consilium.”   
When we deal with the issue of definition, we shall first briefly 
define the term in question, as follows: “He impairs the maiestas 
of the state who destroys the elements constituting its dignity. 
What are these…? The suffrage of the people and the counsel of 
the magistracy.”  
The defence is advised to argue that the majesty of the state has been promoted, 
not diminished, by their actions: 
“ego non adfeci, sed prohibui detrimento: aerarium enim conservavi, 
libidini malorum restiti, maiestatem omnem interire non passus sum.” 
primum igitur vocabuli sententia breviter et ad utilitatem adcommodate 
causae describitur; deinde factum nostrum cum verbi descriptione 
coniungetur; deinde contrariae descriptionis ratio refelletur, si aut falsa 
erit aut inutilis aut turpis aut iniuriosa.  
“I have not inflicted, but rather prevented, damage, for I have 
preserved the treasury, resisted the licence of wicked men, and 
kept the majesty of the state from perishing utterly.” Thus the 
meaning of the term is first explained briefly, and adapted to the 
advantage of our cause; then we shall connect our conduct with 
the explanation of the term; finally, the principle underlying the 




Two points arise from this problem of definition in cases of maiestas. The first is 
that there is some overlap between maiestas and the definitions of iniuria already 
encountered in the legal sources because both encompass a lessening of dignitas. 
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What constituted maiestas was ill-defined, and the causes of iniuria were always 
open and fluid. It is therefore a short step to assimilating defamation which 
offended someone’s dignity within the charge of maiestas. Secondly, since 
maiestas applied not only to the people but also to those to whom they had given 
authority, it is easily extended to encompass perceived defamation not only of 
the magistrates but of the emperor himself. By the end of the first century AD, 
Quintilian could write on questions of definition: 
iniuriam fecisti, sed quia magistratui, maiestatis actio est.  
You have committed iniuria, but because it was against a 
magistrate, the crime is maiestas.
121
 
There is however some confusion about the first occasion when maiestas charges 
were brought in a case of defamation. Tacitus claims Cassius Severus was first 
defendant, while the elder Seneca has the rabidly vicious Titus Labienus.
122
 The 
elder Seneca’s account suggests that the cases were nearly contemporary and 
Bauman uses Jerome’s evidence to argue that Severus was tried in AD 8.123 It 
seems likely that Labienus’ trial can be dated shortly before that of Severus. It is 
a major development in the treatment of defamation and various theories have 
been put forward in order to reconstruct the precise legal processes involved. 
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 Quint. Inst. 5.10.39. Smith 1951: 177 suggests this was the case under the Republic, but there 
is no convincing proof that Cicero means that defamation of a magistrate was maiestas.  
122
 Sen. Controv. 10. pr.7. Suet. Calig. 16.1 reports the rescinding of senatus consulta banning 
works by Severus, Titus Labienus or A. Cremutius Cordus. The similarities in the cases make it 
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 Bauman 1974: 29. 
124
 E.g. Bauman 1974: 43-51 attempts to reconstruct the exact legal process against Cassius 
Severus. Since other sources explicitly have Labienus or Severus as the first to suffer the penalty 
of book burning, Bauman conflates these with the account in Dio, which describes the burning of 
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The evidence does reveal that Labienus and Severus had offended many of the 
elite. Moreover, both men were of low class origins, rose to prominence through 
their skill in oratory and had a talent for making enemies. This left them isolated 
and vulnerable to attack, precisely the circumstances in which an ill-defined 
charge of maiestas would be useful. Some scholars have seen a difficulty 
because they offended “against men and women of rank”, so that the charge has 
been extended from the appointed magistrates of the Roman people to the elite as 
a group, and including elite women.
125
 Since there is at least one other case 
where insulting the elite generally was treated as maiestas, this may be another 
example of a modern and perhaps over-legalistic approach to Roman law.
126
 We 
can be certain that for the case to proceed, Augustus must have supported the 
accusation. 
Maiestas charges continued to develop under Tiberius. The period of transition 
after Augustus’ principate was potentially dangerous because of its constitutional 
novelty and we know of mutiny among the legions and at least one plot against 
him.
127
 In these troubled circumstances, Tiberius’ initial moderation is 
remarkable, and far greater than Tacitus implies. Early maiestas charges that 
included defamation were made against M. Granius Marcellus in 15 and 
Appuleia Varilla in 17 and in both cases Tiberius suppressed the defamation 
element and had other charges tried under the relevant law. The evidence 
                                                                                                                                    
anonymous pamphlets, and argues that Cassius Severus was tried and acquitted for anonymous 
pamphleteering in AD 6. He believes that there was then a second trial in AD 8 when a new 
senatus consultum extended the definition of libel further, and Cassius Severus was convicted for 
maiestas. It is not clear that the source evidence can be pressed so far, or that there is any 
advantage in trying to do so.  
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 See Allison and Cloud 1962: 719-20 and Bauman 1967: 199-245 on Augustus’ constitutional 
position and the development of imperial maiestas. 
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 Tac. Ann. 14.50.1 describes the Codicilli of Fabricius Veiento which insulted senators and 
priests. 
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 E.g. Suet. Tib. 25 on unrest at Tiberius’ accession; Cass. Dio 57.4-7 on the mutiny in 
Pannonia; Tac. Ann. 2.39-40 on Clemens’ revolt.  
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suggests that informers brought charges opportunistically and Tiberius wrote to 
the consuls stating the principle that: 
[scripsit consulibus] non ideo decretum patri suo caelum, ut in 
perniciem civium is honor verteretur. … deorum iniurias dis 
curae.  
the deification of Augustus should not be used to the destruction 
of his countrymen … the gods must look to their own wrongs.128 
However, the position of the deified emperor did provide opportunities for 
prosecutors and Pliny goes as far as to allege that Tiberius deified Augustus in 
order to introduce maiestas charges.
129
 The SC de Cn. Pisone patre shows that 
this was a factor from early in the principate, as the charge includes defiling the 
numen of the deified Augustus.
130
 The puzzling case of Cremutius Cordus 
becomes more explicable if it represents the adjustment to the position of the 
deified emperor, since it concerned the prosecution of a work which Augustus 
had heard and praised.
131
 Suetonius and Tacitus agree the charge was excessive 
praise of Cassius and Brutus and Dio adds that Cremutius Cordus failed to praise 
Augustus and Tiberius sufficiently. It may be that praising Caesar’s assassins 
was interpreted as criticism of Augustus, Caesar’s heir, and that this was more 
serious in regard to the deified emperor than it had been of the living one. 
Cremutius Cordus committed suicide, his works were burnt and Dio tells us that 
the aediles sought out private copies. It was noted in the introduction that 
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 Tac. Ann. 1.73 3-4. 
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 Plin. Pan. 11.1. Tac. Ann. 2.50.2 reports that Tiberius distinguished between sacrilege against 
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Quintilian’s description of the later, bowdlerised version of the Annals suggests 
we should not overstate the work’s rehabilitation. Whatever brought Cordus to 
trial was clearly still unacceptable.
132
  
The emperor’s position is apparently complicated by his reply when the praetor 
sought clarification: 
Tiberius, consultante Pompeio Macro praetore an iudicia 
maiestatis redderentur, exercendas leges esse respondit.  
Tiberius, to an inquiry put by the praetor, Pompeius Macer, 
whether process should still be granted under this law (lex Julia 
de maiestate), replied that “the law ought to take its course”.133 
Tacitus presents Tiberius as the villain here, but if maiestas charges were 
rejected by the emperor in the senate, the praetor might reasonably wonder how 
he should proceed in his own court. Both Levick and Richardson suggest that the 
praetor’s question is about due process in the appropriate jury court.134 The 
senate sitting as a court of law was a new development under the principate and 
the SC de Cn. Pisone patre may shed light on the relationship between cases 
tried in the senate and those in the praetor’s court.135  The praetor is instructed to 
impose a penalty of aquae et ignis interdictio on Piso’s associates and Mackay is 
probably correct to assert that this amounts to little more than a courteous 
formula towards the praetor; the senate had made the actual decision.
136
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 Levick 1999: 191; Richardson 1997: 510. 
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 The constitutional basis of trials in the senate worries Robinson 1995: 8-9. Garnsey 1970: 25-
27 suggests that it arose through convenience for political cases or for elite defendants. 
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 SCPP vv 121-3. Mackay 2003: 355. For discussion of the legal technicalities, including 
whether or not the senate could convict equites see Mackay 2003. Richardson 1997 is concerned 
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The impact that maiestas prosecutions had upon freedom of speech will be 
explored further in chapter 4, as part of a wider discussion of the relationship 
between senate and emperor. The evidence presented here focusses upon legal 
processes, and sets the scene for future consideration. Charges of maiestas were 
mainly brought during Tiberius’ principate and those of Gaius, Nero and 
Domitian. They needed imperial approval and without such support, they fell 
into abeyance.
137
 The realities of imperial power are sometimes thinly veiled and 
the presence of the army must indicate explicit imperial approval, as for example 
when the Praetorian guard picketed Libo Drusus’ home and watched his suicide.  
Although maiestas charges needed imperial support, they were brought by 
individual senators against one another. The sources suggest that after the deaths 
of Germanicus and Drusus, Sejanus’ growing influence led to faction and a 
resulting increase in maiestas cases.
138
 Cremutius Cordus’ case provides an 
example of how this worked in practice, since Tacitus tells us that Sejanus’ allies 
brought the prosecution and Dio attributes it to his hostility. Further evidence of 
factionalism is shown as the accusers in one case themselves become victims of 
another intrigue. So Scaurus’ accusers fell victim to charges of bribery and 
Tacitus reports that Libo’s accuser over-reached himself and incurred the 
emperor’s wrath eight years after the trial. 139 Despite the dangers, there were 
good reasons for bringing a maiestas charge in the senate. In a quaestio court, 
charges had to be restricted to the provisions of the lex that set up that court. A 
trial in the senate offered the flexibility of combining charges normally heard in 
separate quaestiones and so for example Mamercus Aemilius Scaurus could be 
charged with magic and adultery with Livilla. A conviction for maiestas brought 
enormous rewards to the accusers – the outrageous methods used to lure Titius 
Sabinus into expressing hostility to the emperor would not have been worthwhile 
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 Examples of moderation and suppression of maiestas: Cass. Dio 66.19.1-3 on Titus. Cass. Dio 
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unless considerable profits were at stake. Moreover, maiestas allowed slaves’ 
evidence to be used. Informers could thus undertake a “fishing expedition” by 
including maiestas in charges brought before the emperor or consuls, then 
gathering evidence to support the claims.
140
  
The evidence suggests that maiestas charges have not moved very far from their 
politically ambiguous origin since entrapment of victims, excessive rewards and 
sycophantic thanksgiving must reflect imperial concern and approval.
141
 Cases 
heard by the senate, sitting as a jury, with the consuls presiding must therefore be 
understood within their political and factional circumstances.
142
 The precise legal 
process becomes less important than the pressure imposed by these particular 
political circumstances, and sometimes the sources show the senate under very 
great pressure indeed. Since the senate reacted to the emperor’s perceived 
agenda, producing an ad hoc reaction through a senatus consultum, our sources 
are not overly concerned with the exact legal nature of charges and penalties for 
defamation.  
1.7 The imperial sources 
The first case that touches on defamation in Augustus’ principate is that of C. 
Cornelius Gallus in about 26 BC. Although Gallus was a distinguished poet, it 
was not his literary work that got him into trouble. Appointed by Augustus to 
govern Egypt as prefect, it was alleged that he was insolent, disrespectful and 
self-aggrandising. Augustus’ response was not litigation but renuntiatio 
amicitiae. That Gallus was denied entrance to Augustus’ house and barred from 
entering imperial provinces illustrates the difficult position in which he now 
found himself. Although renuntiatio amicitiae was technically a private action, 
Augustus’ power and position meant that an impact on public life was inevitable. 
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The denial of imperial friendship had serious consequences for Gallus, because it 
made him vulnerable to faction within the senate. This pattern of a combination 
of imperial hostility and political faction leading to someone’s downfall is 
repeated again and again. For example, Tacitus attributes the downfall of Scaurus 
in 34 to the enmity of Q. Naevius Cordus Sutorius Macro. Macro’s denunciation 
of Scaurus’ tragedy angered Tiberius and paved the way for formal charges 
against him. The sources show that when someone knows that they have incurred 
imperial displeasure, they understand that they have no further recourse left; 
usually suicide is their only option.
143
 Renuntiatio amicitiae needs to be 
understood in its social as well as its legal context. Imperial displeasure had far-
reaching consequences because of the danger of disgrace by association. So for 
example Ovid recounts that his friends abandoned him and is worried that his 
books will no longer circulate even in private hands.
144
  
Ovid’s relegation to Tomis in AD 8 fits the same paradigm as renuntiatio 
amicitiae, even if the process was different. The nature of the offence is opaque, 
since Ovid blames carmen et error. However, since his Ars Amatoria was 
published at least eight years before, the delay in Augustus’ response is 
puzzling.
145
 The work certainly formed part of the charge since Ovid repeatedly 
defends himself against criticism and the edict banned his books from imperial 
libraries.
146
 The evidence from the exile poems must be used with caution since 
Ovid is writing to his own agenda and his sincerity is questionable, but the case 
does demonstrate that the decision was taken by the emperor alone. Ovid is 
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books: Tr. 1.1.109-118; 3.1.59-82. 
  
                                                                                         56 
 
explicit that no senatus consultum was issued and there was no special 
hearing.
147
 Ovid’s situation is also typical in that exile occurs because he fails to 
acquire patrons who can intervene with the emperor.
148
 The imperial sources 
show that the emperor’s decision affects all defamation cases and when there are 
acquittals, these are often due to direct intercession with the emperor. For 
example, in 23 C. Cominius was spared conviction through his brother’s 
intervention for composing a lampoon against the emperor and in 66 Curtius 
Montanus was spared execution for his libellous verses in deference to his father. 
On those occasions that someone is convicted, the defendant’s isolation is 
striking. For example Libo Drusus can find no one to act for him nor will anyone 
act as witness to Publius Anteius’ will until reassured by Tigellinus.149  
The evolving role of the emperor as the supreme patron in Roman society had 
serious implications for defamation and freedom of speech. This will require 
further consideration, but for now it should be noted that in December 69 
Vespasian legally defined the emperor’s position with regard to the law by the 
lex de imperio Vespasiani. Paragraph 6 of this law gave him the legal right to do 
whatever he thought necessary in the state’s interests.150 The extent to which this 
legislation was novel is unclear; both Gaius and Ulpian present similar 
formulations of the emperor’s position in relation to the law and Brunt suggests 
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Whatever the precise legal basis for it, by the third century, Dio describes the 
emperor’s situation as follows: 
λέλυνται γὰρ δὴ τῶν νόμων, ὡς αὐτὰ τὰ Λατῖνα ῥήματα λέγει: 
τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἐλεύθεροι ἀπὸ πάσης ἀναγκαίας νομίσεώς εἰσι καὶ 
οὐδενὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἐνέχονται. 
For [the emperors] have been released from the laws, as the very 
words in Latin declare; that is, they are free from all compulsion 
of the laws and are bound by none of the written ordinances.
152
 
The emperor’s attitude and the resulting reaction by contemporaries are therefore 
as influential in cases of defamation as the theoretical legal processes for dealing 
with iniuria and maiestas.
153
 This particularly affects defamation of the emperor 
himself. 
1.8 Penalties 
Gaius provides information about the penalties imposed on someone convicted of 
causing iniuria in the praetor’s court.154 The plaintiff sets his own value on the 
loss of dignity and upon conviction the iudex decides whether or not this is 
justified. The exception is for atrox iniuria when the praetor himself decided the 
appropriate penalty; the iudex technically has authority to reduce this sum but 
never does so in practice, in deference to the praetor. Moreover, Gaius portrays a 
legal system that changes and evolves, since his account is concerned to show 
that things are no longer the same as they were at the time of the Twelve Tables. 
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154
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This system provides financial compensation for the victim, taking into account 
the more serious nature of atrox iniuria. 
For cases heard by the quaestio court, the penalty (poena legis) would be fixed 
by the law which set up the court. There is however no consensus among 
scholars as to what exactly the poena legis was for the various maiestas laws 
after 103 BC. Cicero provides evidence that in the late Republic, maiestas carried 
the death penalty but the convicted person was allowed to leave Rome and take 
up residence and citizenship in an allied city.
 155
 However, the situation is 
confused by a passage in the Digest: 
Labeo existimabat capitis accusationem eam esse, cuius poena 
mors aut exilium esset.  
Labeo thinks that a prosecution is a capital case whether the 
penalty is death or exile.
156
 
Does this suggest that in the first century AD, a “capital penalty” included 
interdictio aquae et ignis (punishment that adversely affected the caput [life] of 
the convicted man) as well as execution? Levick argues that because maiestas 
related to the security of the Roman people, it always carried the death penalty 
which was commuted to exile by custom rather than by law.
157
 Others argue that 
exile was the legal penalty and that the emperors acted outside their powers when 
they imposed the death penalty for maiestas.
158
 
Tacitus provides evidence in the case of Clutorius Priscus in AD 21. It is not 
clear precisely what the charges against Priscus were, but they appear not to have 
been maiestas since Tacitus gives Manius Lepidus a speech which argues against 
the death penalty and for interdiction: 
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cedat tamen urbe et bonis amissis aqua et igni arceatur: quod 
perinde censeo ac si lege maiestatis teneretur.  
“Expel [Priscus] however, from Rome, confiscate his property, 
ban him from fire and water: this is my proposal, and I make it 
precisely as though he were guilty under the law of treason.” 159  
Levick discusses the obscurity of the charge and the correct interpretation of 
Tacitus’ grammatical construction in order to argue that this is not conclusive 
proof that interdictio aquae et ignis was the penalty for maiestas. Although 
detailed and closely argued, her approach highlights the difficulties encountered 
in attempting to assess the penalties for maiestas. It is the familiar one of the lack 
of clear evidence – we are reduced to best guesses about procedures, charges and 
penalties, using evidence from the historians which is not intended as a legal 
commentary.
160
 The sources portray a positive medley of penalties, which cover 
exile, imprisonment, and execution, usually pre-empted by suicide.
161
 They 
describe the confiscation of property, which is often used to reward informers, 
the suppression of the name or portraits of the convicted man, and the banning 
and burning of works. Not all these penalties are imposed on every occasion and 
decisions differ with individual cases. Tiberius’ ruling that informers were 
entitled to their rewards even after the defendant’s suicide both emphasises the 
seriousness of maiestas charges and provides incentive to bring them. The 
sources record that a defendant’s suicide should mean his property was retained 
for the family, although this was sometimes ignored in practice.
162
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The SC de Cn. Pisone patre lists the charges against Piso, including military 
treason and violating the numen of the deified Augustus.
163
 The senate says that 
the defendant’s suicide meant he escaped “the punishment he deserved” (i.e. 
execution) and adds penalties including a ban on the women of the family 
mourning his death, the abolition of the use of his praenomen and the removal of 
his statues and portraits.
164
 The senate’s decree confiscates Piso’s property, 
except for a land grant which is returned to imperial ownership. However, 




So far, the evidence accords with a modern understanding of penalties applied in 
accordance with a systematic legal process, so that the convicted man’s memory 
is suppressed and his estates confiscated. However, the inscription contains 
further information which challenges any conception that the senate applied 
penalties in such a way. Tiberius asked them: 
[senatum rettulit] qualis causa M. Pisonis visa esset, cui relationi 
adiecisset, uti precum suarum pro adulescente memor is ordo 
esset, (et) qualis causa Plancinae visa esset, pro qua persona, quid 
petisset et quas propter causas, exposuisset antea. 
how the case of M. Piso was regarded, to which item he added 
that this order should be mindful of his pleas on behalf of the 
young man; and how the case of Plancina was regarded for whom 
he had presented earlier his pleas and the reasons for them.
166
 
The senate do not fail to pick up this imperial hint about M. Piso and Plancina. 
When penalties are listed, it is recorded that the senate granted M. Piso immunity 
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and part of his father’s estate “in agreement with the humanity and restraint of its 
Princeps.”167 
The senate is as responsive to Tiberius’ hint about Plancina, and express 
themselves so delicately it is worth quoting in full: 
quod ad Plancinae causam pertineret, cui pluruma et gravissuma 
crimina obiecta essent, quoniam confiteretur se omnem spem in 
misericordia(m) principis nostri et senatus habere, et saepe 
princeps noster accurateq(ue) ab eo ordine petierit, ut contentus 
senatus Cn. Pisonis patris poena uxori eius sic uti M. filio 
parceret, et pro Plancina rogatu matris suae deprecari se et, quam 
ob rem et mater sua inpetrari vellet, iustissumas ab ea causas sibi 
expositas acceperit, senatum arbitrari et Iuliae Aug(ustae), optume 
de r(e) p(ublica) meritae non partu tantummodo principis nostri, 
sed etiam multis magnisq(ue) erga cuiusq(ue) ordinis homines 
beneficis, quae, cum iure meritoq(ue) plurumum posse(t) in eo, 
quod a senatu petere deberet, parcissume uteretur eo, et principis 
nostri summa(e) erga matrem suam pietati suffragandum 
indulgendumq(ue) esse remittiq(ue) poenam Plancinae placere.  
That as regards the case of Plancina, against whom many 
extremely serious charges had been brought, since she was now 
admitting that she placed all her hope in the mercy of our princeps 
and the senate, and our princeps has often and pressingly 
requested from this order that the senate be satisfied with the 
punishment of Cn. Piso senior and spare his wife as it spared his 
son M(arcus), and pleaded himself for Plancina at the request of 
his mother and had very just reasons presented to him by her for 
wanting to secure her request, the senate believes that to Iulia 
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Augusta (Livia), who had served the commonwealth superlatively 
not only in giving birth to our princeps but also through her many 
great favours towards men of every rank, and who rightly and 
deservedly could have supreme influence in what she asked from 
the senate, but who used that influence sparingly, and to the 
supreme piety of our princeps towards his mother, support and 
indulgence should be accorded and has decided that the 
punishment of Plancina should be waived.
168
 
The senate praise the princeps and his mother, laying emphasis on Livia’s virtue 
and Tiberius’ piety in responding to her wishes. Mackay suggests that this is 
done to obscure the harsher truth that the senate has conceded to Tiberius’ 
request for mercy for his mother’s friend.169 This ad hoc approach to applying 
penalties and their adjustment when the defendant had imperial support goes a 
long way towards explaining the variation in application and harshness of 
penalties for maiestas in the first century. It is not a matter of following and 




Pliny provides support for such flexibility in his account of the trial of Julius 
Bassus: 
quia scilicet et Macro legem intuenti consentaneum fuit damnare 
eum qui contra legem munera acceperat, et Caepio cum putaret 
licere senatui – sicut licet – et mitigare leges et intendere, non sine 
ratione veniam dedit facto vetito quidem, non tamen inusitato.  
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Macer, following the law, regarded it as appropriate to condemn 
one who had illegally accepted gifts, while Caepio, since he 
believed that the senate had the power (as in fact it has) both to 
soften and intensify the rigour of the law, had some justification in 
proposing pardon of an action which was admittedly forbidden, 
but was not without precedent.
171
  
It is illuminating that the forbidden but not unprecedented view prevails; both the 
SC de Cn. Pisone patre and Pliny’s letter show the importance of considering 
how legal process worked in practice rather than relying on theory. 
1.9 Burning and banning books  
The elder Seneca says that Labienus’ books were the first to be burned in a case 
of defamation, with Severus’ works following soon after.172 Tacitus has Cassius 
Severus as the first to suffer the penalty. Either way, that provides a date of 
around AD 8 for the first occasion when book burning was associated with 
defamation. Not only that, but Suetonius preserves evidence that works by 
Labienus, Severus and Cremutius Cordus were banned from being owned and 
circulated by order of the senate. Dio describes the aediles and magistrates 
hunting out and burning anonymous books in AD 6 and 12. Later in the century, 
Tacitus describes Domitian ordering the burning of works by Arulenus Rusticus 
and Herennius Senecio. The sources express unease about book burning. For 
example, Seneca condemns it, linking literature with glory and book burning 
with suppression.
173
 Anxiety is suggested by a popular topic in schools of 
declamation: Antony promises to spare Cicero’s life if he burns his writings: 
Cicero deliberates whether to do so.
174
 Tacitus uses it as an occasion for 
rhetorical grandstanding on tyranny, and its long term inability to suppress 
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 It is clear that book burning made a significant impact upon 
contemporaries. There is also evidence for works being banned from imperial 
libraries – Ovid uses the conceit of his book travelling to Rome and not finding 
its “brothers” on the library shelves.176 He returns to the theme in Tristia 3.14, 
probably addressed to the Palatine librarian Hyginus.  
As well as suppression of contemporary writings, Gaius is alleged to have 
considered destroying Homer’s poems and is described as “almost” removing the 
works of Virgil and Livy, along with their busts, from imperial libraries.
177
 
Suetonius presents this as evidence for his increasing megalomania, but 
Goodyear argues instead that he acted on literary grounds, due to his dislike of 
their style.
178
 This is plausible, and a reminder that the emperor’s influence 
extended beyond the legal sphere. There is other evidence for imperial tastes 
influencing what was produced: Starr suggests that under Tiberius there was a 
vogue for obscure didactic poetry by Euphorion, Rhianus and Parthenus.
179
 
Horsfall argues for the role of imperial libraries in giving books status, so that 
contemporary literary interests were actively guided by the inclusion of particular 
works.
180
 The likeliest explanation is that we should see literary considerations as 
separate from punitive burning or banning of books. Gaius’ threat to burn works 
he disliked thus becomes an extreme example of imperial interest in literature, 
rather than having legal implications.
181
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The situation is further complicated because a princeps could reverse his 
predecessor’s decision. This meant that previously offending works were allowed 
to be owned, circulated and read once more. Part of the problem of interpretation 
arises from the natural tendency to draw parallels between what the sources 
describe in Rome and book burning in early modern Europe. Although Kenney 
dismisses this comparison, because of the different mechanisms of censorship 
after the invention of the printing press, I would suggest that it is useful to note 
how widely levels of control and attempts to enforce censorship varied in the 
early modern era. This provides insight into the complicated forces that affect 
book burning and counters notions that it has a simple, single “political” cause.182 
So, for example, the Inquisition was not solely concerned with “censorship”: of 
approximately 1500 denunciations made at Venice, 800 were against 
“Lutheranism”, 35 against Anabaptists, 190 for magic, superstition or sorcery 
and 70 for Judaism. Only 150 or about 10% concerned the printing, selling or 
owning of prohibited books.
183
 Effective control required the co-operation of the 
secular authorities, and that depended upon how closely they wanted the support 
of the Church at the time. The Republic of Venice produced its own Catalogo in 
1549, listing banned works by 47 Protestant authors and a further hundred others, 
but that was not enforced. Since nobles were hostile to Rome and had personal 
loyalties to their friends, relations and clients, it was effectively worthless. In 
March 1559 the Republic of Venice decreed that the Inquisition was welcome to 
burn banned books, provided they bought them from the book-shops first. Soon 
after fears arose over the influence of home-grown heretics – an understandable 
sensitivity, since the religious wars currently ravaging France showed just how 
much damage that could inflict. At the same time, Venice experienced economic 
difficulties as the Ottoman Empire encroached on their eastern Mediterranean 
territories. This caused a change of heart, so that the Republic now wanted an 
alliance with the Pope. They therefore worked closely with the recently formed 
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Inquisition, enforcing pre-publication censorship, inspecting book-shops and 
homes, and destroying books banned by the Index Librorum Prohibitorum, first 
published in 1554 and revised subsequently.
184
 Towards the end of the century, 
as relations between Venice and the Pope soured, the situation was reversed. 
Events in Paris followed a similar pattern, and the impact of patronage to assist 
individual printers is, if anything, more marked. All these points – that book 
burning is affected by different vested interests, and by individuals’ differing 
concerns, thrives in difficult political situations and can change abruptly and 
without warning – provide parallels with the situation in the early Roman empire.  
The evidence also suggests that book burning in Rome was used as a form of 
social sanction.
185
 It was not just the burning, but the public display that 
mattered. The elder Seneca describes book burning as an “insult” (contumelia) 
and reports that seven of Scaurus’ orations were burnt by senatorial decree.186 He 
thinks this is no bad thing, and it was clearly never intended as total destruction, 
since he tells us that Scaurus’ works survive – “extant libelli”. This may perhaps 
refer to his notes before he worked up the speeches into published form. That 
destruction was only partial provides further evidence that book burning 
functioned as a disgrace rather than as a mechanism to suppress works entirely. 
Burning books to make a public point occurs when the Greek historian 
Timagenes destroyed his history of the princeps’ achievements in protest at his 
expulsion from Augustus’ house. Seneca preserves an account of Asinius Pollio 
taking him into his household, with Augustus’ permission: “‘fruere,’ inquit ‘mi 
Pollio, fruere!’”187 This is not the tone of an emperor who is seriously offended 
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and there seems to be posturing on both sides. None the less, Timagenes clearly 
intended burning his work to be a public expression of contempt for the emperor.  
This element of display is found in the account of Virgil wanting to have the 
Aeneid burnt, surely a genuine wish for the work to be destroyed and one which 
was overridden on the emperor’s orders.188 Ovid tells us that he himself burnt his 
Metamorphoses as he prepared for exile.
189
 He regrets this but hopes surviving 
copies will circulate. He even wishes he had burnt Ars Amatoria before it caused 
trouble.
190
 There are examples of correspondence being burnt so that it cannot be 
used for blackmail purposes. The sources praise this, even in the case of the 
freedman Narcissus, who is more usually treated with hostility.
191
 Ostentatious 
burning of records so that they cannot be used to anyone’s detriment makes a 
political point, that a new principate offers a fresh start.
192
 The sources are 
appalled if this is revealed as insincere, counting it as a sign of imperial saevitia 
when copies are preserved and later used to settle old scores.
193
 
Modern scholars have pointed out that in a society before the printing press, one 
surviving exemplar sufficed to provide further copies, so that book burning was 
not necessarily effective for the complete destruction of a work. There was no 
real way of policing who held copies, and little evidence of a desire to do so.
194
 
Where there is evidence of deliberate circumvention of bans – Cremutius’ 
daughter preserved his works and Fannia took Senecio’s books with her into 
exile – it comes from later sources, after the offending work has been 
                                                 
188
 Suet. Vita Vergili. 
189
 Ov. Tr. 1.7.15-40. 
190
 Ov. Tr.  5.12.66-8. 
191
Cass. Dio 61.34.5 on Narcissus burning correspondence. Cass. Dio 63.15 and Suet. Otho 10, 
Otho burns his correspondence to stop it falling into the wrong hands. Cass. Dio 67.11.1-2 Lucius 
Maximus burns Antoninus’ correspondence after his revolt against Domitian. 
192
 For example, Suet. Aug. 32.2 burns records of debts to the treasury to end blackmail. Calig. 
15.4, Gaius does the same, along with references to his family. Tac. Ann. 13.23 Nero has account 
books burned in the forum as a sign settlement of debts would not be demanded. 
193
 Suet. Calig.  30.2 the burning of records is revealed as a trick and the letters used as evidence. 
Cass. Dio 59.4.3, 6.3, 10.8, 16.3 refers to the same incident. Cass. Dio 60.4.5 Claudius really 
does destroy them. 
194
 Starr 1987; Kenney 1982. 
  
                                                                                         68 
 
rehabilitated. It is therefore positively biased towards praising them for “saving” 
the work. It may reasonably be questioned how far there was any real desire or 
ability to enforce a ban once a public book burning had been performed. Even 
Dio’s account of aediles at Rome and magistrates elsewhere hunting out 
Cremutius Cordus’ history for burning does not imply that this occurred on more 
than a single occasion in each town. There is no evidence for further efforts to 
prevent ownership and reading of the banned work, and it may be noted that this 
is not reported in the sources as the subject of denunciations. When treason 
charges could be brought for changing clothes near a statue of Augustus, or 
carrying a ring or coin stamped with his image into a privy or a brothel, the lack 
of evidence for possession of banned works forming grounds for charges 
suggests that it was not considered culpable.
195
 Tacitus has an acerbic evaluation 
of Veiento’s Codicilli which only enjoyed popularity while they were dangerous 
to possess, after they were banned and burned. Once they were freely available, 
they sank into obscurity.
196
 This strongly suggests that there was little effort at 
total suppression. 
The situation thus becomes clearer if book burning is seen as a way of making a 
public statement, which could be either positive or negative. To burn one’s own 
work or material that threatened others could be commendable. Book burning 
imposed by the senate and enforced by the aediles was a sign of disgrace. Being 
a defendant in court was considered humiliating and the penalties of losing 
property, exile, even death associated with condemnations for maiestas were 
disgraceful ones.
197
 In this context, burning the offending work was indeed a 
contumelia, as was removing books from libraries or forbidding them to be 
owned and circulated. However, this was not intended as a systematic attempt at 
suppressing the work, which explains why not all penalties were imposed on all 
occasions. Ovid’s depiction of imperial censure creating reluctance to read his 
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works and his fear that they will not circulate even in private hands is 
revealing.
198
 Public book burning and the banning of works from libraries and 
general circulation emphasised the author’s shame.  
In contrast with this, there are the relatively few reported occasions when all 
copies of a work were sought out – in Rome and the municipal cities – and 
systematic destruction took place. These seem to have been items that constituted 
a political threat. Astrology and magic were dangerous since horoscopes and 
omens were widely believed. Predictions of future power or an emperor’s death 
encouraged practical efforts to fulfil the prophecy. Augustus, in his role as 
Pontifex Maximus ordered over two thousand books of oracular writings to be 
burnt as early as 12 BC.
199
 Approved portions of the Sibylline books were 
retained, firmly under imperial control, in two gilded cases under the pedestal of 
the Palatine Apollo. Cramer thinks that Augustus acted in his capacity as 
Pontifex Maximus to obscure the political implications of his actions, but this is 
an unnecessary refinement.
200
 “Religious” prophecies threatened “political” 
unrest; Augustus was destroying works he considered detrimental to state 
security. Whether or not every copy was destroyed, he demonstrated their 
unacceptability and discouraged their retention and circulation. Similarly, 
evidence for anonymous pamphlets being sought out and destroyed suggests fear 
of a genuine threat to stability. 
Book burning and banning made a political statement, but they cannot have 
meant total suppression and in most cases were never intended to do so. The 
purpose was to display imperial disfavour and create conditions for social 
censure so that others were unwilling to openly possess, discuss, or circulate 
works. That it was so unsuccessful is partly due to elite reluctance to comply, at 
least in the cases that we know about, and to the ease of preservation.  
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Furthermore, rapid political changes meant that a work one emperor suppressed 
was rehabilitated under a successor as a gesture of reconciliation. The exception 
seems to have been anonymous pamphlets which were always suppressed with 
vigour. 
1.10 Conclusion 
The legal evidence shows that defamation was a form of iniuria and so 
constituted an attack on someone’s dignitas. The law allowed the victim to seek 
redress for the resulting disgrace in the praetor’s court. The plaintiff might even 
seek compensation for atrox iniuria if the offence took place in a public setting, 
or was particularly severe, or was inflicted by someone of lower status.  
Although it is probable that the praetor’s court continued to try defamation, the 
historical sources are more interested in cases giving rise to criminal charges and 
heard by the senate. This change in the way that defamation was dealt with 
during the first century AD is a logical development. Defamation has the 
potential to extend beyond one individual’s dignitas if it is made against 
prominent individuals or institutions. It becomes a criminal matter if it threatens 
the well-being of the state. Since the senate had flexibility to supplement existing 
laws from the time of Augustus onwards, it is probable that during Augustus’ 
principate a senatus consultum supplementary to Sulla’s law against physical 
assault provided for defamation. The assimilation of defamation with lex Julia de 
maiestate is an equally logical development because, like iniuria, maiestas 
relates to the dignitas of the plaintiff. Defaming someone of superior social status 
was considered particularly serious and maiestas specifically protected the 
dignity of Roman magistrates as agents of the populus.  
Defendants were exposed to more serious penalties if they were tried for 
maiestas. The evidence suggests that a number of factors, including whether or 
not the defendant had imperial support, determined the severity of the sanctions. 
The evidence has shown that the emperor’s perceived wishes were crucial to the 
course of trials in the senate; law, politics and the emperor’s position are not 
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distinct elements. This is why Augustus could extend the ambiguous maiestas 
charges to incorporate defamation and why prosecutors seeking their own 
advancement could exploit them at times of political faction.  
Sometimes modern authorities are inclined to be critical of what they see as a 
lack of precision in the historical sources, or even to suggest that the historical 
sources are misrepresentative of “proper” legal process. This should be 
approached cautiously because these sources were written by and for 
contemporary members of the Roman elite. As this chapter has shown, they 
represent an understanding of the law that differs from a western, twenty-first 
century perspective. So far as such an imaginative leap is possible, it would be 
wise to consider the evidence on its own terms rather than imposing modern 
expectations of due process. If discussion is based on what is known about the 
actual prosecutions for defamation, it provides a solid basis for considering the 
political, social and moral impact of events in the first century.  
Three key themes have emerged from considering the evidence for legal control 
of speech. The first is the need to evaluate the ancient sources on their own terms 
rather than imposing our own expectations of what happened or how control 
operated. Secondly, these sources emphasise the importance of relative social 
standing in Roman society. They show that defamation gave offence because it 
harmed the way in which someone was perceived and so damaged their status. 
This concept is found in the legal sources, which define degrees of iniuria and 
distinguish when it becomes atrox, but the idea is more pervasive. All the 
contemporary sources are deeply interested in relative social status, and the 
impact of insult or ridicule. The final theme that emerges is the role of patronage, 
especially imperial patronage. This underpins all the accounts of prosecutions for 
defamation, with an individual’s relationship with the emperor proving more 
important than strict legal processes. Those three themes – not second guessing 
our sources, considering relative social standing, and the role of patronage recur 
when attention is turned to other aspects of freedom of speech. The next two 
  
                                                                                         72 
 
chapters take these themes and consider the impact of social conventions on 
freedom of speech in early imperial Rome. 
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2: Social conventions and status anxiety among 
the Roman elite: obscenity, humour and licensed 
insult 
2.1 Introduction 
The evidence for what caused a member of the Roman elite to take offence is 
confusing and apparently contradictory. Seneca’s Apocolocyntosis is peppered 
with sexual and scatological jokes at the expense of the late emperor Claudius. 
Yet it was performed at Nero’s court and circulated thereafter. Satirical poems 
about the elite by Cassius Severus, Antistius Sosianus and Fabricius Veiento 
have not survived for comparison, but we know that these authors were 
relegated. Martial quotes an obscene poem by Augustus to justify his own use of 
“plain Latin”, but this same plain-speaking Augustus can be described as 
“disturbed” by Severus’ licentiousness and disrespectful poems.201 Imperial 
satirists condemn modern morals and manners, but are reluctant to identify 
influential contemporaries among their targets.
202
  
Modern scholars often formulate this problem in political terms.
203
 They point 
out that poets such as Juvenal and Martial depended upon their patrons and did 
not want to alienate them, while an elite Roman pursuing a public career needed 
support from his peers and seniors. However, it is not necessarily helpful to 
separate the “social” and “political” worlds of the Roman elite too completely. 
Poetry was recited at social occasions. Someone who wanted to achieve political 
office either had to win an “election” in the senate, or to be appointed by the 
emperor. This meant that candidates needed to cultivate the good opinion and 
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active support of others. So, for example, Pliny routinely writes letters 
recommending friends for office or canvassing on their behalf. 
204
 Accordingly, 
this chapter and the next will explore the social norms that governed polite 
speech among the Roman elite. This will provide a more complete context to 
discuss “political” freedom of speech in chapters 4 and 5.  
Chapter 1 demonstrated that offence was caused when someone felt that their 
status had been diminished, either through words or actions (contumelia, iniuria). 
Seneca’s theoretical discussion about anger confirms that this was an active 
concern in the competitive and highly status-conscious world of elite Roman 
society:  
videamus quid sit quod nos maxime concitet: alium uerborum, 
alium rerum contumeliae mouent; hic uult nobilitati, hic formae 
suae parci; hic elegantissimus haberi cupit, ille doctissimus; hic 
superbiae impatiens est, hic contumaciae; ille seruos non putat 
dignos quibus irascatur, hic intra domum saevus est, foris mitis; 
ille rogari iniuriam iudicat, hic non rogari contumeliam. 
Let us see what it is that especially irritates us. Some are enraged 
by insulting words, some by insulting actions. One man demands 
respect for his rank, another for his personal appearance. One 
wants a reputation for supreme elegance, another for supreme 
scholarship. Arrogance is unbearable to one man, obstinacy to 
another. One man does not think slaves worth his anger, another is 
fierce at home but mild outside. One man thinks it a disgrace to be 
asked for something, another finds it insulting not to be.
205
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the last sentence quoted. Here I follow the reading supplied by the Oxford Classical text (with 
apparatus criticus). iniuria provides a satisfying balance to contumelia here. 
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The philosopher Epictetus illuminates the importance usually attached to marks 
of honour such as official positions and dinner-party invitations, when he warns 
his students against setting too much store by social aspirations.
206
 These honours 
did not only concern the individuals involved, but informed wider social 
structures. Epictetus further recommends that his students should not be 
concerned with using their own position to help others.
207
 This is radical advice 
because such marks of approval were integral to elite society and status was 
negotiated and enhanced through signs of esteem. Lendon goes as far as to argue 
that Tiberius orchestrated the downfall of Sejanus through selective insult and 




The terms that the sources use to refer to someone’s status are auctoritas and 
dignitas. Auctoritas has a range of meanings related to the concepts of authority 
and influence, and is used particularly to denote influence upon others. It is a 
form of prestige, demonstrated by acknowledging that a particular person ought 
to be treated with deference. So, for example, when Otho advises his supporters 
to abandon him, Tacitus says: 
iuvenes auctoritate, senes precibus movebat. 
The young men he persuaded by his authority (auctoritas), the 
older by his appeals.
209
 
Otho’s auctoritas is a personal quality, which the iuvenes feel obliged to obey, 
but which is not sufficient to influence his seniors. The related term dignitas is 
used to denote worthiness of character. It can also be used to describe holding 
                                                 
206
 Epictetus, Manual 24, 25. 
207
 Epictetus, Manual  25. 
208
 Lendon 1997: 141-5. While this pushes the argument to an extreme level, Lendon’s examples 
show elite sensitivity to perceived insult and concern for saving face. 
209
 Tac. Hist. 2.48. The OLD gives thirteen distinct shades of meaning for auctoritas, all 
incorporating concepts of esteem, prestige, authoritativeness. 
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office, because esteem was conferred by position.
210
 These concepts share 
common ground as both denote the respect in which an individual is held by 
others. Their impact will be discussed further in section 3 below. Where 
translation is appropriate, auctoritas will be rendered as “authority” and dignitas 
as “status”.  
The cases discussed here mainly concern the elite because most of the evidence 
comes from literary sources written by and for the elite or their protégés.
211
 This 
means that the evidence is filtered through the perceptions of elite male authors, 
providing limited scope for extending the discussion to wider society. Discussion 
is complicated by the way that themes about offence overlap and interconnect in 
the primary sources. For example, satire reveals contemporary attitudes towards 
mockery, while the historical sources record actual exchanges – or at least claim 
that they do. In order to impose a coherent structure, the present chapter explores 
occasions when obscenities or insults might be acceptable to the elite. The 
following chapter will look at evidence for direct communication among the 
elite, and the strategies they employed for avoiding offence. It will also consider 
Roman attitudes to public and private communication and how those affected 
freedom of speech.  This investigation is made possible because, just as in the 
modern world, when the sources criticise someone’s words or actions, they 
reveal their underlying attitudes about what was not acceptable. Chapters 2 and 3 
form a complementary exploration of social conventions with regard to freedom 
of speech.   
This chapter begins with a brief analysis of the terms the Romans employ for 
discussing how freely someone may speak, libertas and licentia. It then supplies 
                                                 
210
 See e.g. Suet. Claud. 5.1 where Claudius abandons all hope of the dignity of office: tunc 
demum abiecta spe dignitatis ad otium concessit. The OLD has a mere four meanings for 
dignitas, the concept of someone showing distinction or worthiness. 
211
 Ruffell 2003 discusses abuse and invective among the Roman elite and argues that surviving 
literary invective is informed by less polished, popular material and jingles appearing as graffiti 
or popular chants. However, almost all the surviving evidence has been transmitted through elite 
sources, particularly historians. Graffiti and popular protest will be discussed in chapter 5.   
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an overview of the Roman elite and its systems of patronage, in order to provide 
a framework for the discussion that follows. It will examine evidence for the 
concept that insult was licensed at certain times, and contend that concern with 
status imposed constraints even on such occasions. It will suggest that strategies 
were employed to make problematic material acceptable to an elite audience and 
to avoid challenges to individual status. The final section will look at the problem 
posed by humour and ridicule, and consider how far ridicule in oratory and satire 
is affected by anxiety over status. It will argue that concern for the greater moral 
good could justify outspoken remarks.  
2.2 Libertas and licentia 
The two words that Roman authors use most often in discussing freedom of 
speech are libertas and licentia. The most basic meaning of libertas is freedom, 
or independence. This encompasses social, political and physical freedoms from 
slavery, oppression and captivity.
212
 Freudenburg argues that a native speaker 
perceived libertas as a combination of all these concepts of freedom. He suggests 
therefore that when libertas is used to describe speech, it is the frank and open 
speech which befits a free man, one of the defining features of the elite male.
213
  
Licentia is also defined as “freedom”, but is usually presented as a negative 
quality, resulting in a lack of restraint and disorderliness.
214
 Quintilian 
demonstrates this when he criticises those encouraging small children to be 
precocious: 
gaudemus, si quid licentius dixerint: verba ne Alexandrinis 
quidem permittenda deliciis risu et osculo excipimus. 
We rejoice if they say something over-free (licentius), and words 
which we should not tolerate from the lips even of a favourite 
                                                 
212
 Oxford Latin Dictionary. 
213
 Freudenburg 2001: 3-4. 
214
 Oxford Latin Dictionary. 
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Alexandrian slave (Alexandrinus delicius) are greeted with 
laughter and a kiss.
215
   
However, there appears to be potential for some confusion between whether 
someone was demonstrating libertas or licentia. The Oxford Latin Dictionary 
definition of libertas includes “excessive freedom” and “impertinence”, while the 
definition of licentia includes “freedom”. Wirszubski suggests that the distinction 
between libertas and licentia is one of self-control: “libertas untempered by 
moderation degenerates into licentia.”216 Wirszubski sees licentia as a failure to 
conform to the standards expected of a Roman citizen. In this interpretation, 
libertas can only be enjoyed under the law, and if uncontrolled, it becomes 
indistinguishable from licentia.
217
 Roller objects that defining libertas solely in 
political terms is too narrow an approach and that it is necessary to explore its 
broader social implications.
218
 He argues that a better understanding of libertas 
can be reached by examining the wider, metaphorical expressions employed to 
describe it. He looks particularly at examples where the sources discuss 
exchanges with an emperor, demonstrating that the elite “modelled” the 
emperor’s relationship with them in terms either of a master addressing a slave, 
or a father addressing a son.
219
 He concludes that libertas was a positive but 
vague term which meant “the (desirable) condition of not being a slave”.220 
Roller’s view is that “people with differing political interests provide differing, 
and even opposed, metaphorical structuring of political situations in terms of 
status and thereby attempt to impose different understandings of these political 
situations.”221 This means that libertas has a static meaning, and only seems to 
shift.  
                                                 
215
 Quint. Inst. 1.2.7. 
216
 Wirszubski 1950: 1-7. 
217
 Wirszubski 1950: 7-17. 
218
 Roller 2001: 219. 
219
 Roller 2001: 213-287. 
220
 Roller 2001: 228. 
221
 Roller 2001: 228. His conclusion that the metaphor used to describe libertas changes rather 
than the meaning of the word itself remains confusing. The fact that different metaphors may be 
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These different arguments reveal a real difficulty of interpretation. The 
contemporary sources suggest that this is not a modern phenomenon, and that 
distinguishing libertas from licentia was an active concern for the Roman elite. 
The elder Seneca characterises the Greek historian Timagenes, who was expelled 
from Augustus’ friendship, as “a man of acid tongue, and over free (nimis liber) 
with it”.222 He also shows that libertas taken to excess becomes problematic, 
when he describes the outspoken orator Titus Labienus: 
libertas tanta, ut libertatis nomen excederet, et, quia passim 
ordines hominesque laniabat, Rabienus vocaretur.  
His freedom of speech (libertas) was so great that it passed the 
bounds of freedom and because he savaged all ranks and men 
alike, he was known as Rabienus.
223
 
When libertas is taken to such an extent, the implication is surely that “licentia” 
should be applied instead. Tacitus provides further evidence of tension in 
defining libertas and licentia when he has Maternus say in the Dialogus: 
 est magna illa et notabilis eloquentia alumna licentiae, quam 
stulti libertatem vocabant, comes seditionum, effrenati populi 
incitamentum, sine obsequio, sine severitate, contumax, temeraria, 
adrogans, quae in bene constitutis civitatibus non oritur. 
There is that great and famous oratory which is a foster-child of 
licence, which foolish men called liberty, an associate of sedition, 
a goad for the unbridled populace. It owes no allegiance to any. 
                                                                                                                                    
used – and understood – would seem rather to imply that libertas can change with differing 
contexts.  
222
 Sen. Controv. 10.5.22. [homo] acidae linguae et qui nimis liber erat puto quia diu non fecerat. 
Seneca implies that as an ex-slave, Timagenes was over-compensating in his outspokenness. 
223
 Sen. Controv. 10.pr.5.  N.b. also Hor. Sat. 2.8.35-8 where heavy drinkers are too freely 
abusive – maledicant liberius. 
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Devoid of discipline, it is insulting, offhand and overbearing, and 
does not flourish in a well-regulated constitution.
224
  
Tacitus and Seneca do not perceive a problem with libertas or licentia in 
themselves, but in the failure to correctly identify them. This is a dangerous and 
destabilising misuse of libertas, an idea which Tacitus entertains elsewhere.
225
 
This presentation may be complicated by Tacitus’ irony, but for his remarks to 
make sense, there has to be a believable, underlying possibility that licentia may 
be mistaken for libertas. Since the two terms are not absolutes, they are subject 
to change and renegotiation depending on particular circumstances. There is 
therefore a risk that a small misjudgement will lead to a remark being 
misconstrued by its audience. Quintilian makes this explicit: 
multum refert etiam quae sit persona suadentis, quia, ante acta vita 
si inlustris fuit aut clarius genus aut aetas aut fortuna adfert 
expectationem, providendum est ne quae dicuntur ab eo qui dicit 
dissentiant. at his contraria summissiorem quendam modum 
postulant. nam quae in aliis libertas est, in aliis licentia vocatur, 
et quibusdam sufficit auctoritas, quosdam ratio ipsa aegre tuetur.  
The personality of the adviser also makes a lot of difference. If his 
illustrious past, his noble family, his age, or his fortune raises 
expectations, we must take care that what is said is not out of 
keeping with the man who says it. The opposite situation requires 
a humbler tone. For what is called liberty in some is called 
licence in others and while some need nothing but their personal 
                                                 
224
 Tac. Dial. 40.2.  
225
 E.g. Tac. Hist. 2.10.1, Agr. 2. 
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Deciding whether someone is demonstrating licentia or libertas depends not only 
on what is said, but upon who is speaking. To add to the confusion, the sources 
do not present fixed rules, but rather a kaleidoscope of potential variations. This 
explains why there is such difficulty in defining the terms: employing libertas 
without causing offence depended upon assumptions which were not made 
explicit. The Roman elite would assimilate these as they matured and took their 
place as adult members of society. This fluidity is reflected elsewhere, with 
regard to remarks which are venustus (“said with grace and charm”) and urbanus 
(using urbane wit, but not laughable), both of which are approved in the 
sources.
227
 Quintilian paraphrases part of Domitius Marsus’ treatise De 
Urbanitate, which emphasises that the characteristics of urbane wit are elegance, 
sophistication and the amusement it provides for its audience.
228
 However, 
Quintilian challenges earlier authorities and concludes that urbanus is only truly 
represented through absences: absences of discordance, rusticity, disorder, or of 
anything foreign in one’s judgement, speech, expression or posture.229 It is 
something that is frequently and favourably commented upon, and breaches are 
criticised.
230
 Yet it is so intrinsic and so instinctively recognised by a Roman 
audience that it is difficult to articulate the concept.  
                                                 
226
 Quint. Inst. 3.8.48 (my emphasis). This idea is widely encountered, for example Quint. Inst. 
8.5.8: quis enim ferat puerum aut adulescentulum aut etiam ignobilem si iudicet in dicendo et 
quodam modo praecipiat? See also 4.1.6-7.  
227
 Quoted Quint. Inst  6.3.17-21. E.g. Tac. Dial. 26.5. Petron. Sat. 52.7 is a sarcastic usage since 
Trimalchio falls short through vulgar excess: cum dixisset Agamemnon: “pauper et dives inimici 
erant.” ait Trimalchio “quis est pauper?” “urbane” inquit Agamemnon. 
228
 Quint. Inst. 6.3.101-122. N.b. Quint. Inst. 6.3.18: venustum esse quod cum gratia quadam et 
venere dicatur apparet. 
229
 Quint. Inst. 6.3.107. For examples about tone see Inst. 1.5.9, for dress Inst. 11.3.137-44, for 
rusticity and foreign words Inst. 8.1.2, 2. 1, for gestures Inst. 11.3.65-136. 
230
 For example, Sen. Controv. 7.pr.3-4 Albicius indulging in vulgar expressions to ape 
sophistication; Quint. Inst. 8.4.8. Antony vomiting in the forum; Sen. Controv. 7.4.7 Pompey 
scratching his head with one finger. 
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The Roman elite themselves struggled to express the subtleties of polite speech. 
It is therefore not surprising that modern scholars find it difficult to reconstruct 
the protocols of an unfamiliar and historic culture. Rather than imposing a 
definition where the contemporary sources do not, it would perhaps be wiser to 
accept that libertas is a positive quality – the free speech of a free man. Licentia 
is a negative one, reflecting inappropriate and immoderate speech. These were 
not absolutely fixed characteristics, because the hierarchical nature of Roman 
society meant that the status of the speaker impacted upon how his remarks were 
interpreted, creating the danger that libertas might be mistaken for licentia. 
2.3 Overview: the Roman elite and systems of patronage 
Elite Roman society consisted of a tiny minority of wealthy male citizens, 
essentially the equestrian and senatorial class, though there was considerable 
fluidity between these ranks.
231
 Saller argues that the Romans thought that the 
ideal official and the ideal aristocrat shared the same characteristics. This meant 
that perceived “good character” was essential to gain office, while the fact of 
holding the office bestowed proof of someone’s worth, creating a powerful link 
between social prestige and political influence.
232
 Good character depended not 
upon how someone assessed their own worth, but upon how others judged them. 
Quintilian suggests harnessing gossip to support a court case because this 
affected how someone was perceived.
233
 Status was accrued in various ways, 
such as high birth, an illustrious hometown, offices held, wealth, possessions and 
deportment, but it was not an intrinsic quality. “Honour was mediated through 
the perceptions of others, and even a superfluity of worthy qualities was of no 
use unless these qualities were known and approved by other aristocrats.”234 So 
for example, when Plutarch or Quintilian counsels the student on how to behave 
                                                 
231
 For a discussion of how the Roman elite was constituted see Edwards 1993: 12-17; 
MacMullen  1974: 89-120; Winterling 2009: 17-25. 
232
 Saller 1982: 96-121; Lendon 1997: 17-29 presents a similar argument. 
233
 Quint. Inst.  5.3.  
234
 Lendon 1997: 36-9. Lendon assumes the existence of censorship, without discussing the 
implications. 
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at a lecture, they are concerned with how his remarks and demeanour will be 
perceived by the audience.
235
 These social judgements affected a young man’s 
career, and failure to follow the appropriate codes of behaviour risked damaging 
his reputation. It is for this same reason that Quintilian is so concerned that the 
young orator should behave with due dignity, not pulling faces or making off-
colour jokes.
236
 Dress, appearance, gesture and tone must always be suitable for 
maintaining reputation, and although vehemence, passion even, are quite 
acceptable, at all times dignity must be maintained.
237
 The quality of the speaker 
was judged, as well as the quality of the speech. Prestige and moral reputation 
reinforced one another and affected how someone’s words were received:  
plurimum tamen ad omnia momenti est in hoc positum, si vir 
bonus creditur.  
If [the orator] is believed to be a good man (vir bonus), this will 
exercise the strongest consideration at every point of the case.
238
 
An elite Roman negotiated social relationships through a network of friends, who 
acted as brokers for communicating with other people. Plutarch suggests that one 
of the duties of a true friend is to perform introductions and Pliny’s letters show 
this in practice. For example he recommends Voconius Romanus to Priscus. 
Romanus’ background, literary talents and admiration for Pliny are cited as proof 
of good character.
239
 Lendon argues that the elite negotiated their friendships 
through a “network of honouring” and that they used praise as a form of 
“currency” in social interaction.240 Saller expresses similar ideas, arguing that 
honours formed part of a system of exchange and influence.
241
 Pliny’s letters 
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 E.g. Plut. On Listening 13, 15; Quint. Inst. 2.2.9-13. 
236
 Quint. Inst.  6.3.28-30. Cic. De or.  2.61-71 expresses very similar concepts. 
237
 See for example Quint. Inst. 9.2.76-7; 10.1.9. 
238
 Quint. Inst. 4.1.7. 
239
 Plut. Adulator 24; Plin. Ep. 2.13. 
240
 Lendon 1997: 23, 57-100.  
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 Saller 1982: 41, 69. 
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demonstrate that the Roman elite dealt with “friends” who were superiores, 
pares or inferiores as well as with lesser clients.
242
 There was fine gradation in 
client–patron relationships, so that every member of the elite could place not 
only himself, but everyone he spoke with in a hierarchy of relative standing.
243
 
Transgressors were rebuffed: the elder Seneca describes Julius Caesar awarding 
equestrian status to the mime Laberius at the games. As Laberius went to sit in 
the seats assigned to the equites the others huddled up so as not to admit him. 




Edwards discusses elite Roman concepts of immorality, and suggests that vices 
such as incontinentia (lack of self-control, especially in sexual relationships), 
mollitia (effeminacy, luxuriousness), dishonesty and cowardice were perceived 
as a threat to society. This made them a legitimate target for criticism, which was 
designed to reinforce social norms and protect the elite as a whole from dangers 
posed by deviance.
245
 This in turn may help to explain why particular speakers 
are treated in particular ways. For example, Seneca’s description of Titus 
Labienus shows reluctant admiration for someone who was very poor, very 
notorious, very hated:  
magna autem debet esse eloquentia, quae invitis placeat, et cum 
ingenia favor hominum ostendat, favor alat, quantam vim esse 
oportet, quae inter obstantia erumpat! nemo erat, qui non, cum 
homini omnia obiceret, ingenio multum tribueret.  
                                                 
242
 E.g. senior friends such as Vestricius Spurrina, Ep. 3.1 or Rufus Corellius Ep. 9.13, equals 
such as Tacitus, Ep. 1.6, 4.13, 8.7, lesser friends such as Septicius Clarus Ep. 1.15 or Suetonius 
Ep. 5.10. 
243
 See Saller 1982: 8-14 and 1989 for status in Roman friendships. 
244
 Sen, Controv. 7.3.9. The text is corrupt, but the sense of the anecdote remains clear. 
245
 Edwards 1993. Corbeill 1996 presents a similar argument about invective used with moral 
force to rebuke alleged deviance. See also Lendon 1997: 40-55 and Langlands 2006: 18-29 for 
similar concepts. 
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Great indeed must be the eloquence that pleases even the 
reluctant; and since it is the favour of men that marks out genius, 
their favour that nourishes it, how great must be the force that can 
burst through all obstacles to its course! There was no one who 




Seneca’s evaluation is concerned not with Labienus’ qualities, but with how 
others judged them. This separation of Labienus’ talent from his moral worth is 
unusual.
247
 More commonly an explicit link is made between someone’s good 
conduct and their moral attitude. For example, Pliny describes an anonymous 
person who has spoiled secret ballot papers with jokes and obscenities: 
quid hunc putamus domi facere, qui in tanta re tam serio tempore 
tam scurriliter ludat, qui denique omnino in senatu dicax et 
urbanus et bellus est? 
What conduct may we not consider him capable of at home when 
he plays such disgraceful jokes in a matter of such importance and 
at such a serious moment, one who, in short, in the senate of all 
places is such a smart and elegant and fine fellow?
248
 
Pliny assumes that behaviour at home and in public reflect one another and 
reveal someone’s moral character – or its lack.  
There is little further evidence about Labienus’ reputation, but parallels may be 
drawn with others who rose from humble birth to great wealth, fame and 
influence because of their oratorical ability. In the Dialogus, Aper describes the 
fame and fortunes of Eprius Marcellus and Vibius Crispus, and adds:  
                                                 
246
 Sen. Controv.10. pr.4.6. 
247
 Tac. Dial. 25.5 provides another instance of this. Messalla criticises Republican orators for 
revealing mutual hostility in their letters: non est oratorum vitium, sed hominum. However, it 
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nam quo sordidius et abiectius nati sunt quoque notabilior 
paupertas et angustiae rerum nascentes eos circumsteterunt, eo 
clariora et ad demonstrandam oratoriae eloquentiae utilitatem 
inlustiora exempla sunt, quod sine commendatione natalium, sine 
substantia facultatum, neuter moribus egregius, alter habitu 
quoque corporis contemptus, per multos iam annos potentissimi 
sunt civitatis ac, donec libuit, principes fori, nunc principes in 
Caesaris amicitia agunt feruntque cuncta atque ab ipso principe 
cum quadam reverentia diliguntur.   
The lower and meaner their birth, the more notorious the poverty 
and the straitened means amid which their life began, the more 
famous and brilliant are they as examples to show the efficacy of 
an orator’s eloquence. Without the recommendation of birth, 
without the support of riches, neither of the two distinguished for 
virtue, one even despised for the appearance of his person, they 
have now for many years been the most powerful men in the state, 
and, as long as it suited them, they were the leaders in the courts. 
At this moment, as leading men in the emperor’s friendship they 
carry all before them, and even the leading man himself of the 
State esteems and almost reverences them.
249
 
This is not to be taken at face value, since Aper is arguing for the advantages of 
an oratorical career, and demonstrating its practical rewards. Mayer notes that the 
strong language of sordidus and abiectus may simply mean that they are novi 
homines and draws parallels with Tacitus’ observations on Cassius Severus’ 
sordida origo and Juvenal’s description of a good orator of low birth.250 
However, behind this, the reader may still detect Tacitus’ disapproval of Eprius 
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 Tac. Dial. 8.1-3, quoted 3. 
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 Mayer 2001: 109-112 referencing Tac. Ann. 4.21.3 and Juv. 8.47-9. 
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Marcellus, and Mayer finds the phrase neuter moribus egregius “damning”.251 
This is because it undercuts Cato’s maxim that an orator should be vir bonus 
dicendi peritus.
252
 Aper’s remarks emphasise that disadvantages of birth, 
character and appearances may be mitigated by material success and political 
influence, but they are not forgotten. Perceived character remained of the utmost 
importance for forming the elite’s judgement and oratorical talent alone is not 
enough.  
This puts Labienus in a difficult position: he lacks moral authority because others 
have a poor opinion of him. Seneca reveals this when he criticises him for only 
declaiming in private. Seneca claims that this was then the usual custom, but 
adds that Labienus himself considered public performances shameful and 
boastful.
253
 This is not in itself surprising, since the Roman elite distinguished 
performances before an invited audience from less prestigious theatrical 
performances. This was particularly the case when reading poetry.
254
 However, 
this is not the problem here, as Seneca continues:  
adfectabat enim censorium supercilium, cum alius animo esset. 
 
For he pretended to the severity of the censor, though his  
character was quite other.
255
 
                                                 
251
 E.g. Tac. Ann. 16.21-29 describes Eprius Marcellus persuading Nero to allow Thrasea Paetus 
and Barea Soranus to be charged with maiestas, then terrorising the senate, and cannot be 
anything other than hostile. 
252
 Mayer 2001: 112 cross references this with Plin. Ep. 4.7.5 where Pliny describes Regulus as 
vir malus dicendi imperitus. The importance of the orator’s good character will be discussed 
more fully in section 2.5.1. 
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 Sen. Controv. 10. pr.4. 
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 For the development of recitatio, see for example Markus 2000. She summarises ancient 
attitudes and modern theories, emphasising the distinction between formal recitatio and informal 
performance. Habinek 1998: 103-121 discusses “writing as social performance” and argues that 
the tension between writing and performance gave performance prestige, so that recitation 
enhanced elite status. 
255
 Sen. Controv. 10. pr.4. 
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This reveals an unexpected charge: hypocrisy. Labienus was pretending to the 
“good” elite qualities of modesty and decorum, but the judgement of his peers 
did not accord with his own. A further anecdote reinforces the fragility of his 
social standing: when Labienus was reciting his history, he rolled up part of the 
scroll, refusing to have it read until after his death. Seneca is appalled: 
quanta in illis libertas fuit, quam etiam Labienus extimuit. 
How great must have been their outspokenness if even Labienus 
was frightened of it!
256
 
However, although Labienus avoids giving offence by appearing to self-censor 
the work, his obviousness underlines rather than diminishes the problem and 
emphasises his non-conformity. That this was maladroit is shown by another 
account of how such self-censorship should have been handled: 
recitaverat quidam verissimum librum, partemque eius in alium 
diem reservaverat. ecce amici cuiusdam orantes obsecrantesque, 
ne reliqua recitaret. … et ille quidem praestitit quod rogabatur — 
sinebat fides – liber tamen ut factum ipsum manet manebit 
legeturque semper, tanto magis quia non statim. incitantur enim 
homines ad noscenda quae differuntur.  
Someone had been reciting a most truthful account, and had held 
back part of it for another time. Would you believe it, but friends 
of a certain individual came begging and pleading with him not to 
read out the rest… The performer granted the request, as his good 
faith allowed, but the written word, like the events themselves, 
remains and will remain to be read for all time and all the more 
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for not being read there and then; for men are roused to discover 
facts reserved for the future.
257
 
The differences are striking. Pliny does not name and shame the “certain 
individual” or his friends (although we may presume their identities were 
generally known). He describes the account as truthful and the initial delay is due 
to time constraints, not fear of giving offence. It is suppressed because of 
graceful capitulation after the culprit’s friends intervene, showing the network of 
friendship and obligation that underpins elite society. Pliny’s final point is 
laboured: this is not self-censorship because the written word survives. It will be 
sought out, not for motives of vulgar curiosity, but because people want to know 
the truth.  
There is no indication that friends affected Labienus’ decision to omit his 
material. This isolation is striking and Titus Labienus emerges as someone who 
does not fit in with or follow the rules of elite communication. His background 
and behaviour do not conform to the expected standards and his attempts to 
demonstrate good character are judged to be pretence. As a result, he lacks moral 
authority. His case demonstrates how far the bad opinion of the elite was to be 
feared and avoided, since a good reputation reflected through praise was essential 
for social success. These unwritten rules inform elite communication and create a 
situation where insult threatens reputation and damages social status.  
                                                 
257
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2.4 Obscenity 
2.4.1 Conflicting evidence and attitudes 
Roman attitudes to obscenity are difficult to decipher. Cicero has Antonius 
condemn indecent remarks (obscenitas) as “not only degrading to a public 
speaker, but hardly sufferable at a gentlemen’s dinner party”.258 Quintilian and 
Plutarch show that these views continued into the principate, while the younger 
Seneca believes that indecent language brought on an involuntary blush of 
shame.
259
 This is a motif that recurs: Domitian’s ruddy complexion was regarded 
as a mark of his shamelessness, while modest blushes revealed innate decency of 
character.
260
 Cicero, Quintilian and the elder Seneca all advise great care in 
approaching obscene topics. Quintilian advises avoiding them altogether and if 
this is not possible, using a periphrasis.
261
 
On the other hand, obscenity and abuse occurred as part of the ritual at weddings, 
funerals or triumphal processions.
 
 Obscene elements – sexual and scatological 
themes – occur in Latin literature, especially satire and epigram. Writing epigram 
was a diversion enjoyed by the most eminent men. Augustus not only had Greek 
epigrammatists among his household, but could extemporise obscene verses that 
capped their best efforts.
262
 Anecdotes appear in the historical sources, such as 
Suetonius’ account of the Roman elite racing from a public lavatory in response 
to Lucan’s scatological joke at Nero’s expense.263 When Quintilian disapproves 
of encouraging small children to use indecent language, these children are 
repeating obscenities heard in their homes.
264
 There is also evidence of insult 
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How should these apparent contradictions in attitudes be explained? It is difficult 
to reconstruct an individual’s sense of humour and tolerance at such a distance, 
but there is some evidence that attitudes were less forbearing under the 
Flavians.
266
 Ummidia Quadratilla, in her late seventies, was still enjoying the 
gaming and pantomime performances which were fashionable when she was a 
young woman, but considered neither diversion suitable for her grandson.
267
 
Differing personal sensitivities to obscenity may also be reflected in poems 
written for patrons. For example, Pliny quotes a poem in which Martial praises 
his devotion to study during the day. It warns the visitor to approach Pliny’s 
house only in the evening, when it is time for even Catos to relax.
268
 Pliny’s 
pride is palpable – he is able to “remember” the poem and quote it to Paternus – 
showing that Martial struck the right tone and pleased this particular patron.  
Confusion about the origin of the word obscenus among the Romans themselves 
may perhaps have arisen because obscene material was performed on stage at the 
Floralia, and in the Atellan farces, which were Oscan in origin. Varro makes a 
direct connection between obscenus and scaena (stage) and Pompus Festus 
suggests a link with the Oscans.
269
 However, as Richlin points out, Festus later 
contradicts himself. Noting that Verrius had made the same association between 
obscenus and the Oscans, he adds: 
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quod verum esse non satis adducor, cum apud antiquos omnis fere 
obscena dicta sint, quae mali ominis habebantur.
270
 
But I am not quite convinced that this is true, since among almost 
all the ancients things were said to be “obscene” that were 
considered of ill-omen. 
In fact, obscenus is commonly found with the meaning of “boding ill, 
unpropitious, ill-omened”.271 Richlin therefore argues that this should be 
understood as the primary meaning of obscenus. She believes that it refers to 
things considered “of ill-omen and that it applies to sexual and scatological 
material along with other things perceived as unclean, and that this meaning 
extends into the world of literature … . Fittingly, the obscene area has its own 
bards and its own poetry”.272   
This idea that obscene material stands apart and is appropriate for certain people 
at certain times sits well with the evidence of poets echoing the language of 
religious ceremony when they warn their audience to keep away if they are not 
suited to the themes of the poem.
273
 Obscene material was accepted at some 
celebrations, and it is generally agreed that Seneca’s Apocolocyntosis was 
composed for recital at the Saturnalia festival of 54 and preserved because of the 
imperial connection.
274
 Nauta believes that some of Martial’s poetry is similar in 
kind. It was normal for a client to give a Saturnalia gift to his patron and books, 
self-composed or not, made particularly suitable presents.
275
 Nauta argues for 
close links between behaviour at the Saturnalia, and at a dinner party 
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(convivium). He suggests that the Saturnalia was an extended and radicalised 
convivium and that both shared features such as rules for drinking and the 
appointment of a rex to impose forfeits on the diners. In this interpretation, 
abusive and obscene poetry is allowed in the context of permitted licence. 
Saturnalia and convivia will be further discussed in the next section, and both 
will be referred to as “festival occasions”. 276  
Richlin makes the further suggestion that there is a link between the unclean, ill-
omen and obscenity. Roman reluctance to use explicitly obscene language arises 
because it was perceived to “stain” the speaker’s mouth by association. 277 This 
dislike of something considered “dirty” or “nasty” pervades the sources – for 
example Martial’s jokes about unpleasant kisses or perfume used to camouflage 
unpleasant odours are forceful enough for one author to describe him as 
“obsessed” with “sexual smells, disgusting genitalia and … physical deformities 
in both sexes”.278 It also explains why the evidence about obscenity is so hard to 
interpret: this preoccupation with what is clean and unclean extends beyond 
clearly defined, rational boundaries into something far more primitive, instinctive 
and uncontrollable. Obscene material will not necessarily lead to a fully rational 
response and while variation in an individual’s reaction will, of course, be in 
accordance with the wider social conventions, this too helps to explain seeming 
anomalies in what was considered offensive and the response to it. 
2.4.2 Festival and permitted licence 
Festivals with licensed free speech and reversal (or “inversion”) of social roles 
are common to many cultures.
 279
 Mikhail Bakhtin believed that festival 
occasions – which he calls carnival – gave rise to a special kind of 
communication because normal taboos and hierarchical distinctions were ignored 
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 This has common ground with anthropological theories, 
especially those pioneered by Victor Turner. Turner suggests that during festival 
occasions and rites of passage hierarchies are not functioning in their usual 
way.
281
 As a result, people speak more openly. Turner sees this as an ongoing 
and essential process for maintaining social norms and hierarchies in everyday 
life. There are certainly elements in Roman society that fit these broader 
anthropological models.
 
When obscenity and abuse occur at weddings, funerals 
or triumphal processions, this is usually interpreted as licensed, aggressive, often 
humorous, and functioning as a method of reinforcing norms of morality and 
behaviour.
 282
 Social inversion formed part of the Saturnalia festival, celebrated 
in mid December. However, Bakhtin’s theory of a direct link between Roman 
Saturnalia and medieval carnival is now discredited, and there are further 
problems, since he makes assertions without evidence. The political context of 
his work must be remembered, since his aim was to criticise Stalinism.
 283
 
Bakhtin and other commentators celebrate festival occasions as opportunities for 
renewal and revival, but this should not blind us to the particular concerns that 
festival occasions caused for members of the Roman elite.
 284
 These focus on the 
potential for damage to social status. The sources show that abusive language 
could be expected at convivia from slaves, dinner-party wits (scurrae), lewd 
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dancers (cinaedi) and buffoons (moriones).
285
 There are also examples of guests 
who courted popularity by insulting others.
286
 Insult need not be verbal, since the 
host might invite someone in order to make them look foolish.
287
 Suetonius’ 
account of Claudius’ experiences before he became emperor shows how insult 
might function at a dinner party:  
nam et si paulo serius ad praedictam cenae horam ocurrisset, non 
nisi aegre et circuito demum triclinio recipiebatur, et quotiens post 
cibum addormisceret, quod ei fere accidebat, olearum aut 
palmularum ossibus incessebatur, interdum ferula flagrove velut 
per ludum excitabatur a copreis. solebant et manibus stertentis 
socci induci, ut repente expergefactus faciem sibimet confricaret. 
If he came to dinner a little after the appointed time, he took his 
place with difficulty and only after making the round of the 
dining-room. Whenever he went to sleep after dinner, which was a 
habit of his, he was pelted with the stones of olives and dates, and 
sometimes he was awakened by the jesters with a whip or cane, in 
pretended sport. They used also to put slippers on his hands as he 
lay snoring, so that when he was suddenly aroused he might rub 
his face with them.
288
  
This makes uncomfortable reading for a modern audience, who may find they 
agree with Epictetus when he asks whether it is worth enduring a meal for the 
prospect of advancement.
289
 In fact, Epictetus is disingenuous, because the 
Roman elite had little choice about whether they should attend convivia. For 
those, like Claudius, who were invited to an imperial banquet, refusal was not an 
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option. Convivia provided essential opportunities for social and political 
advancement. Suetonius describes Tiberius appointing a young man of obscure 
family to the quaestorship for drinking an amphora of wine at a convivium. This 




Convivia had considerable impact upon determining relative social status. This 
created anxiety over whether guests would be treated appropriately, and fear that 
status would be diminished. For example, the author of the Laus Pisonis praises 
his patron’s behaviour towards his clients: 
nulla superborum patiuntur dicta iocorum,  
nullius subitos affert iniuria risus:  
unus amicitiae summos tenor ambit et imos.  
rara domus tenuem non aspernatur amicum  
raraque non humilem calcat fastosa clientem. 
 
They do not wince under any witticisms of overbearing jests: no 
man’s grievance furnishes material for sudden laughter. A 
uniform tenor of friendship encompasses highest and lowest. Rare 
the house that does not scorn a needy friend; rare the house that 
does not trample contemptuously on a humble dependant.
291
 
In contrast, other patrons treat even the most moral clients with contempt: 
nec quisquam vero pretium largitur amico,  
quem regat ex aequo vicibusque regatur ab illo,  
sed miserum parva stipe focilat, ut pudibundos  
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exercere sales inter convivia possit.  
ista procul labes, procul haec fortuna refugit,  
Piso, tuam, venerande, domum: tu mitis et acri  
asperitate carens positoque per omnia fastu  
inter ut aequales unus numeraris amicos,  
obsequiumque doces et amorem quaeris amando.  
 
No one confers largess on a true friend in order to guide him on an 
equal footing and in turn be guided by him, but one hires the 
wretched man for a trumpery wage to have the power of 
practising shameful witticisms at the festal board. Far has such a 
disgrace, far has a plight of this sort fled, worshipful Piso, from 
your house. In your gentleness and freedom from sharp asperity, 
laying aside pride everywhere, you are reckoned as but one 




This panegyric not only praises its subject, it offers a programme for others to 
follow. Piso is presented as a true gentleman, although it should be noted that 
some are still more equal than others and his guests are expected to learn 
obedience (obsequium) and love (amor). Similar disquiet is reflected when 
Juvenal refers disparagingly to the famous scurrae Gabba and Sarmentus. who 
endured miseries (iniquae) in return for a meal. Martial has similar themes of the 
indignities required for a dinner.
293
 Quintilian warns that the humour of the 
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scurra is often turned back on himself, while Plutarch deliberates over what 
mockery is suitable for the company.
294
  
Food and entertainment were sometimes provided according to rank, creating 
further pitfalls in regard to status. Pliny disassociates himself from the practice, 
but the reader is left in no doubt that Pliny was among those honoured with the 
best.
295
 He uses the opportunity to point a moral when he writes to Junius Avitus. 
The man sitting next to him had enquired if he approved of the practice and was 
astonished to learn that Pliny provided the same fare for all his guests. This is 
not, however, a matter of fair treatment, because the point of the story is his 
frugality. He keeps the cost moderate by drinking the same wine as his freedmen 
rather than offering them the best vintages. The moral is that Junius Avitus must 
take care to avoid the appearance of extravagance: 
quorsus haec? ne tibi, optimae indolis iuveni, quorundam in 
mensa luxuria specie frugalitatis imponat. convenit autem amori 
in te meo, quotiens tale aliquid inciderit, sub exemplo 
praemonere, quid debeas fugere. igitur memento nihil magis esse 
vitandum quam istam luxuriae et sordium novam societatem; quae 
cum sint turpissima discreta ac separata, turpius iunguntur.  
Why am I telling you this? So that the luxury disguised as 
economy found on certain people’s tables does not deceive a 
young man of great promise like yourself. Whenever I meet with 
such a situation, my affection for you prompts me to quote it as a 
warning example of what to avoid. Remember then that nothing is 
to be more shunned than this novel association of extravagance 
                                                 
294
 Plut. Quaest. Conv. 1.1, 2.1. Quint. Inst. 6.3.82. 
295
 Plin. Ep. 2.6. Gibson and Morello 2012: 158-9 note that Pliny is “re-focusing a hackneyed 
topic” (luxuria) to explore the theme of amicable hospitality and that his concern is with how 
people are treated rather than genuine “equality.” 
  
                                                                                         99 
 
and meanness, vices which are bad enough when single and 
separate but worse when found together.
 296
 
He omits to mention that this practice may have had its own dangers, though he 
is certainly aware of them. A letter to Calestrius Tito advises on the importance 
of maintaining proper distinctions when dealing with provincials, and praises 
him for “winning the affection of the humble without losing the regard of their 
superiors”.297 In the context of convivia, failure to make social distinctions 
created the risk that one’s more senior guests might take umbrage.298 Rather than 
engaging with this problem directly, Pliny sets out his position in a letter to 
Genitor. This ostensibly reproves his disapproval of a lavish banquet:  
equidem nihil tale habeo, habentes tamen fero. cur ergo non 
habeo? quia nequaquam me ut inexspectatum festivumve delectat, 
si quid molle a cinaedo, petulans a scurra, stultum a morione 
profertur. 
 I myself don’t lay on anything of the sort, but I bear with those 
who do. Why do I not have them? Because I derive absolutely no 
unexpected or gratifying pleasure from the effeminacy of a 
dancer, the wantonness of a wit or the stupidity of a clown.
299
 
Pliny goes on to say that he is sure others find his own dinner-party 
entertainments of reader, lyre-player or comic actor equally unappealing. 
However, there is a strong sense that only the immoral will really think so and 
the terms he uses for the entertainment offered by the dancer (mollis), wit 
(petulans) and the clown (stultus) are pejorative ones. The show of tolerance is a 
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mere veneer and Pliny’s strategy is to present the issue as one of moral choice. In 
this way, he opts out of the competition for social status, without acknowledging 
it. In an earlier letter to Septicius Clarus Pliny teases him for accepting an 
invitation to a fancier party.
300
 He contrasts the food and entertainment he 
himself would have offered and adds: 
potes apparatius cenare apud multos, nusquam hilarius simplicius 
incautius. 
You can dine in many houses on more elaborate fare, but nowhere 
more genially, innocently, and unguardedly.
 301
  
Once again, Pliny avoids engaging directly with issues of status. Emphasising the 
unpretentious nature of his own dinners allows him to present them as friendly 
occasions which stand outside the competition for status.  
One of the most serious charges levelled against Bakhtin is his failure to engage 
with issues of control and licence, since the carnival occasions that Bakhtin 
describes are those permitted by the authorities. They therefore represent a form 
of controlled licence, often described as a “safety valve”, rather than genuine 
social inversion. This is a particular issue for Roman festival occasions, which 
show a striking lack of spontaneity. Abusive and obscene elements may be 
appropriate to the festival, but they are governed by strict conventions. This 
could be extended as far as a formal “code of conduct” for the guests to 
follow.
302
 Peachin observes that “verbal abuse could appropriately be cast at 
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anyone while physical abuse was generally reserved for those of lower status. 
The etiquette that appears to have been operative in the triclinium … seems … to 
reflect rules of conduct observed elsewhere and at other times”.303 Rimell, 
perhaps more perceptively, suggests that the “blurring of norms and rules during 
the Saturnalia might make it more difficult to judge the point to which those 
limits have stretched, with potentially dangerous consequences”.304 The problem 
is not simply that ordinary rules have been overturned, but that they have been 
replaced, making festival etiquette opaque and easy to misinterpret. Tacitus’ 
account of the Saturnalia celebrations in AD 54, when Nero attempted to 
humiliate his step-brother, demonstrates both limits to licence and the potential 
for malice:  
festis Saturno diebus inter alia aequalium ludicra regnum lusu 
sortientium evenerat ea sors Neroni. igitur ceteris diversa nec 
ruborem adlatura: ubi Britannico iussit exsurgeret progressusque 
in medium cantum aliquem inciperet, inrisum ex eo sperans pueri 
sobrios quoque convictus, nedum temulentos ignorantis, ille 
constanter exorsus. 
During the festivities of the Saturnalia, while his peers in age were 
varying their diversions by throwing dice for a king, the lot had 
fallen upon Nero. On the others he imposed various orders, not 
likely to put them to the blush: but, when he commanded 
Britannicus to rise, advance into the centre, and strike up a song 
— this, in the hope of turning into derision a boy who knew little 
of sober, much less of drunken, society — his victim firmly began 
a poem hinting at his expulsion from his father’s house and 
throne. His bearing awoke a pity the more obvious that night and 
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revelry had banished dissimulation. Nero, once aware of the 
feeling aroused, redoubled his hatred.
305
 
Britannicus adroitly turns an intended insult back upon its perpetrator. However, 
this was a situation with implications beyond the immediate Saturnalian setting 
because of the relative circumstances of the two young men. Britannicus might 
have been wiser to allow the rex his joke. 
There are other expressions of anxiety about status at the Saturnalia. Pliny writes 
of a particular suite of rooms at his Laurentine estate: 
in hanc ego diaetam cum me recepi, abesse mihi etiam a villa mea 
videor, magnamque eius voluptatem praecipue Saturnalibus capio, 
cum reliqua pars tecti licentia dierum festisque clamoribus 
personat; nam nec ipse meorum lusibus nec illi studiis meis 
obstrepunt. 
I regard myself as being away even from my house, and I take 
great pleasure in it, especially at the Saturnalia, when through the 
rest of the house the roof resounds with the uninhibited behaviour 
and the festive shouts of the holidays; for then I do not impede the 
games of my household, and they do not interrupt my studies.
306
 
Pliny is willing to indulge his household during their holiday, but he does not 
want to participate. Seneca shows a similar attitude, writing that there is no real 
difference between the Saturnalia and an ordinary working day. He discusses the 
correct attitude to take to the festival: 
si te hic haberem, libenter tecum conferrem quid existimares esse 
faciendum: utrum nihil ex cotidiana consuetudine movendum an, 
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ne dissidere videremur cum publicis moribus, et hilarius 
cenandum et exuendam togam. …. si te bene novi, arbitri partibus 
functus nec per omnia nos similes esse pilleatae turbae voluisses 
nec per omnia dissimiles. 
Should we make no alteration in our daily habits, or should we 
take off our togas ... and have dinner parties with a note of gaiety 
about them, to avoid giving the impression that we disagree with 
the ways of those around us? If I know you as well as I think I do 





Seneca, unlike Pliny, decides that the best course is to pursue a happy medium. 
Pliny presents his concerns as reluctance to interrupt his studies, since he is too 
busily occupied to indulge in otium. Seneca’s concerns are philosophical, but the 
problem is the same for both men. They do not want to appear to criticise the 
festival, but nor do they want to celebrate it fully. The difficulty is particularly 
acute because of customs regarding social inversion. The Saturnalia festival was 
temporary, while the danger of rebellious slaves was a perennial concern for the 
Roman elite.
308
 The temporary, limited nature of festival added to the stresses 
that surround the occasion. Neither Pliny nor his slaves are able to forget their 
relative status despite the holiday. No wonder festival occasions were controlled 
to limit upset to social relationships after the celebrations ended.
309
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2.5 Humour and ridicule 
Even the contemporary Roman audience were not always sure when something 
was funny rather than simply abusive.
 310
 As Quintilian sees it, it is a matter of 
common sense that jokes are problematic. 
neque enim ab ullo satis explicari puto, … unde risus lacissetur … 
praeterea non una ratione moveri solet: neque enim acute tantum 
ac venuste, sed stulte, iracunde, timide dicta aut facta ridentur, 
ideoque anceps eius rei ratio est, quod a derisu non procul abest 
risus … quae cum in aliis demonstrantur, urbanitas, cum in ipsos 
dicentes recidunt, stultitia vocatur.  
I do not think that anybody can give an adequate explanation ... of 
the cause of laughter… moreover there is great variety in the 
things which raise a laugh, since we laugh not merely at those 
words or actions which are smart or witty but also at those which 
reveal folly, anger or fear. Consequently, the cause of laughter is 
uncertain, since laughter is never far removed from derision. … 
when we point to such a blemish in others, the result is known as 




Jokes reveal qualities which the victim wishes to keep hidden, while making 
someone look foolish may invite reprisals. As Halliwell observes, “[I]n a society 
with a strong sense of shame and social position, [humour] is a powerful means 
                                                 
310
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of conveying dishonour and of damaging the status inherent in a reputation”.312 
Concerns over status may be observed when Suetonius reports a failure in 
Domitian’s sense of humour: 
Aelium Lamiam ob suspiciosos quidem, verum et veteres et 
innoxios iocos, quod post abductam uxorem laudanti vocem suam 
“eutacto” dixerat, quodque Tito hortanti se de alterum 
matrimonium responderat: μὴ καὶ σὺ γαμῆσαι θέλεις; 
[Domitian slew] Aelius Lamia for joking remarks, which were 
reflections on him, it is true, but made long before and harmless. 
For when Domitian had taken away Lamia’s wife, the latter 
replied to someone who praised his voice: “I practise continence”; 
and when Titus urged him to marry again, he replied: “Are you 
too looking for a wife?”313  
The political edge to these quips raises questions about how “harmless” the 
retorts really were, but Suetonius ignores that aspect. He presents them as jokes 
which disclosed the realities of the situation and therefore exposed Domitian’s 
actions to ridicule. There is other evidence for imperial intolerance of ill-timed 
humour. When someone watching a funeral called upon the corpse to let 
Augustus know that his legacies were still outstanding, Tiberius executed him so 
that he could deliver the message directly.
314
 Caligula had a notoriously vicious 
sense of humour, while Domitian was sensitive upon the subject of baldness, and 
took any jokes about it as a personal insult.
315
 Plass suggests that not all such 
anecdotes are based in literal truth, but reflect a form of black humour used as a 
coping mechanism in times of political and personal stress.
316
 The stories were 
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repeated and came to form part of the historical assessment of the emperors 
concerned. This in itself provides an example of the threat humour poses, since a 
funny story is memorable and circulates among a wide audience. Some of them 
may even believe it.
317
  
Roman concern over ridicule was not only with physical danger. There was also 
the risk that it might misfire and expose the instigator himself to disgrace. 
Quintilian considers the difficulty of controlling the audience’s response to a 
quip: when the ill-favoured Sulpicius Longus described a man trying to prove his 
free status as having the face of a slave, Domitius Afer retorted, “Is it your 
profound conviction, Longus, that an ugly man must be a slave?”318 Quintilian 
does not need to spell out the audience’s reaction or the glee with which this 
story was repeated. There are other examples where a witty retort discredits the 
original speaker and Quintilian warns: 
ea quae dicet vir bonus omnia salva dignitate ac verecundia dicet: 
nimium enim risus pretium est si probitatis inpendio constat. 
A good man will see that everything he says is consistent with his 
dignity and the respectability of his character; for we pay too dear 
for the laugh we raise if it is at the cost of our own integrity.
319
 
These ideas about respectable and dignified humour are informed by Aristotle’s 
theory of the liberal jest. Grant summarises the evidence and offers a definition: 
“It is worthy of a gentleman in all respects, for although by its very nature it must 
ridicule faults and foibles, it ridicules only minor ones and is not directed at 
friends, the unfortunate or those in high position; it is expressed in refined 
language; it is not abusive in spirit except when there is a worthy purpose to 
serve; it observes the proper time and place. Above all it reflects the kindliness, 
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dignity and refinement of the speaker. The illiberal jest, on the other hand, has 
the opposite characteristics.”320  
Humour can be used to defuse threats to one’s status. Suetonius says of 
Vespasian: 
maxime tamen dicacitatem adfectabat in deformibus lucris, ut 
invidiam aliqua cavillatione dilueret transferretque ad sales. 
He particularly resorted to witticisms about his unseemly means 
of gain, seeking to diminish their odium by some jocose saying 
and to turn them into a jest.
321
  
Vespasian’s jokes alleviate distaste at his money grubbing. Suetonius gives other 
examples of Vespasian using humour to defuse criticism of his behaviour and 
background. When the ex-consul Mestrius Florus reminded him that the proper 
pronunciation was plaustra rather than plostra, Vespasian greeted him next day 
as “Flaurus”.322 This technique was not confined to the emperor. Quintilian 
preserves an anecdote about the famously witty Domitius Afer. When a client 
ignored him in the forum, Afer sent a slave to say: “I hope you are obliged to me 
for not having seen you.”323 On both occasions, humour is unanswerable. The 
victim is made to look foolish, but required to laugh along with the audience or 
seem ungracious and so lose face further.  
At first sight, Cassius Severus’ jokes seem similar in tone. When Severus was 
reproached with being banned from a certain Proculeius’ house, he retorted “do I 
ever go there?”324 Yet the sources also preserve the tradition that Cassius 
Severus’ jokes were problematic. Quintilian condemns Severus, saying that 
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despite his many talents, he allowed his temper to rule his judgement and his 
jests often turned against him. The elder Seneca describes his dignity as worthy 
of a censor, as long as he avoided humour.
325
 Perhaps the answer may be found 
in Tacitus’ assessment of Severus: 
sordidae originis, maleficae vitae sed orandi validus [vir erat]. 
Of sordid origin and mischievous life, but a powerful orator.
326
 
Tacitus ascribes Severus’ relegation to Seriphos in AD 24 to the fact that he had 
made numerous enemies. It may be that the sources reflect prejudice not about 
humour in itself, but rather about who makes the jokes. In this interpretation, low 
status makes someone’s dignitas fragile so that he cannot “get away with” jokes 
that another speaker could safely deliver, supported by a network of friendship 
and patronage that sanctioned his humour. The evidence suggests that the relative 
status of the joker, his target and his audience impacted upon how humour was 
received.
327
 Humour remained unpredictable and therefore dangerous. Pliny, 
astute at negotiating social situations, opts out of using humour. He may report a 
witticism or write that he is sending a long letter about long speeches but he does 
not joke about his friends.
328
  
2.5.1 Ridicule, invective and appropriate speech in oratory 
Both Quintilian and Cicero are concerned with the humour appropriate for the 
orator. Quintilian summarises different types of humour – both verbal and 
physical – and separates polished oratory from country witticisms.329 An orator 
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can use laughter to ingratiate himself with the judge and jury, or ruffle 
overconfident witnesses, but all laughter remains potentially dangerous.
330
 Thus 
it is best to avoid humour which the judge or jury could interpret as a joke at 
their expense.
331
 The concern underlying this is, once again, one of relative 
status: orators do not want to behave like scurrae. It was important to judge 
one’s tone correctly: Cicero advises that only lesser faults should be ridiculed, 
while serious ones should be treated gravely.
332
 
There are obvious dangers in an aggressive and vitriolic delivery, but these were 
not new under the principate. Cicero’s treatise on oratory has a dramatic date of 
91 BC, and he has Antonius advise caution. Even if the defendant and his 
supporters demand that the opponent’s witness be abused (maledicere) and cross-
examined (interrogare), this is unwise: 
hic quantum fit mali, si iratum, si non stultum, si non levem 
testem laeseris! habet enim et voluntatem nocendi in iracundia et 
vim in ingenio et pondus in vita.  
How much harm is done if you fall foul of a witness who has lost 
his temper and is no fool, and a person of consideration! His anger 
supplies him with the wish to injure you, his ability with the 
power to do so and his past record with influence.
333 
 
Proceed with caution, Cicero advises. He can be seen putting that into practice in 
the Pro Caelio, where his character assassination of Clodia is framed in terms of 
what her grandfather would have said.
334
 Insulting a Roman matrona of 
impeccable lineage could have had serious repercussions. By framing her 
behaviour in context of the mos maiorum – the ancestral customs that were the 
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foundation of virtuous behaviour – Cicero’s denunciation is subtle enough to 
seem as if he is speaking out for the common good. The risks of offending the 
powerful did not diminish during the principate. Quintilian urges the orator not to 
be abusive for the sake of it: abuse encourages abuse and increases the risk of 
causing offence.
335
 If someone has to be denounced, the prejudices of the 
audience should be taken into account and they should be won over by flattery, 
in order to diminish the risk to the speaker.
336
 There needs to be a balance 
between what is becoming and what is expedient.
337
 Ridicule and invective 
become acceptable if they are presented in terms of the public good, as a benefit 
for society as a whole. For example, the Romans considered that deformity and 
ugliness were a mark of moral depravity rather than misfortune and therefore 
they became legitimate targets for the orator.
338
 This tactic continued from the 
late Republic into the principate. Quintilian suggests that witnesses may be 
undermined by questions that reveal their unfortunate past, disgraceful conduct 
or degrading occupation.
339
 Birth, nationality, sex, education, age, appearance, 




The style of oratory under the principate, introduced by Severus and employed 
by Labienus, has been presented as particularly outspoken – “acerbitas”. 
Rutledge opposes this view and argues that this change is illusory and arises 
from the hostility that authors such as Tacitus or Pliny felt towards the 
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 Rutledge is able to demonstrate considerable continuity in style 
from the late Republic. This meant that the orator needed a way to demonstrate 
that his use of invective was disinterested and his motives for employing it were 
pure. In order to denounce others, he needed to establish his own moral authority. 
Cicero, although he acknowledges that it is an ideal seldom met, thinks that the 
orator should possess humour, wit, culture worthy of a freeborn gentleman, sharp 
ripostes when attacked and all this combined with a subtle charm (venustas) and 
urbanity (urbanitas).
342
 For Quintilian, writing 150 years later, the same concepts 
remain central. His ideal pupil has not only intellectual ability, but is also of good 
character (probus). In fact, a stupid pupil is preferable to a bad one.
343
 Cato’s 




Corbeill suggests that the disgrace accruing from invective was so great that it 
functioned as an extra-legal punishment.
 345
 Although we know that fear of 
disgrace made the elite reluctant to instigate court cases, that view is more 
problematic.
346
 Anyone could find themselves accused, and Quintilian advises 
the orator to assign appropriate character flaws to the parties in the case, so that 
thieves are represented as greedy, adulterers lustful, or murderers impulsive. In 
defence, the qualities must be reversed.
347
 The accuracy (or otherwise) of these 
imputations is not a factor; the orator is still a good man when he speaks as best 
assists the case he is making.
348
 There needs to be a balance between saying what 
is suitable and what will win the case.
349
 This was why someone’s services as a 
speaker in court were represented as part of a wider network of exchange of 
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favours and influence, rather than motivated by self-interest which would cast his 
moral agenda into doubt. There was a polite fiction that an orator took on cases 
only for the noblest of reasons, and this attitude remains consistent in the 
sources. In 94 BC Antonius defended the disreputable Norbanus and resorted to 
the strategy of claiming “he was my quaestor” (and therefore owed loyalty) in 
order to counter criticism over defending a citizen accused of undermining state 
security.
350
 In c. AD 95, Quintilian advises that the court should believe that the 
advocate acts by reason of duty to a friend, relative or country and that he is 
motivated by moral considerations.
351
 Pliny, too, feels the need to make his 
excuses for taking on particular cases, quoting Thrasea Paetus’ advice that one 
should act for friends, those without legal representation, or in order to set a 
precedent.
352
 He adds his own view that cases which bring fame and glory are 
also acceptable. Fame and glory, it may be noted, rather than sordid financial 
rewards. Pliny’s view may be bolstered by the fact that he was wealthy in his 
own right, and had no particular need to make money through his advocacy.
353
 
However, the potential financial rewards of oratory were considerable and the 
sources suggest that those who made large profits were viewed with suspicion 
because this undermined the disinterested, moral basis of their invective.
354
  
The evidence shows that invective and ridicule had its place in the courtroom, 
but it operated within rules of conduct, based on the understanding that the orator 
was a good man acting for good purposes in censuring the bad and praising the 
good. Ridicule and invective which operated outside those rules damaged rather 
than enhanced the orator’s reputation and therefore his social position. 
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2.5.2 Ridicule, invective and appropriate speech in satire 
Roman satire and epigram has a Hellenistic and Republican pedigree, perhaps 
even going back to Indo-European praise and blame poetry.
355
 The Romans 
recognised satire as a distinct genre, and Quintilian observes that this was the 
only form of literature invented by the Romans themselves.
356
 They also enjoyed 
the type of verse that Pliny refers to as “trifles” (nugae) or “play” (lusus) – 
composed for entertainment and so presumably incorporating satire, epigram and 
Menippean satire.
357
 This does not mean that satirical poetry is homogenous: part 
of the difficulty in interpretation may lie in the differing status of the poets. 
Members of the elite such as Pliny, Seneca or Petronius composed light verse to 
amuse their social circles, and were rewarded by applause. Poets of lesser status 
such as Martial or Juvenal actively sought support from patrons for their 
endeavours. 
The satirist presents himself as particularly at risk of giving offence, since he 
reveals secret vices that damage the public good. Not only does he do this, but he 
employs obscene or abusive language which may be offensive in and of itself. 
We know writers of satire could find themselves in court, as did Cassius Severus 
in c. AD 8 and Fabricius Veiento in AD 62. They were charged with defaming 
the emperor or members of the elite and the evidence suggests factional politics 
among the elite were partly to blame. However, that was not the whole story, so 
that it remains to investigate why some cases were prosecuted when others were 
not. 
Poets capitalise upon the social conventions for festival occasions in order to 
excuse offensive elements in their work. When Ovid defends his Ars Amatoria, 
he plays with the tradition that warned those who had no place at a celebration to 
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stay away. He claims that he had a particular audience in mind. It was never 
intended for respectable women, but only for the demi-monde from whom 
mistresses might be chosen.
358
 Yet he exploits this convention as part of the joke, 
by pointing out that if a wife is so inclined, she can misread even the most 
serious historical works as salacious. This is a theme he develops, suggesting that 
smutty stories are lurking within even the greatest works of epic and tragedy. 
Ovid’s joke works by saying the unsayable: the boundary between clean and 
unclean, obscene and acceptable depends upon the audience’s willingness to 
accept the poet’s intentions. This is why parody is so dangerous for a Roman 
audience: it mixes the signals. By confusing serious and humorous, flattery and 
insult, parody challenges the audience’s expectations and response. Richlin 
argues that this is where Ovid’s particular power to offend lies: parody 
contaminates the original. “[T]he noble saga of Troy, in some parts at least a 
constituent of the dignitas of the Caesars, had lost some of its shine when Ovid 
was through with it.”359 Ovid positions his poetry so that boundaries between the 
acceptable and the obscene are not clearly defined. They become a matter of 
negotiation between audience and author. If this audience contains someone in a 
position of power who chooses to take offence, then their disapproval can have 
serious consequences. 
Anderson argues that problems in interpretation arose when Martial’s poems 
were read in a published collection, abstracted from their original festival setting. 
That made it much more difficult for the author to control the way they were 
received or to manage identification of intended targets.
360
 Anderson believes 
                                                 
358
 Ov. Ars Am. 1.31-4, 2.599-600, 3.27; reprised at Tr. 2.243-52, Pont. 3.3 49-64. For 
interpretation see e.g. Alden 2006, who sees Tr. 3.1 as “flippant” and “defiant”; Nugent 1990 on 
problems of sincerity.  
359
 Richlin 1992: 156. See also Freudenburg 2001: 238-9 on problems of parody contaminating 
the original. The reasons for Ovid’s exile cannot be properly explored here, but the poet himself 
ascribes the cause, at least in part, to offence caused by his poetry and part of the punishment 
included the banning of his books from imperial libraries. Ov. Tr. 1.1. 105-22; 2.130-154; 3.1. 
Williams 1982 argues that the exile was primarily on literary and moral grounds, whereas Levick 
1999: 60-1 argues for a political explanation.  
360
 Anderson 2011: 199.  
  
                                                                                         115 
 
that Martial’s criticism as well as his praise is aimed at real people, and this is 
why Martial employs strategies to control the way his work is read and so 
minimise the risk of giving offence.
361
 The point that published poems can be 
read outside the festival situation is an especially useful one, because that creates 
a disconnection between the reader and the event it describes. It also allows the 
reader to dwell on the poem in a way that would not be possible during a 
convivia. At first sight, then, it is not surprising that Martial begins his epigrams 
by presenting his poetry as suitable for festival occasions. He also emphasises the 
relationship between the author and his audience: 
spero me secutum in libellis meis tale temperamentum ut de illis 
queri non possit quisquis de se bene senserit, cum salva 
infirmarum quoque personarum reuerentia ludant; quae adeo 
antiquis auctoribus defuit ut nominibus non tantum ueris abusi 
sint sed et magnis. ... absit a iocorum nostrorum simplicitate 
malignus interpres. 
I hope to have struck a balance in my little books such that 
nobody can complain of them who has a good opinion of himself; 
their jesting is with respect of persons, even the humblest, respect 
which was so lacking in writers of old that they made free not 
only with real names, but even with great ones … My quips are 
straightforward. I want no interpreter’s malice…362 
His concern, he says, is with moderation and appropriate response – the same 
issues that Pliny and Seneca debated when they considered how to behave during 
Saturnalia. Martial goes on to say that although he uses the licence of epigram, 
he does so because he is following the example of his predecessors and because 
it suits the occasion. Martial’s juxtaposition of “personarum reverentia” with 
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“ludant” introduces an essential element of his self-representation.363 He is 
playing, but it is appropriate play. Cato is used as an inverted example, the 
moralist who behaves inappropriately by approaching only to express 
disapproval. Martial states explicitly that only an unpleasant interpreter will find 
problems with his simple jokes.
364
 
This is a theme that recurs.
365
 Martial even explodes the conventional warning 
into a joke, advising respectable matrons to look away now, because the rest of 
the book will be unsuitable for their delicate gaze.
366
 Martial acknowledges that 
this will enthuse rather than repulse the reader, and later in the book the same 
matron is still reading.
367
 Martial defends his poems because they are no worse 
than the mimes the matron visits and therefore they should not be condemned. 
Epigrams have their place and should be enjoyed for what they are.
368
 This is not 
unreasonable, since it accords with the convention that some occasions are 
appropriate to licence and the inversion of normal behaviour, while others are 
not. So, when he introduces book 5, dedicated to Domitian, Martial claims that 
this means those who enjoy racier material should look to his other books.
369
 
These jokes echo elements in Ovid’s subversive self-presentation, but Martial 
presents them differently. He is a poet whose works are playful, but appropriate.  
There is a wider problem of interpretation, because of the nature of Martial’s 
libelli. The epigrams appear to be thrown together at random, or even placed so 
that an apparently serious message is undercut and becomes paradoxical. When 
Rimell discusses the difficulty of interpreting Martial’s political views, she 
argues that he employs “paradox and inconsistency within the frame of the 
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libellus … Complex, multiple interactions between poems … create an 
environment of split perspectives and theatrical posing… .”370 Rimell suggests 
that the lack of obvious structure and seemingly random order of the epigrams 
mean that the reader is left to judge the poet’s intentions. Martial can deny his 
own accountability by placing responsibility for interpretation with his audience. 
This means that any criticism arises from the malign nature of the hostile reader, 
and not from anything intrinsic to the poems.
371
  
The fact that many scholars have observed patterns and cycles within the 
apparently random placement of the epigrams suggests that Martial’s position is 
more complicated than this.
372
 One of these themes is Martial’s reworking of the 
idea of appropriate and inappropriate conduct. The first poem addressed to 
Domitian develops the message of the prologue: 
contigeris nostros, Caesar, si forte libellos, 
terrarum dominum pone supercilium. 
consueuere iocos vestri quoque ferre triumphi, 
materiam dictis nec pudet esse ducem. 
qua Thymelen spectas derisoremque Latinum, 
illa fronte precor carmina nostras legas. 
innocuos censura potest permittere lusus: 
lasciva est nobis pagina, vita proba. 
Caesar, if you happen to light upon my little books, put aside the 
frown that rules the world. Even the triumphs of emperors are 
wont to tolerate jests, and a general is not ashamed to be matter 
for a quip. Read my verses, I beg, with the expression with which 
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you watch Thymele and jesting Latinus. A censor can tolerate 
harmless jollity. My page is wanton, but my life is virtuous.
373
 
Martial repeats that his poetry is appropriate to its occasion, just as insults are 
allowed at a triumph or a mime performance. He introduces a new element here: 
the poet himself is morally upright, and so separate from his suspect works. This 
is a literary commonplace, and for example Pliny uses it, quoting Catullus for 
justification.
374
 This should not obscure its importance in distancing the everyday 
world from the fictionalised, festival world of epigram; the fact that it is used 
frequently suggests it was successful. Martial reminds his audience that a satirist 
is not his satire. 
Martial examines the same ideas from different viewpoints, so for example when 
he complains about Cornelius’ criticism of his epigrams, he reprises exactly the 
concepts that were expressed in the prologue and poem 4, but this time with 
explicit sexual imagery.
375
 This, he tells us, is necessary and appropriate: 
quare deposita severitate 
parcas lusibus et iocis rogamus, 
nec castrare velis meos libellos: 
Gallo turpis est nihil Priapo. 
So please put prudery aside and spare my jests and jollities; and 
don’t try to emasculate my little books. There’s nothing uglier 
than a neutered Priapus.
376
 
This poem follows another obscene epigram about the immodest Lesbia. Rimell 
sees the deliberate difficulty with their juxtaposition: “taken together, the two 
poems perform an absurd contradiction that this book, especially, flaunts … a 
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prime example of how imperial carnival, like epigram, marries carefree licence 
with bitter restraint.”377 It is, however, possible to see a different and equally 
absurd joke here, which provides parallels rather than contradictions between the 
two cases. Lesbia’s behaviour is not appropriate even for a prostitute, and she 
needs to be more discreet. Cornelius’ mealy-mouthed complaints miss the point 
of epigram, and he needs to be less severe. Here, and throughout the libelli, 
Martial interweaves poems that deal with questions of balancing appropriate and 
inappropriate behaviour. When greedy Caecilianus eats all the mushrooms, or 
Sosibianus addresses his father as “dominus”, or Scaevola refuses to spend his 
new wealth, these different poems reflect the same problem.
378
 The subject and 
the detail change, but the poet asks his audience to consider whether examples of 
speech and behaviour fit the occasion. The audience are invited to laugh at the 
social ineptitude of Martial’s victims. Martial is offering his audience “wrong” 
responses to a situation and this means that they have to think about what is 
“right”. This is poetry which sets out a moral position and in this way Martial 
differs from Ovid.
 379
  Ovid’s frivolousness means he refused to commit himself 
and his poetry to one interpretation and so leaves his audience to impose their 
own moral reading. This is not to say that Martial is heavy handed. He teases the 
reader in positioning his epigrams and as their juxtapositions are part of the joke 
they are not intended to be transparent or staid. Nonetheless, concern for 
appropriateness is a recurring theme and one that extends to his interest in 
plagiarism, the misappropriation and so the misplacing of his own poetry.
380
 The 
final responsibility for interpretation may indeed lie with the reader, but Martial 
gives his audience responsibility. He makes sure that the malignus has no excuse 
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for misunderstanding the festival context. This poetry is humorous, the audience 
are told not to take it seriously, and above all it is appropriate for its setting.
381
  
Martial’s concerns are not unique. Pliny, too, is anxious to be seen to write 
appropriate poems for festival occasions. Pliny summarises Titius Aristo’s 
information that there has been criticism of his versiculi: 
[You say that] fuisse apud te de versiculis meis multum 
copiosumque sermonem, eumque diversitate iudiciorum longius 
processisse, exstitisse etiam quosdam, qui scripta quidem ipsa non 
improbarent, me tamen amice simpliciterque reprehenderent, quod 
haec scriberem recitaremque. quibus ego, ut augeam meam 
culpam, ita respondeo: facio non numquam versiculos severos 
parum, facio; nam et comoedias audio et specto mimos et lyricos 
lego et Sotadicos intellego; aliquando praeterea rideo iocor ludo, 
utque omnia innoxiae remissionis genera breviter amplectar, 
homo sum.  
There were some who, without censuring the works themselves, 
rebuked me in a friendly and open way for writing and reciting 
them. To exacerbate my fault, my risposte to them is this: I grant 
that on occasion I write verses that are far from dignified; yes, I 
grant it; moreover I also listen to recitations of comedies, I watch 
mimes, I read lyric poetry and I appreciate Sotadics. Then too 
there are occasions when I laugh, make jokes, sport, and – let me 
summarise all the forms of harmless relaxation – am human.382 
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This is a standard defence of the writer of risqué verses: they suit the occasion. 
Pliny goes on to say that although modesty forbids him from a comparison with 
living writers, the most eminent senators of the past wrote such verses. He then 
lists twenty-six examples. Pliny even twists the traditional vita proba argument 
by dismissing Nero as an exemplum: verses do not become depraved even when 
wicked men write them.
383
  
How seriously should we take the suggestion that Pliny is responding to genuine 
criticism?
 384
 The topic of appropriate behaviour has recurred in his concern over 
how to behave at the Saturnalia and at dinner parties, now he reacts to the idea 
that his verses are inappropriate to his dignitas as a senator. He provides his 
audience with additional information. The reported rebukes are not bitter and 
there is no malice behind them. Pliny’s actual poems appear to be beyond 
reproach. The letter moves on to deal with problems of recitatio generally and 
the importance of accepting literary criticism and adapting one’s output as a 
result. He finishes by reprising the theme of appropriateness: he has begun to 
lecture and recalls the intimate nature of his recitation.
385
 Pliny presumes – or 
affects to presume – that once his friends understand that his poetry is 
appropriate for festival occasions, reflects his good character and follows in the 
best literary tradition, they will realise it does him credit.  
This argument is important enough for Pliny to revisit when he sends his 
“hendecasyllables” to Paternus.386 After the standard defence that obscene verses 
do not reflect the poet’s virtuous life, Pliny adds:  
ex quibus tamen si non nulla tibi petulantiora paulo videbuntur, 
erit eruditionis tuae cogitare summos illos et gravissimos viros qui 
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talia scripserunt non modo lascivia rerum, sed ne verbis quidem 
nudis abstinuisse; quae nos refugimus, non quia severiores (unde 
enim?) sed quia timidiores sumus. 
If several of these poems seem to you rather too coarse, your 
learning must cause you to reflect that those outstanding and 
highly serious men who wrote verses like these avoided neither 
wanton topics nor even explicit language. I have drawn back from 
such treatment not because I am too puritanical (why should I 
be?) but because I am too cowardly.
387
  
Pliny is afraid of damage not to his moral reputation, but to his reputation as a 
poet. The fact that he is willing to circulate the poems suggests that he has no 
real anxiety about their causing offence. When Pliny asks Paternus what he will 
say to a third party, that emphasises his concern for social judgements. He 
lessens the stakes by presenting the poems as mere trifles, and as a work in 
progress. Indeed he prepares Paternus’ response for him, just as Martial prepares 
his audience. Pliny’s poems are amusing trifles, suitable for leisure, and such as 
gentlemen compose. He knows what is appropriate for the occasion. Both Pliny 
and Martial provide a framework for their audience to react within the context of 
festival literature. In Pliny’s case, there may even be an element of double bluff. 
One of the topoi of light verse is deriding those serious persons who fail to 
recognise when it is appropriate to relax: their disapproval of festival occasions 
reflects badly upon them. We have already seen Pliny dismiss allegations that he 
is expected to behave strictly at all times.
388
 Writing naughty poems has a certain 
glamour about it. It is possible that Pliny is trying to gain admiration for his 
festival verses, while making sure that he does not circulate anything that might 
really offend his audience. 
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2.5.3 Named targets in Roman satire 
Although Roman satire looked back to Lucilius, notorious for his direct insults 
against recognisable individuals, this was not a feature of satire of the early 
empire. On the whole, poets avoid naming – and therefore shaming – real 
individuals. There are exceptions – Juvenal uses figures from the recent past, and 
some of Martial’s epigrams can be related to known patrons. 389 However, even 
when the poet set up an “everyman” as his target, the audience were able to make 
associations between the poem and real life events. Epigrammatic poetry for 
recital at a convivium or Saturnalian party depended upon the audience 
recognising real life parallels or the jokes lost their point. Since elite Roman 
society was relatively small, it must have been difficult to disguise references to 
individuals or to keep a witty epigram from circulating. Nor is it clear that it was 
always desirable to do so.  
When Martial defends himself against the accusation of giving offence, he moves 
beyond the standard formulae of justification into presenting himself as someone 
whose art advances fame. He mocks a reader who wrongly believes he is to be 
the subject of a poem. He inverts the satirist’s traditional defence when he tells 
Quintus that he and his mistress were not the intended targets of an epigram.
390
 
The joke is twisted so “Quintus” (still perhaps pseudonymous) has revealed his 
guilt by taking offence. Martial claims that people are grateful for the recognition 
they receive in his poetry.
391
 Indeed, he refuses to give an unnamed person the 
satisfaction of appearing as the subject of a poem.
392
 Martial, at least in his own 
presentation, has the power in this situation. It is worse to be ignored than to be 
satirised. This raises a tantalising question of whether association with an 
epigram, at least in its milder forms, was automatically disgraceful. A balanced 
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discussion is difficult because the evidence that survives emphasises occasions 
when offence was taken rather than when someone responded with pleasure, 
though Suetonius has an anecdote about Vespasian asking to be made the subject 
of a joke.
393
 It can be suggested that public recognition was desirable. White 
argues that both Martial and Statius published epigrams created for particular 
dinner parties and so commemorate the event and compliment the host.
394
 
Whether or not he is correct, the concept that epigram was a way of providing 
public attention is intriguing. Pliny shows delight when a visitor to Rome was 
able to recognise him by his description.
395
 Would a Roman with social 
ambitions be sufficiently fame-hungry that pride at being the subject of mild 
epigram offset any minor embarrassment?
396
  
This is not to suggest that the risks of naming and shaming someone over more 
serious misconduct were negligible. Some modern critics see satirists’ reluctance 
to name targets as a form of self-censorship arising from political constraints. For 
example, Freudenburg suggests that Horace needed to handle his theme of 
libertas carefully in order not to cause offence. He is not able to risk criticising 
Octavian through implying that there are constraints on freedom of speech. 
Instead, he uses humour as a way of engaging indirectly with the issue. He also 
turns his criticism into a literary one, blaming Lucilius’ rough style as the source 
of his difficulty with his precursor.
397
 Other scholars deny that there was a 
problem with naming targets and argue that fictionalisation is an “internal 
literary issue”, and so is a matter of genre rather than suppression. 398 Some see 
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advantages in generalisation, since it allowed the audience to relax and enjoy the 
joke without fear of repercussions.
399
 Damon makes an alternative suggestion 
that since the victim is not specifically named, the poem may be taken to refer to 
any and everybody. As a result, the entire audience feel guilty, as “Quintus” did 
in response to Martial’s epigram discussed above.400  
The plethora of theories and the obvious difficulty in aligning them may in fact 
reveal an essential aspect of satire. The satirist is not restricted to a single voice, 
and he may both entertain and horrify his audience in the same lines. Quintilian 
observes that there is pleasure in hearing others say what we dare not express 
ourselves; outrageousness is a key element in satire.
401
 There are perhaps modern 
parallels with “shock jock” radio or television talk shows which both appal and 
fascinate their audience. However, this is not a parallel which should be 
emphasised too far, because satire has a serious moral agenda. Spisak argues that 
Martial has ethical intentions and means to offer instruction through 
entertainment.
402
 The satirist reveals what he sees in the interest of the greater 
good. Ridicule and invective are therefore justified through their moral purpose. 
This in turn allows satirists to move away from the benign, Aristotelian model of 
the liberal jest and incorporate elements of the harsher Old Comedy.
403
 Such 
humour was linked with more overt concepts of justified libertas: the joke had a 
moral purpose in reinforcing social acceptability. Braund suggests that the satirist 
positions libertas as free speech he approves and licentia as that which he 
despises. This lets him claim the moral superiority associated with libertas while 
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avoiding criticisms for licentia. Her view of a “dynamic tension” between 
libertas and licentia is an attractive one, since a refusal to maintain a stable 
position is marked element of the genre.
404
 Persius contrasts his own work with 
that of his contemporaries and offers it as a corrective.
405
 Juvenal mocks 
contemporary literature and says he is offering an alternative form. Rome is so 




It is sometimes suggested that Martial is at particular risk of having his status 
misunderstood, since he creates poetry to entertain the company, and so may find 
himself ranked with the despised scurrae. Damon analyses a number of Martial’s 
poems and suggests that Martial separates fictional parasites, who embrace the 
duties of the client in return for a meal, from his own voice. It is therefore 
Martial himself who addresses “real” patrons without describing himself in the 
role of client.
407
 Nauta goes further, suggesting that Martial’s poetry bestows 
cultural prestige. He is a poet in his own right, not a dinner-party wit, and his 
poems can be published because they are worthy of a wider audience.
408
 Nauta 
proposes that Martial uses fiction as an “honour strategy”: “With his gentle 
mockery of real persons Martial behaved as the gentleman guest he was, while 
with his savage mockery of fictional persons he played the role of the scurra, yet 
without compromising his own status and without endangering the seriousness of 
his praise when he offered praise.”409  
However, there is a difficulty in that all the evidence about naming targets is 
“internal” – in other words, it comes from comedy, satire and epigram. This 
means it may poorly reflect reality, and for example Cloud suggests that 
Juvenal’s presentation of Roman society is sufficiently fictionalised that it does 
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not accurately present daily routines.
410
 This makes it unclear how far any poet 
could control the line between literary play and real life offence, however 
cleverly he weaved his defences. Positioning satire as poetry with a moral 
purpose offers only fragile protection, because it is a short step from the role of 
critical observer to that of open critic. That is a much more dangerous situation, 
made worse if the target knows that he is being reproached. Both Severus and 
Veiento found themselves on trial for satirising members of the elite. Their 
position may have been particularly awkward because they were not reliant on 
their poetry for patronage but rather were amongst the group that composed 
poetry as a diversion. In other words, they could not be dismissed as lowly 
scurrae who might bark, but not bite – the position that Martial seems also to 
have wished to attain. Tacitus tells us that Cassius Severus had defamed men and 
women and women of repute (illustri) in his scandalous writings.
411
 It is not clear 
how directly Severus has named his victims, but they certainly recognised 
themselves. There may be a combination of factors at work, since Severus had 
neither influential supporters to intervene on his behalf nor the moral authority to 
attack the elite with impunity. He was exiled and his books were burned. 
Veiento seems to have managed to embarrass the emperor as well as the elite, 
since Nero dealt with him as an amicus and the charges included sale of offices: 
crimine Fabricius Veiento conflictatus est, quod multa et probrosa 
in patres et sacerdotes composuisset iis libris, quibus nomen 
codicillorum dederat. 
Fabricius Veiento succumbed to the … charge of composing a 
series of libels on the senate and priests in the books to which he 
had given the title of Codicilli.
412
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Once again, there were multiple, illustrious victims and it is possible that the 
targets were named directly. Veinto’s work was titled Codicilli (“Will” or 
“Testament”) which may be a nod towards Tiberius’ earlier ruling that wills 
should not be subject to censorship but read in full.
413
 Veiento was relegated and 
his books were burnt. However, he recovered. He is found as a delator under 
Domitian and as an intimate of Nerva’s.414 Perhaps the Codicilli represent a 
youthful misjudgement, an attempt to follow the popular fashion for satirical 
verse, which provided an opening for a political enemy to strike. We have seen 
that Tacitus’ verdict of their quality was scathing and their appeal lasted only as 




This chapter has examined what might cause a member of the Roman elite to 
take offence, and failed to find a simple answer. The speaker, his audience, and 
the occasion all impact upon how discourse is received, and the question of 
offensiveness revolves around issues of relative status. This is not something an 
individual can direct for himself since it is dependent upon others’ evaluation. 
Misjudging what should be said in a particular place with a particular audience 
had potentially serious consequences. Obscenity and humour were especially 
problematic because they were difficult to control. The speaker’s own status 
affected the reception of humorous or obscene remarks. A person of high status – 
an emperor or consular – would usually find his jokes well received. For persons 
of lesser status, such as Cassius Severus, this might not be the case. 
There were times when obscenity and ridicule were appropriate. They were a 
feature of “liminal” occasions when social norms were suspended to mark the 
separation from the everyday world, and of festival occasions. However, even 
Saturnalia and convivia did not mean a complete suspension of rules. Instead, 
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they operated under their own code. This led to some uncertainty about what was 
acceptable. It explains both the enthusiasm for “rules” with which to negotiate 
such festival occasions and the anxiety with which contemporary authors view 
them. 
Literature composed for such festival occasions does indeed, as Mikhail Bakhtin 
saw, need to be interpreted in its context. However, in the elite Roman setting, it 
is too simplistic to understand this as “licensed” literature, which can say what it 
pleases. Anxieties about appropriate speech and relative status pervade festival 
literature. This is why the same set of justifications are repeated: the poetry is 
suitable for the occasion, the poet himself is moral, and even the most eminent 
men compose such verses. These are the “rules” of festival literature in elite 
Roman society. However, they depend upon the audience accepting the poet’s 
representation of his work as appropriate. If the audience rejected the poet’s 
formulation and condemned his work as obscene or offensive, he had little 
redress. Martial and Pliny both work hard to emphasise the suitability of their 
work for its occasion so that there is as little room as possible for the audience to 
re-impose a different and less acceptable interpretation.  
Ridicule and obscenity could be justified as having a higher moral purpose. 
Orators represented themselves as acting out of concern for public interest, and 
satirists too claimed a moral agenda. Humour and obscenity operated to reinforce 
acceptable behaviour and shame the deviant. That this was still problematic is 
illustrated by Cicero and Quintilian’s advice to the orator on how to avoid giving 
offence. Concern to maintain one’s own dignity was paramount, and so obscenity 
was best avoided and ridicule used with care. Satire, too, had its problems, 
especially in regard to insulting named, influential targets. This issue has been 
complicated because of poets’ playfulness around the issue of naming, and 
because sometimes it could be desirable to be the subject of mild epigram. It 
remains clear that there was potential for catastrophic misjudgement: if the target 
of satire felt his status was damaged, he had to respond or lose face further. If 
this person was powerful in his own right, or had powerful friends, then the 
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matter was serious, perhaps life-threatening. No wonder circumspection was 
used. 
Understanding causes of offence is further complicated because the elite do not 
necessarily spell them out, even to themselves. Social norms were assimilated as 
part of the process of maturing and taking one’s place as an adult. These 
incorporated concern for relative social status, and an understanding that 
obscenity and ridicule had their place at the margins of polite society. No wonder 
that the glimpses we have, in Seneca, Martial and Pliny, reveal the terrible 
anxiety of trying to negotiate the shifting, imprecise world of etiquette and 
relative status. The strategies that the elite employed for avoiding offence bring 
us to the subject of the next chapter. 
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3: Social conventions and status anxiety among 
the Roman elite: communication and strategies for 
avoiding offence 
3.1 Introduction 
It is now time to consider occasions when there was no question of licence for 
insult. In normal circumstances people do not spell out how they expect others to 
speak or behave, because social conventions operate automatically. That means 
that some of the most helpful primary sources are those which advise on 
education. Plutarch and Quintilian both do this, instructing young men on how to 
make a good impression on their elders and betters. The philosopher Epictetus 
offers counter-cultural examples, revealing normal social expectations by 
challenging them. Other authors provide evidence when they criticise someone’s 
words or actions, showing where a solecism has been committed. This needs to 
be treated carefully, because comments on manners and morals were usually 
made by novi homines, and so may reflect the concerns of a limited section of 
society.
416
 For example, Pliny’s letters discuss good and bad etiquette in elite 




Other evidence provides less obvious information about elite interaction, but is 
less self-conscious in what it says. When Hall attempted to reconstruct the basis 
of “good manners” for avoiding affront in the context of the late Republic, he 
used Cicero’s De Oratore to provide evidence.418 He describes strategies of 
obligation and evasion within the reported conversation, where L. Crassus is 
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persuaded to speak, despite his reservations. Hall acknowledges the literary and 
structural benefits of delaying Crassus’ speech, but none the less argues that the 
De Oratore “provides valuable insights into Roman aristocratic values and 
behaviour. The nuances of what Crassus and his friends say reveal much about 
the web of social expectation in which such figures were implicated.”419 His 
method of extrapolating concepts of etiquette from the literary text provides a 
helpful model. Quintilian repeatedly uses Cicero as an exemplum for his budding 
orator, and while this has the benefit of avoiding discussing too recent behaviour, 
it also shows that Cicero still exemplified appropriate conduct. The evidence 
suggests that elite Romans preserved continuity in standards of accepted 
behaviour, perhaps unsurprising in a conservative society with great respect for 
the customs and uses of the past. 
This chapter will explore the problems of insult and social status in greater depth, 
arguing that the elite employed strategies to avoid or minimise offence. 
Managing insult posed a particular difficulty in Rome because the emperor’s 
unique position as primus inter pares affected the way he addressed others and 
their response to him. This chapter will consider imperial status in regard to 
giving and perceiving insults across the social scale, reserving the related 
question of freedom of speech in the senate for the next chapter. That creates a 
somewhat artificial divide between social and political context, but has the merit 
of allowing greater clarity of discussion. It also sets the scene for chapter 4 by 
establishing the etiquette which governed exchanges between the emperor and 
his fellow members of the elite. The final section of this chapter will consider 
how the Roman elite thought about public and private, and the way that impacted 
upon their concept of free speech. The Roman elite were routinely surrounded by 
friends, freedmen and slaves, making the distinction between “public” 
communication intended for a wide audience and “private” exchanges within a 
limited circle different from that of the modern, western world. It will be argued 
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that almost every exchange had an audience and even when that was restricted to 
a select group, confidentiality relied upon their discretion. The present chapter, in 
conjunction with the ideas presented in chapter 2, demonstrates the impact of 
social conventions on freedom of speech in Rome. The hierarchical, competitive 
nature of elite society created a fear not only of giving or receiving offence, but 
of being seen to do so. This meant that both censure and self-censorship operated 
to control what was said between junior and senior parties, and among one’s 
peers.  
3.2 Insults 
It is not difficult to find Romans insulting one another.
 
The elite exchanged 
abuse, while some emperors behaved outrageously.
420
 The people were rude to 
the elite in the street, among the crowd at the theatre or games, and through 
graffiti.
421
 Orators delivered invective, and students and teachers sparred in the 
schools of declamation.
422
 Dickey, in her detailed study of Latin forms of 
address, summarises earlier research into Roman insults, noting that they consist 
of glossaries of terms, or are outdated, and are often limited in scope.
423
 They 
also focus on evidence from comedy or oratorical invective, which we have seen 
operated under its own protocols. Dickey observes that there are rules about what 
is considered offensive in any society, and that these are language and culture 
specific.
424
 So, for example, insult is not necessarily determined by a word’s 
lexical meaning and rude terms can be used as endearments. The “register” of a 
term also matters – the different types of language appropriate for different 
situations – so that it is possible to use the high register of literary language and 
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still be deliberately offensive. Dickey acknowledges the complexity of this, and 
the difficulty for constructive discussion. She adds: “Since offensiveness relates 
to the extent to which the speaker wishes to injure the addressee, it can be 
determined by examining the temperature of the debate in which an insult is used 
and the relationship of the speaker and addressee.” 425 She then provides a table 
of Latin direct insults, with their register, and the number of times they occur. 
She notes that sexual insults and ingratitude appear to be especially offensive.
426
  
Dickey’s sensible approach analyses examples where someone is addressed 
directly, though the conventions of genre may raise some questions about 
reliability. She discusses Martial’s mockery of Sosibianus for addressing his 
father as domine and suggests several scenarios for why this was infelicitous.
427
 
It may have been originally a low register term used by younger people to older 
relatives, which was then contaminated by an amatory use, suggesting an 
inappropriate sexual relationship. An alternative theory is that it was in general 
sub-literary use as a polite term to address a comparative stranger. This would 
emphasise the unfamiliarity between the two men. Her final suggestion is that 
Martial may have been forcing the audience to make the connection between the 
lexical meaning of dominus as “master” and the address meaning of domine as 
“sir”. This forces the reader to see an association they might otherwise miss, just 
as in modern English “darling” can be used as an endearment or a general term 
of address, creating an inconsistency between the two forms that can get well-
intentioned bus drivers into trouble.
428
 Dickey favours the last solution, but 
perhaps the most useful aspect of her argument is that it shows how little we 
know. Dominus is controversial elsewhere, with Tiberius refusing to accept the 
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term and Domitian claiming it.
429
 Dickey acknowledges that the “grammar” of 
insult in any language is internalised by its native speakers, so that they 
automatically understand the register and relative offensiveness of a term which 
may escape an external commentator. Dickey’s approach provides useful 
evidence for terms of address and of how someone could give deliberate, direct 
offence. It leaves open the question of how the Romans dealt with more complex 
insults, and the difficulties created by inadvertent offence, where a remark was 
not intended as an insult. 
The elite sources record the exchange of insults between members of the Roman 
elite, but they are often reluctant to repeat them directly.
430
 Pliny describes an 
angry exchange in the senate between Licinius Nepos and Juventius Celsus, and 
says explicitly that they did not restrain themselves. However, Pliny himself 
found their words offensive and does not wish to repeat them.
431
 Richlin’s 
argument that Romans avoided explicitly obscene language because it “stained” 
the speaker’s mouth was discussed in chapter 2 and reluctance to record insult 
may reflect this prejudice about what can decently be reported.
 432
 Literary 
considerations may, however, be more important, since reporting insult lowers 
the tone. When Tacitus recounts the trial of Votienus Montanus, described as vir 
celebris ingenii, he does not record his insults against the emperor. Instead, he 
tells us about the unfortunate candour of the military witness and Tiberius’ fear 
of hearing abuse during public appearances. That allows the reader to supply the 
missing information from the context. It avoids the tedium of repeated insults, 
and focusses the account on Tiberius’ outrage. The audience’s conjectures may 
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 Suet. Tib. 27. Mart. 10.72 rejoices at no longer having a dominus at Rome. 
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 This is common phenomenon. See for example: Cass. Dio 54.30.4, 58.1, 59.4, Suet. Aug. 56, 
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be even worse than anything the author directly reports. This is a clever and 
dignified treatment, which does not spare the emperor but retains the high tone.  
Suetonius, as a biographer, is less reluctant to report insult directly. For example, 
he repeats Julius Caesar’s obscene threats, and the resulting exchange of insults 
in the senate: 
quo gaudio elatus non temperavit, quin paucos post dies frequenti 
curia iactaret, invitis et gementibus adversariis adeptum se quae 
concupisset, proinde ex eo insultaturum omnium capitibus; ac 
negante quodam per contumeliam facile hoc ulli feminae fore, 
responderit quasi adludens: in Suria quoque regnasse Sameramin 
magnamque Asiae partem Amazonas tenuisse quondam. 
Transported with joy at this success, he could not keep from 
boasting a few days later before a crowded house, that having 
gained his heart’s desire to the grief and lamentation of his 
opponents, he would therefore from that time mount on their 
heads; and when someone insultingly remarked that that would be 
no easy matter for any woman, he replied in the same vein that 
Semiramis too had been queen in Syria and the Amazons in days 
of old had held sway over a great part of Asia.
 433
  
That this appears more suited to a rugby (harpastum?) club dinner than an 
exchange in the senate is precisely the point. Repeating the insults furnishes a 
good story, so they are easily remembered and circulated. Directly reporting the 
insults lowers the tone, so that his account lacks the gravitas that Tacitus 
achieved by recording the fact of insult but omitting the detail.  
                                                 
433
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Insult posed potential problems for the speaker as well as his target. Cicero was 
concerned that his brother’s irritability and rudeness might damage his 
reputation, and warned him against sending any more insulting letters, as enough 
damage had been done.
434
 Cicero gives examples and adds that he should destroy 
letters that might cast him in a bad light because they are unfair, unjust or 
contradictory (epistolae iniquae, iniustates, contrariae).
435
 Quintilian advises the 
young orator that insults should be used cautiously because of the risk to one’s 
dignity and of giving offence.
436
 The problem was not only that the target would 
be angry, but that a devastating response made the speaker look foolish. The 
elder Seneca and Quintilian both record examples of particularly witty and 




Pliny provides an example which shows the importance of responding adroitly to 
an awkward remark. When a certain Paulus was reciting his elegaics: 
is cum recitaret, ita coepit dicere: ‘Prisce, iubes...’. ad hoc 
Iavolenus Priscus (aderat enim ut Paulo amicissimus) ‘ego vero 
non iubeo.’  
[H]e began with the words, “Priscus, you command me…” At 
this, Javolenus Priscus, who was there as a close friend of Paulus, 
broke in: “But I do not command you.”438 
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 Cic. Q. fr. 1.1 37-41. 
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 Cic. Q. fr. 1.2.8-9. 
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 Quint. Inst. 2.12.5. 
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 E.g. Quint. Inst. 6.3.71-94; Sen. Suas 3. 2-12, 4. 4-5. While not precisely an insult, Quint. Inst. 
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438
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This is met with general hilarity, but Pliny does not view the incident as amusing. 
His criticism of Priscus as “slightly mad” (est omnino Priscus dubiae sanitatis) is 
surprising, since he was a distinguished lawyer and experienced governor, and it 
is at least possible that Pliny’s disapproval springs from rivalry. However, his 
judgement about inappropriate speech is not reserved for the joker: 
interim Paulo aliena deliratio aliquantum frigoris attulit. tam 
sollicite recitaturis providendum est, non solum ut sint ipsi sani 
verum etiam ut sanos adhibeant.  
Meanwhile, the eccentric behaviour of another brought Paulus a 
lukewarm reception. So people intending to offer a recital should 
ensure not only that they themselves are sound in mind, but also 
that the audience they invite are, too!
439
 
Pliny presents both men as adversely affected by the incident, because the 
recitation degenerated into farce. Paulus failed to come up with a witty rejoinder 
that might have saved the situation. 
3.3 Insults and social status  
The elder Seneca underlines the stark realities of power relations in imperial 
Rome. The subject for one declamation has a rich man assumed to have killed a 
poor man for insulting him.
 440
 The low status of the victim’s son allows limited 
redress. Suetonius reports, with disapproval, that Nero’s father Domitius 
Ahenobarbus, struck out a freedman’s eye for speaking too freely in a dispute.441 
The younger Seneca advises bearing cheerfully with wrongs done by the 
powerful, so they will not be encouraged to repeat the insult. The implication is 
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that they both can and will do so. Survival in royal service is ascribed to 
“suffering wrongs and saying thank you”.442  
However, there are some circumstances when insults were tolerated. Dio 
describes a Gaul calling Gaius “a big humbug” (μέγα παραλήρημα) and escaping 
without harm, because he was a shoemaker.
443
 Dio draws the moral: 
οὕτω που ῥᾷον τὰς τῶν τυχόντων ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐν ἀξιώσει τινὶ ὄντων 
παρρησίας οἱ τοιοῦτοι φέρουσι.  
Thus it is, apparently, that persons of such rank as Gaius can bear 
the frankness of the common herd more easily than that of those 
who hold high position.
444
 
There are other examples of humble people speaking openly to and about their 
superiors without suffering harm. Indeed they are envied for being able to do 
so.
445
 Two strands of thought seem interwoven. Firstly, there is a view that 
ordinary people like this Gaul are “simplex”, which means they lack the 
sophistication that would enable them to express insult without dissembling. The 
simple nature of the Gauls seems to be used almost proverbially, and as a result, 
they were among those that received a certain amount of licence and even 
amused toleration.
446
 For example, Quintilian says that: 
nam in convictibus et cotidiano sermone lasciva humilibus, hilaria 
omnibus convenient.  
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On social occasions and in daily conversation, risqué jokes will 




This attitude is reflected in law, since certain people were not believed capable of 
giving offence.
448
 Children and the mentally handicapped fell into this class, 
while Seneca describes the insulting wit (contumeliosa) of slaves as amusing, 
provided it begins with their masters.
449
 
Secondly, such people were tolerated because their insults posed no threat. 
Where there is a large variation in the relative status of the two parties, 
magnanimity serves to emphasise that the superior’s standing is so great that he 
cannot be harmed by insults from his inferiors. This was a favourite strategy of 
both Augustus and Vespasian, who implicitly underline their own superior status 
in this way.
450
 Dio disapproves when Tiberius shows that he had understood 
insults against him. It would have been better to pretend not to realise the 
implications and take no notice.
451
 
Misinterpreting insults, and therefore failing to understand that there were 
grounds for offence, was not a tactic confined to emperors. Ignoring an insult 
was a potentially successful means of avoiding a difficult situation because it 
allowed relations to remain cordial between the parties. This was so important 
that inferiors actively created situations where misinterpretation was possible. 
Quintilian suggests that when documentary evidence proves false it should be 
ascribed to ignorance on the part of the signatories, rather than fraud.
452
 Similar 
suggestions are made about the use of euphemisms which allow all present to 
                                                 
447
 Quint. Inst. 6.3.28. 
448
 Dig. 47.10.3. 
449
 Sen. Constant. 11.3. eadem causa est, cur manciporum nostrorum urbanitas in dominos 
contumeliosa delectet, quorum audacia ita demum sibi in convivas ius facit, si coepit a domino.  
450
 E.g. Suet. Aug. 5, 55; Vesp. 13.   
451
 Cass. Dio 57.23. 
452
 Quint. Inst. 5.5.1. 
  
                                                                                         141 
 
ignore inconvenient realities: luxury can be described as generosity, avarice as 
economy, carelessness as simplicity.
453
  
A variation on this strategy of offering the opportunity to misinterpret insult, 
even if it meant massaging the facts into a more palatable version, occurs in 
Cicero’s letters. In 50 BC, it was proposed in the senate that Cicero should be 
awarded a supplicatio for his military success against the Parthians while 
governor of Cilicia. Cato’s opposition to this was an insult, and he wrote to 
Cicero to explain his actions.
 454
 Shackleton Bailey argues that “It was obviously 
not an easy letter to write. … It would have been more in keeping with the 
accredited character of the writer if he had defended his opposition as a matter of 
principle instead of resorting to … humbug.”455 However, this may not quite 
reflect the subtleties involved. Cicero was able to make a courteous response, 
accepting Cato’s implicit good will, so it seems more likely that any 
awkwardness arises not from self-consciousness at writing “humbug” but 
because Cato is aware he is re-positioning the reality.
456
 The insult caused by his 
vote against Cicero is presented as a minor awkwardness, one barely worth 
noticing given his regard for Cicero’s prestige (maiestas). Since there has been 
no open disagreement, good relations have been preserved. In this case, we can 
see that this was a deliberate strategy, because Cicero is more open about his 
views when he writes to Atticus. Although he initially presents a neutral account 
of events, he later writes in far more assertive terms, describing the denial of the 
supplicatio (and therefore Cato’s vote) as a “humiliation” (dedecus).457 The 
situation has been managed by accepting Cato’s face-saving misinterpretation; 
that does not mean it has not been perceived and Cicero’s letter to Atticus reveals 
his anger. The problem is not only Cato’s conduct, but that Caesar has written 
about it to Cicero, who detects gloating. Caesar’s letter brings the situation into 
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the open and Cicero interprets this as damaging to his status. If he can, he tells 
Atticus, he will take steps to redress the situation, though he is not able to 
suggest exactly how this can be done.
458
 
Ignoring or misinterpreting insult was successful as long as it could be done 
convincingly. The elder Seneca describes an incident when the strategy failed, 
embarrassing Porcius Latro. Latro accidently insulted Marcus Agrippa in the 
course of a declamation by referring to his humble origins, and therefore those of 
Augustus’ grandsons.459 Both Agrippa and Augustus were present, as was 
Maecenas. He signalled to Latro to conclude his remarks, and so drew attention 
to the situation. Some, Seneca says, thought that this was done maliciously, so 
that Augustus could not ignore the insult. The only way to save face was for 
Latro himself to continue to appear unaware of what had happened. Apologising 
would make the situation worse and Seneca has considerable sympathy for 
Latro’s predicament. Ignoring insults worked if it could be believed that the 
recipient had not noticed them. Once the reality of the situation was forced into 
open view, redress had to be sought to avoid damage to one’s reputation. 
3.4 Status, criticism and reproof 
A member of the Roman elite had friends of varying status, and this affected 
strategies for managing criticism. Criticism is perilously close to insult, because 
of its potential to offend and to damage status. Habinek explores this in the 
context of Cicero’s letters, suggesting that the “junior” friend could criticise his 
senior more safely than an equal or a superior, because the disparity in status 
made his remarks less threatening. Habinek argues that Cicero’s letters 
manipulate relative standing between friends for his own political purposes.
460
 
This fits well with the concept that showing tolerance towards inferiors was an 
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effective way of demonstrating high status, discussed above. Plutarch’s concerns 
over distinguishing a dangerous flatterer from a helpful friend reflect similar 
concerns with friendship, criticism and status. The junior friend’s role was not an 
easy one, and training in how to give and receive reproof safely started in the 
schoolroom. Quintilian’s ideal teacher is himself a good man, who trains his 
pupils by accentuating the positive. Sarcasm and abuse are not desirable when 
correcting students because they will take him in dislike. A popular teacher will 
inspire and encourage his students to imitate his good conduct.
461
 
Plutarch provides further evidence when he advises Nicander on making the 
most of his education. He is told to listen humbly and avoid answering back.
462
 
Plutarch was writing for a young man intending to study philosophy rather than 
oratory and for a provincial audience, so that his world was removed from the 
Roman elite. Nonetheless, it is informative that rebukes should neither be 
ignored and scoffed at nor taken so much to heart that the hearer runs away in 
shame.
463
 Plutarch provides advice on receiving even an unjust reproof: 
καὶ γὰρ ὀὲν ἀδίκως ἡ ἐπιτίμησις γίγνεσθαι δοκῇ, καλὸν 
ἀνασχέσθαι καὶ διακαρτερῆσαι λέγοντος: παυσαμένῳ δ᾽ αὐτὸν 
ἐντυχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον καὶ δεόμενον τὴν παρρησίαν ἐκείνην καὶ 
τὸν τόνον, ᾧ νῦν κέχρηται πρὸς αὐτὸν , εἴς τι τῶν ἀληθῶς 
ἁμαρτανομένων φυλάττειν. 
it is an admirable thing to endure it with continued patience while 
the man is speaking; and when he has come to the end, to go to 
him with an explanation, and beg him to reserve for some real 
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It might be tempting to dismiss these as idealised views, appropriate for students, 
but not for adult life. However, Pliny writes in response to a letter from his 
grandfather-in-law, and what he says fits this paradigm almost exactly.
465
 He 
begins by stating his willingness to help Fabatus’ protégé, and there is a strong 
suggestion that the older man has expressed criticism fairly freely: 
epistularum, quas mihi ut ais ‘aperto pectore’ scripsisti, oblivisci me 
iubes:  
You bid me forget the letters which you wrote, as you put it, “with 
the heart’s candour”. 
Pliny acknowledges the implied criticism and Fabatus’ status: 
ex illis enim vel praecipue sentio, quanto opere me diligas, cum 
sic exegeris mecum, ut solebas cum tuo filio.  
they make me realise as never before how much you love me, 
when you make the same demands on me as you used to on your 
own son. 
He goes on to offer an explanation that there was in fact no fault to answer: 
nec dissimulo hoc mihi iucundiores eas fuisse, quod habebam 
bonam causam, cum summo studio curassem quod tu curari 
volebas.  
I admit my pleasure was increased by knowing I had a good case: 
I had already done my best to carry out your request. 
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Pliny ends his letter by saying: 
proinde etiam atque etiam rogo, ut mihi semper eadem 
simplicitate, quotiens cessare videbor (‘videbor’ dico, numquam 
enim cessabo) convicium facias, quod et ego intellegam a summo 
amore proficisci, et tu non meruisse me gaudeas.  
I do beg you then most earnestly to reprove me with the same 
frankness whenever I seem to fail in my duty (I say ‘seem’ 
because I never really shall fail). I shall understand that real 
affection prompts your reproaches and you shall be glad to find I 
did not deserve them.
466
 
The formula of endurance, explanation and earnest desire for frank discussion of 
faults has served Pliny well here. He has in fact made no real concession to 
Fabatus, but has successfully shown deference towards the older man. That is 
important, since Fabatus was owed respect by virtue of age and connection 
through marriage. Mishandling this relationship would reflect badly on Pliny, 
who avoids the trap, and instead emphasises the family tie that unites them. His 
approach here shows that notions of etiquette imparted in the schoolroom were 
indeed recognised as appropriate in the adult world.  
Recent work has considered both the position of individual letters within the 
books and the relationships of themes within the books.
467
 In the example 
discussed above, Pliny was defending himself against criticism for failing to 
provide support requested on someone else’s behalf. Elsewhere, Pliny is found 
recommending friends for office or canvassing on behalf of others.
 468
 One of 
these is letter 6.6, in which Pliny writes to Fundanus about the exemplary Julius 
Naso. Its position in relation to his reply to Fabatus at 6.12 is surely no co-
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incidence, since it means that Pliny has already reminded his audience how one 
ought to write a letter supporting a junior friend.
469
 Pliny tells Fundanus: 
si quando, nunc praecipue cuperem esse te Romae, et sis rogo. 
opus est mihi voti laboris sollicitudinis socio. petit honores Iulius 
Naso; petit cum multis, cum bonis, quos ut gloriosum sic est 
difficile superare. 
Now if ever I should like your presence at Rome and I beg you to 
be there. I need a comrade to share my prayer and toil and 
anxiety. Julius Naso is a candidate for office, along with many 




This is presented in terms of a compliment to Fundanus’ own status. Pliny 
suggests that Fundanus’ moral authority is so great he can only bring benefit to 
the campaign:  
ea est auctoritas tua, ut putem me efficacius tecum etiam meos 
amicos rogaturum.  
Such is your authority that I believe that I will importune even my 
own friends more effectively if you are with me.
471
  
Pliny also manages to remind us about the danger involved, because if a 
candidate did badly, his sponsor lost face. Pliny presents this as a game of 
relative status and a risky one at that. It may be that the stakes are not as high as 
Pliny suggests, but if we take him at his own evaluation, Fabatus’ letter of 
criticism begins to seem rather gauche. By providing this wider context, Pliny 
repositions the situation so that Fabatus’ criticism reveals his lack of 
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understanding of his grandson-in-law’s sophisticated world. Pliny is someone 
who himself recommends excellent candidates, supported by men of great 
auctoritas, and whose prestige relies on their success. Fabatus’ criticism is 
shown to be ill-judged and Pliny’s response correspondingly more gracious. 
Pliny has demonstrated how to handle a rebuke by his grandfather-in-law. When 
it comes to administering a reproof, Pliny’s letter to Geminus provides an 
example of how it should be done. Geminus has asked for a dedication of one of 
Pliny’s works. His letter is praised and the request acknowledged. However, 
there is a problem: 
obveniet materia vel haec ipsa quam monstras, vel potior alia. sunt 
enim in hac offendicula non nulla: circumfer oculos et occurrent. 
A suitable topic will occur to me, either the one which you 
indicate or something else more suitable, since your suggested 
topic contains comments of a slightly offensive nature. Take a 
look and they will strike you.
472
 
What can have been offensive? Pliny allows the reader no clue, and suggests that 
Geminus’ social sense is so finely attuned that he will realise his error when he 
looks again. Since the mistake is slight and inadvertent, Pliny can comply with 
the request, leave the issue and end the letter with unimpaired cordiality. 
However, Geminus has offended and by publishing that fact and his own reproof, 
Pliny has maintained the upper hand in the exchange.  
The philosopher Epictetus was a former slave, probably of the imperial 
household, who set up a school of philosophy at Nicopolis. The historian Arrian 
circulated notes taken at his lectures. This has the advantage that it provides a 
“snapshot” view, rather than the polished self-presentation of Pliny’s letters. 
When Epictetus reprimands a young man over his effeminate dress and hairstyle, 
                                                 
472
 Plin. Ep. 9.11.1. 
  
                                                                                         148 
 
he provides a master class in rebuke and status.
473
 Epictetus takes the youth 
through a form of Socratic dialogue to establish that true beauty lies in 
excellence and moderation, but he is on dangerous ground. Although he has 
standing as a teacher of philosophy, he is the social inferior of his students. 
Offending them could have unpleasant repercussions. So he deals with the 
problem by acknowledging the situation with apparent frankness, and claiming 
that it is his duty as a philosopher to speak out. The student would only have 
grounds to complain if Epictetus made excuses for him rather than correcting the 
fault.  
τὴν μὲν κόμην ἠδύνατό μου διορθῶσαι, τὰ μὲν περιάμματά μου 
περιελεῖν, ψιλούμενόν με παῦσαι ἠδύνατο, ἀλλὰ βλέπων με — 
τίνος εἴπω; — σχῆμα ἔχοντα ἐσιώπα.’ ἐγὼ οὐ λέγω, τίνος ἐστὶ τὸ 
σχῆμα τοῦτο: σὺ δ᾽ αὐτὸ ἐρεῖς τόθ᾽, ὅταν εἰς σαυτὸν ἔλθῃς, καὶ 
γνώσει, οἷόν ἐστι καὶ τίνες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσι. 
[Epictetus] could at least have set my hair right, he could have 
stripped me of my ornaments, he could have made me stop 
plucking my hairs; but although he saw me looking like – what 
shall I say? – he held his peace. As for me, I do not say what it is 
you look like, but you yourself will say it when you come to 
yourself and will realise what it is and the kind of people those are 
who act this way. 
Epictetus puts the formula for accepting rebuke into the student’s own mouth, 
distancing himself from it, and suggesting that the student will in due course 
acknowledge its force. The insult is lessened because the accusation is not made 
overt. The implication that the young man is acting out of innocence rather than 
depravity also softens the rebuke. And Epictetus employs a further distancing 
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effect by claiming that the young man will realise that it would never occur to 
Epictetus himself to criticise anyone like this; he is the mouthpiece of a 
beneficent deity. These strategies allow criticism to be delivered without causing 
offence. 
Criticism could be made more palatable by using flattery, and both Plutarch and 
Quintilian suggest criticising the most important aspect of the problem and 
ignoring trivialities.
474
 If possible criticism should be made about someone else, 
and the target left to draw his own conclusions about its applicability. Pliny 
offers a variation on this theme when he claims that witnessing another father’s 
harsh treatment of a son leads him to advise Junior to treat his child leniently.
475
 
If this strategy cannot be employed, then the problem should be presented as one 
flaw amidst other excellent qualities, which should be duly praised. Lendon’s 
view of praise as a “currency” among the elite has been discussed in chapter 2, 
and it offered a face-saving strategy that could be used to minimise the effects of 
delivering a rebuke. Pliny uses this technique skilfully, writing that although he 
has been criticised for over-generous praise, he prefers this to disparaging his 
friends as others do theirs.
476
 The cynical reader may wonder if anyone has really 
reproached Pliny for this, but whether true or not, countering the allegation 
allows him to underline his own virtue because he values his friends so highly. 
He also creates a situation where any reproof is expressed within the context of 
his open admiration of his friends.  
Criticising someone was a fraught process for the Roman elite because of its 
potential to create resentment or backfire on the speaker. It was easier for a 
junior friend to criticise a senior, but even so, considerable tact and 
circumlocution were required. The evidence suggests that strategies for 
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delivering criticism safely were subtle and indirect, and learned from an early 
age.  
3.5 Imperial status and insult 
The evidence about freedom of speech and imperial status is concerned both with 
the princeps’ political position in the senate, and his social position as a member 
of the elite. Talbert notes the emperor’s “social contacts remained almost 
exclusively confined to the senatorial class and certain closely related equites. 
The affable emperor visited them when they were sick, invited them to dinner, 
and accepted invitations in return. Predictably, senators responded well to such 
imperial civility.”477 The line between social and political success was a fine one. 
It was from these men that the emperor selected his advisors, the so-called 
consilium principis, although this is not a contemporary term.
478
 Rather, those 
close to the emperor are described as amici and this must be understood not as a 
personal “friend” (familiaris), but rather as a more formal business 
relationship.
479
 Inviting trusted intimates to act as advisors was a republican 
practice.
480
 The distinction, of course, was that the emperor’s political role was 
unique, and his decision on any subject was final. By their nature, meetings of 
the emperor and his amici have left little trace in the historical record. Dio says 
this explicitly.
481
 There are hints that some emperors were better at selecting and 
listening to their amici than others. Juvenal satirises a consilium held to advise 
Domitian on finding a dish for a turbot.
482
 His description of the council 
members focusses upon their helplessness and hatred, and speeches by Catullus 
and Veiento parody those appropriate for a more serious occasion. Finally, the 
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council are dismissed and Juvenal draws the moral that even if this was a waste 
of time, it was better than Domitian turning his attention to more serious 
matters.
483
 Care is needed when satire is used to inform understanding of 
historical events, and other accounts of emperors turning to trivial matters in a 
crisis are not much more satisfactory. Nero is described exhibiting new forms of 
water-organs to his amici instead of consulting them about Vindex’s revolt.484 
The story about Gaius summoning consulars to the palace at night and dancing 
for them is similar in tone.
485
 In contrast, when Pliny describes his experiences as 
one of a group of assessors for Trajan, he praises the emperor’s excellent 
character and worthy decisions.
486
 Trajan was concerned with appropriate 
business and demonstrated sincerity and competence. However, this also reflects 
well on Pliny as his amicus so that it does not provide an objective account.  
Some scholars have suggested that advisors were employed to manipulate the 
senate as a whole. For example, Augustus set up a standing committee to prepare 
business before the senate met.
487
 Crook suggests that this was to prevent the 
senate from complaining it had no influence on proceedings, and allow the 
consuls to consult with the emperor before meetings.
488
 There is so little 
evidence that it is difficult to assess the impact of this council; even the dates of 
its operation are conjectural.
489
 More significant is that it lapsed after Augustus’ 
death, suggesting that neither Tiberius nor its members were entirely comfortable 
with such a constitutional novelty.  
When Vespasian was disgraced for falling asleep during Nero’s performances, 
the penalty illustrates the role of the emperor’s entourage in power relations. He 
experienced progressive banishment, first from the emperor’s inner circle, then 
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 Access to the emperor’s person was the key to 
influence, and association with the emperor was a way to gain influence and 
reward. Claudius’ principate is sometimes presented as marking a shift to a 
“palace culture” or “court” with the influence of his wives and freedmen central 
to brokering power. Various arguments are put forward for this: difficulties in his 
relationship with the senate, where he was given the least prestigious position of 
speaking last during Gaius’ principate, or a lack of preparation for public 
position so that he was more accustomed to palace life.
491
 There are signs, 
however, that it merely continues a pre-existing trend. Millar notes that the lack 
of publicly appointed officials meant that it was natural for the emperor to turn to 
his own freedmen, and that the period of their influence is a short one, the middle 
of the first century AD. After that, equestrian posts become increasingly 
important in imperial administration.
492
 Wallace-Hadrill argues that the 
emperor’s unique role as ultimate patron led to his household becoming 
supremely influential, and a locus of gossip. This therefore increased the 
influence of non-senators, so that dynastic faction and palace intrigue became 
politically dangerous.
493
 Wallace-Hadrill argues for a complex, undefined 
membership, with proximity to the emperor’s person as key to influence, and 
possessing “essential ambiguity … as an institution in a private household with a 
central role in public life”.494 It is surely correct to imagine complex and subtle 
undercurrents affecting freedom of speech for those that surrounded the emperor 
and depended on his good will, though the evidence is scanty. The impact of 
gossip will be discussed in chapter 5.  
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The emperor’s household was based on the model of a Republican aristocrat.495 
This precedent extended to his social relationships with the elite, and both 
Cassius Dio and Suetonius describe Augustus rushing from the senate to avoid 
insulting others.
496
 This is presented as an example of liberal behaviour because 
he does not publicly rebuke the senators who have provoked him nor impair his 
dignity by an angry or excessive response. In fact, his behaviour accords with 
elite strategies for limiting insult and offence, as discussed above. It also marks 
his exceptional status, because leaving the senate was not usually acceptable. 
Augustus explains his action as incorrect but expedient, since he avoided being 
compelled to do something harsh.
497
 There were Republican role models for 
individuals whose personal auctoritas set them outside the usual rules of 
acceptable behaviour. Pliny has an anecdote about Cato being discovered while 
drunk, which embarrassed the onlookers, but not Cato himself. Like Cato, 
Augustus’ auctoritas is so great that he can behave “incorrectly” and still emerge 
with his reputation enhanced.
498
 However, there is a crucial difference because 
the accounts emphasise that his mild response is a matter of personal choice, with 
the implied possibility that the princeps might act more severely. This ambiguity 
over imperial status and uncertain response pervades the elite’s relationship with 
the emperor. 
The importance of the imperial domus means that Scott’s model of a “theatrical 
imperative” seems helpful for understanding the issues of control and 
suppression in how the emperor was addressed. Scott argues that dominant 
parties dictate roles and lines to subordinates, who are forced to play along and 
follow a “public transcript” which reflects the official version of events.499 He 
suggests that a disparity of power leads to a “performance of respect” where 
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emotion is suppressed, extreme politeness is used, and people are reluctant to 
make jokes or say anything which might give offence.
500
 Scott offers two 
alternative outcomes for people in this situation, basing his arguments on 
sociological models. Either the strain of co-operating with the required 
performance leads the speaker to burst out with their real feelings, or the “mask 
comes to fit”.501 There is evidence that appears to fit this pattern. According to 
Tacitus, when Britannicus died at an imperial banquet, those who understood the 
implications remained seated, waiting for Nero to show them the desired 
response. Nero ascribed the attack to epilepsy, and the company accepted it. 
Britannicus’ sister Octavia was present and Tacitus reports: 
Octavia quoque, quamvis rudibus annis, dolorem caritatem omnes 
adfectus abscondere didicerat. ita post breve silentium repetita 
convivii laetitia.  
Octavia too, youth and inexperience not withstanding had learned 
to hide her griefs, her affections, her every emotion. 




In Scott’s formulation, they have accepted the “public transcript”. There are 
other examples, such as Agrippina pretending not to understand that she had 
escaped assassination. Tacitus records that her “one defence against treachery 
was to leave it undetected”.503 Nero and his advisors could not believe she was 
prepared to dissemble and their fear of detection hardened their resolve to 
complete the murder. 
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The necessity of preserving the emperor’s reputation by not acknowledging the 
reality of a situation occurs elsewhere in Tacitus: 
Iuliusque Montanus senatorii ordinis, sed qui nondum honorem 
capessisset, congressus forte per tenebras cum principe, quia vi 
attemptantem acriter reppulerat, deinde adgnitum oraverat, quasi 
exprobrasset, mori adactus est. 
Julius Montanus, a member of the senatorial order, though he had 
not yet held office, met the emperor casually in the dark, and, 
because he repelled his offered violence with spirit, then 
recognized his antagonist and asked for pardon, was forced to 
suicide, the apology being construed as a reproach.
504
 
Montanus’ crime was not that he struck the emperor, but that he had admitted 
doing so. Bartsch uses these examples to suggest that: “When an emperor’s 
audience fails to decode the spectacle before their eyes into reality and then 
recode their own response back into the feigned and theatrical, the outcome is 
death.”505 However, as Bartsch notes, her examples reflect Tacitus’ view of 
events and this may present a problem of interpretation. The emperor’s position, 
his relationship with the elite, and questions raised by the contemporary evidence 
will be discussed fully in chapter 4. For now, it needs to be noted that Tacitus’ 
evidence may be coloured by wider literary concerns. Nor is it clear that 
Bartsch’s approach, and Scott’s influential model, fully take into account the 
specific nature of Roman elite society. The emperor was, in theory, one elite 
Roman among others. He may have been the ultimate patron, and the person of 
greatest auctoritas, but he was still primus inter pares and not outside the 
system.  
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The evidence for Nero’s principate may be further complicated, because it seems 
that there was a fashion for insult within the emperor’s close circle. Offensive 
epigrams were popular and the Apocolocyntosis and the Satyricon may reflect 
contemporary trends for insulting literature.
506
 Dio reports that: 
ἦν δέ τις Μᾶρκος Σάλουιος Ὄθων, ὃς οὕτως ἔκ τε τῆς ὁμοιότητος 
τῶν τρόπων καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων τῷ Νέρωνι 
ᾠκείωτο ὥστε καὶ εἰπών ποτε πρὸς αὐτόν ‘οὕτω με Καίσαρα 
ἴδοις’ οὐδὲν διὰ τοῦτο κακὸν ἔπαθεν, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον 
ἀντήκουσεν ὅτι ‘οὐδὲ ὕπατόν σε ὄψομαι.’  
There was a certain Marcus Salvius Otho, who had become so 
intimate with Nero through the similarity of their character and 
their companionship in crime that he was not even punished for 
saying to him one day, “As truly as you may expect to see me 
Caesar!” All that he got for it was the response: “I shall not see 
you even consul.”507 
Dio disapproves of this, pointing a moral about the men’s bad character, but the 
anecdote also shows a potential political danger. Excessively free speech among 
Nero and his intimates seems to have created problems of response, with 
confusion over what was and was not acceptable. Some of those who joined the 
Pisonian conspiracy in AD 65 are alleged to have done so after taking offence at 
imperial insults. This suggests that Nero was not handling his “script” for dealing 
with the elite correctly, since Tacitus claims that both Lucan and Afranius 
Quintianus were motivated by resentment. Lucan was insulted because his poetry 
was suppressed and Quintianus at being targeted in a scurrilous poem by Nero.
508
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The evidence for Lucan’s quarrel with the emperor is the more solid.509 Lucan 
was forced to commit suicide in 65 and his last words were allegedly a quotation 
from the Pharsalia.
510
 It is hard to know quite how to unravel the various 
accounts, but it seems that a breakdown in the personal relationship between the 
two men contributed to Lucan’s hostility, and that insult was a factor. 
If the etiquette of the imperial domus reflects the established relationship 
between clients, subordinates and their patron, then it is well within that model 
both to recognise the underlying reality of a situation, and to ignore it. Cicero and 
Cato used that strategy to retain cordial relations a hundred years before Nero’s 
amici. The example of Pastor attending a banquet with Gaius after his son’s 
murder reflects a situation warped by the emperor’s misconduct, but ignoring 
insult was a normal, acceptable strategy for minimising its effect.
 511
 Etiquette for 
dealing with a difficult situation has become distorted by imperial cruelty and 
extreme circumstances, but the basic model remains intact. The problem is 
therefore not that the model for dealing with insult between people of different 
status was artificial in itself, but that not all emperors played their role as senior 
partner properly. 
Tacitus claims he quotes Subrius Flavus’ explanation for why he joined the 
Pisonian conspiracy against Nero in AD 65: 
“oderam te,” inquit. “nec quisquam tibi fidelior militum fuit, dum 
amari meruisti: odisse coepi, postquam parricida matris et uxoris, 
auriga et histrio et incendiarius extitisti.” 
“I hated you,” he answered, “and yet there was not a man in the 
army truer to you, as long as you deserved to be loved. I began to 
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hate you when you turned into the murderer of your mother and 
your wife – a chariot driver, an actor, a fire-raiser.”512 
This is provided as an example of bluff, military plain speaking, but it also 
reveals that there are limits to imperial auctoritas. Subrius Flavus’ rebuke is not 
just an outburst along Scott’s lines, of “what everyone was thinking”, or a 
reaction against a “script”. It is a response to an emperor who has set himself 
outside the norms of elite behaviour and so forfeited any right to respect from his 
subordinates. The rules governing the relationship between the emperor and his 
subordinates have been stretched to breaking point. 
This contrasts with Augustus, who left the senate rather than be rude to his 
critics, so behaving as a great aristocrat who may bend the rules but not break 
them. Similarly, when Vespasian made jokes to and about his amici and Pliny 
emphasised Trajan’s willingness to acknowledge others’ merit, this was 
appropriate interaction.
513
 It allowed the elite to retain their dignitas. When the 
model of the princeps’ position within an acceptable, Republican-type 
framework as a respected senior friend held firm, subtle manipulation of relative 
status could be used to avoid conflict. For example, Asinius Pollio learnt that he 
had offended Augustus by holding a dinner party on the evening that Gaius 
Caesar’s death was announced. His explanation was that he had done exactly the 
same when his own son died.
514
 This is masterly, since it allowed Augustus to 
recognise that Pollio, as a bereaved (grand) parent, had equal claim to grief. 
Presenting the situation in terms of unsentimental, old-fashioned Roman virtus 
made any rebuke unseemly between fellow aristocrats.  
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The evidence suggests that an emperor who revealed his autocratic power too 
clearly created problems of response. Since he no longer retained the character of 
the senior member of the elite, people became confused and frightened about 
how to reply. This does not quite fit Scott’s model, where “transcripts” are 
imposed from above or evaded from below, because in imperial Rome the script 
was supposed to be a shared one. The emperor was on equal terms with his 
amici, and merely a little more equal than the others. The effect of imperial status 
on criticism and insult in regard to the elite is complicated because we are 
dealing with an unfamiliar culture and the surviving information is partial and 
prejudiced. It does suggest that we should be wary of imposing models from 
other societies on the very particular circumstances of the principate. It seems 
likely that an emperor who handled his role well retained respect among the elite, 
while an emperor who made the reality of his power too overt created 
resentments. These could lead to his downfall. This theme requires further 
investigation, and the next chapter will explore freedom of speech between the 
emperor and the senate. 
3.6 Private and public communication 
It has been argued that elite Romans needed to present themselves positively to 
the community as a whole, so that status was enhanced and repercussions 
avoided. Was there also a sense of a private exchange, one that carried no risk of 
negative consequences from wider society? Seneca describes degrees of severity 
for a reprimand, which suggests he has in mind a tidy sequence where 
communication moved from “private”, through “public” to “legally 
actionable”.515 However, the evidence does not reflect his model and it is far 
from clear that any such progression existed outside the philosopher’s writings.  
It is usually asserted that Roman concepts of “private” and “public” differed 
from modern western norms. In the modern world, a private communication is 
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shared between a small number of individuals, on the understanding that it is not 
intended for a wider audience. Any violation of this causes shock and offence. 
Defining boundaries between public and private is a contemporary concern, 
because new technologies make these problematic and changeable. For example, 
when using a medium such as Twitter, a message may reach a wider audience 
than anticipated, or cause unforeseen offence.
516
 This difficulty in defining one’s 
intended audience and in predicting the impact of a communication can be 
paralleled in Roman society. When Antistius Sosianus recited rude verses at a 
dinner party, he found himself prosecuted for maiestas by Cossutanius Capito.
517
 
When Clutorius Priscus was brought to trial for his poem anticipating Drusus’ 
death, the recital took place in a private house among a gathering of women and 
it is not clear that any written copy had circulated.
 518
 It is easy to suggest that 
these trials are “really” about politics and that reporting offensive speech 
provided a convenient excuse for factional attack. This needs to be explored 
further, since Sosianus and Priscus must have felt they were in a safe 
environment when they recited their poems; they did not expect public 
consequences. On other occasions, unfortunate remarks were made before a 
public audience with varying results. When Cestius criticised a declamation by 
Quinctilius Varus, son of Augustus’ disastrous general saying “it was by that 
kind of carelessness your father lost his army”, he incurred universal disapproval. 
Slandering the father to scold the son was not an appropriate rebuke, but it led to 
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no more than social difficulty.
519
 Why were some remarks subject to public 
interest and a trial but not others?  
When the sources consider an exchange among the elite, they also address the 
issues of who the participants and bystanders are, and the location where it 
occurs. They may discuss the subject matter of the conversation, but the topic 
does not decide whether it is of public concern. The distinction needs to be 
sought elsewhere, and Riggsby’s study seeks to define “public” and “private” in 
the Roman world. Riggsby argues that the Roman elite distinguished between 
“secrecy”, which is the deliberate concealment of information and activity from a 
particular audience, and “privacy”. Riggsby describes “privacy” as a 
“behavioural norm” which allows the existence of “secrecy” as a social 
construct, which permits the concealment to take place.
520
 He observes that 
publicus is an adjectival derivative of populus and so means something “of or 
pertaining to the community”, while privatus is derived from privus and is then 
defined negatively as “anything not related to the community as a whole”.521 
These definitions create a structure for his exploration of “public” 
communication as that in which the community might take an interest and 
“private” communication as that which was intended to be restricted to a limited 
circle.  
When considering freedom of speech, the distinction between public and private 
creates a real difficulty, and the evidence suggests we need to be even clearer 
about our terms. There is certainly an opposition between “public” and “private” 
in the source evidence, and it sometimes contrasts collective, community 
interests with those affecting individuals or families. The adjective singulus can 
be used synonymously with privatus in this context.
 
For example, Tacitus has 
Asinius Gallus say: 
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auctu imperii adolevisse etiam privatas opes, idque non novum, 
sed e vetustissimis moribus: aliam apud Fabricios, aliam apud 
Scipiones pecuniam; et cuncta ad rem publicam referri, qua tenui 
angustas civium domos, postquam eo magnificentiae venerit, 
gliscere singulos. 
With the expansion of the empire, private fortunes had also 
grown; nor was this new, but consonant with extremely ancient 
custom. Wealth was one thing with the Fabricii, another with the 
Scipios; and all was relative to the state. When the state was poor, 
you had frugality and cottages: when it attained a pitch of 
splendour such as the present, the individual also throve.
522
  
Privatus can also be used to designate a citizen’s role within the community with 
regard to whether or not they hold public office; Tacitus describes the young 
Octavian as adulescens privatus.
523
 By the time that Pliny is writing his 
Panegyricus he can describe Trajan’s status as privatus before he became 
emperor:  
scriberis ab amicis, ab ignotis praeteriris: nihilque inter privatum 
et principem interest, nisi quod nunc a pluribus amaris: nam et 
plures amas.  
You are named as heir by your friends and passed over by 
strangers; the only difference between the private individual and 
the princeps lies in the greater number of those who love you, as 
your own affections are more widely spread.
524
 
Pliny also contrasts the position of consuls as privati with that of Trajan as 
princeps: 
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contigit ergo privatis aperire annum, fastosque reserare: et hoc 
quoque redditae libertatis indicium fuit, quod consul alius quam 
Caesar esset. sic exactis regibus coepit liber annus, sic olim 
servitus pulsa privata fastis nomina induxit. 
And so ordinary people enjoyed the honour of opening the year 
and heading the official calendar, and this too was proof of liberty 
restored; the consul need not be Caesar. The year began in the 
same way after the Kings were expelled long ago when the 




Pliny uses privati to denote not citizens without office, but citizens who are not 
princeps. A similar opposition is made between privati and the kings of Rome, 
though with a careful emphasis to identify Trajan with the republican ideal. A 
pattern emerges in the sources whereby privati are still discovered in public 
contexts, as consuls and officials of state. This is not so surprising, since even the 
most personal affairs formed part of the competitive jockeying for status 
underpinning elite society. The topics Pliny writes about include brokering 
marriages and letters to his wife’s grandfather and aunt about her miscarriage.526 
These are not subjects to concern the individual and not the community; rather 
they concern the individual within his community. 
When publicus and related words are used in the imperial sources to refer to 
speech, they denote something which will become a matter of public knowledge. 
They may also be used to describe exchanges in the presence of an audience. So, 
for example, Suetonius tells us about Domitian’s literary interests: 
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simulavit et ipse mire modestiam in primisque poeticae studium, 
tam insuetum antea sibi quam postea spretum et abiectum, 
recitavitque etiam publice. 
He himself too made a remarkable pretence of modesty and 
especially of an interest in poetry, an art which had previously 
been as unfamiliar to him as it was later despised and rejected, 
and he even gave readings in public.
527
 
These seem to be open readings attended by a wide, if perhaps not entirely 
restricted, audience. An uncontrolled audience also emerge when Pliny describes 
Trajan’s public appearances: 
adventante congiarii die, observare principis egressum in 
publicum, insidere vias examina infantium futurusque populus 
solebat.  
On the day of the distribution, it had been the custom for swarms 
of children, the populace of the future, to watch for the emperor’s 
public appearance and line his path.
528
  
This suggests that in a “public” setting, the listeners cannot be easily controlled. 
“Public” does not necessarily concern what is said but who is present to hear it. It 
was rare for an elite Roman to be alone, since both within and without the home 
slaves would be present, often in large numbers.
529
 The continual company of 
friends and clients was so entrenched that when Cicero has Antony advise that it 
is best for clients to give their instructions privately, he needs to be explicit that 
total privacy means no one else is to be present.
530
 The presence of bystanders 
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should thus be seen as a normal factor, but their capacity to both judge and 
divulge conversations is viewed ambiguously by the sources. Seneca considered 
it a sufficient danger that he advises that one should cultivate friends and ignore 
gossip.
531
 Epictetus gives similar guidance.
532
 Plutarch provides examples where 
a public rebuke has proved counter-productive and caused the subject to deny 
that there is a problem in order to save face in front of an audience. He highlights 
criticising husbands in front of wives or parents in front of children as 
particularly disastrous.
533
 However, an audience was such an essential aspect of 
elite communication, that it could be exploited in order to manage an exchange. 
When Pliny describes a confrontation in the senate between Licinius Nepos and 
Juventius Celsus, each man was forewarned about his opponent’s argument; their 
friends had gossiped so much that it was as if they had agreed what to say.
534
 
Pliny’s picture of the senators scurrying (cursitabant) from one group to another 
in order to learn what is happening illustrates the role friends played in 
negotiating the exchange of information. Pliny may find such behaviour 
undignified, but he reveals social realities. This is a pre-negotiated exchange, and 
it has the advantage that none of the parties involved will be surprised by what is 
said. Here there is no conflict over whether anything should be withheld; the 
bystanders’ role is to facilitate communication. 
When it comes to considering the location of conversations, it is usually argued 
that a member of the Roman elite had limited privacy as it is understood in the 
modern west. This was partly due to the presence of slaves and friends, as 
described above, and partly due to other cultural factors. In modern society, the 
home is considered a private space, while external settings, especially 
workplaces, are public areas.
535
  Wallace-Hadrill describes elite Roman homes as 
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“a locus of public life. A public figure went home not so much in order to shield 
himself from the public gaze, as to present himself to it in the best light.”536 This 
awareness of the “public gaze” appears in Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ 
description of the censor’s office, whose remit extended to the bed-chamber and 
indeed everything that took place within the home.
537
 Wallace-Hadrill discusses 
the layout of a Roman domus and suggests that since the home was used for 
receiving guests and clients, there were grades of relative privacy. Thus the 
morning salutatio in the atrium would be generally open, cena in the triclinium 
would imply a greater level of intimacy and access to the cubiculum would be 
restricted to a privileged few.
538
 Wallace-Hadrill argues that the conventional 
translation of cubiculum as “bedroom” is misleading, as it formed part of a suite 
of rooms which became more private and restricted as the visitor penetrated from 
atrium to triclinium to cubiculum.
539
 Riggsby refines this idea and argues for the 
cubiculum as a space for privacy, but only within narrow limits and as one still 
subject to community judgement of acceptable standards.
540
 Both scholars are 
concerned with the problem of defining private and public space within the 
home, and neither archaeological evidence nor the Roman sources provide easy 
answers.  
When Pliny describes Trajan’s presence at his newly restored Circus Maximus, 
he declares: 
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licebit ergo te civibus tuis invicem contueri; dabitur, non 
cubiculum principis sed ipsum principem cernere in publico, in 
populo sedentem, populo, cui locorum quinque milia adiecisti.  
Thus your subjects will be able to look on you in their turn, they 
will be able to see not just the emperor’s cubiculum but the 
emperor himself in public, sitting among his people, the people to 
whom you have already given an additional five thousand seats.
541
 
Pliny here is marking out the cubiculum, which Betty Radice translates as 
“emperor’s box”, as a space apart from the seats of the ordinary people. The 
point of his eulogy here is Trajan’s accessibility in sharing the seats and 
spectacle with the populus. This cubiculum, which Trajan has chosen to leave so 
that his people can see him, physically separates the occupant from those not 
invited within. Pliny’s speech needs to be read cautiously, since its whole 
purpose is to praise Trajan, but this theme of the emperor’s accessibility in 
moving from private to public space was important enough for him to repeat.
542
 
On a less exalted occasion, Pliny is also concerned with accessibility. When he 
visited the ailing Corellius Rufus: 
servi e cubiculo recesserunt (habebat hoc moris, quotiens intrasset 
fidelior amicus) quin etiam uxor quamquam omnis secreti 
capacissima digrediebatur.  
His slaves retired from his cubiculum (this was a practice he 
maintained whenever one of his more trustworthy (fidelior) 
friends came in) and even his wife, who was wholly privy to 
every confidence, used to leave.
543
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In this case, the limited admission to the cubiculum is restricted further. Pliny 
and Corellius’ conversation lacks any bystanders and we only know about it 
because Pliny records the occasion. This situation was not confined to a 
cubiculum. When Spurrina invites Pliny to accompany him on a carriage-ride on 
his country estate, there is seclusion for conversation without an audience, and 
Pliny is at pains to stress that the invitation was a compliment.
544
   
This evidence suggests that it is not place per se but the presence or absence of 
an audience which governs the nature of an exchange. Tacitus describes 
Germanicus’ final conversations with his wife, when he advises her to be 
circumspect in her dealings with the powerful: 
tum ad uxorem versus per memoriam sui, per communis liberos 
oravit exueret ferociam, saevienti fortunae summitteret animum, 
neu regressa in urbem aemulatione potentiae validiores inritaret. 
haec palam et alia secreto, per quae ostendisse credebatur metum 
ex Tiberio. 
Then he turned to his wife, and implored her “by the memory of 
himself, and for the sake of their children, to strip herself of pride, 
to stoop her spirit before the rage of fortune, and never — if she 
returned to the capital — to irritate those stronger than herself by 
a competition for power”. These words in public: in private there 




Historical accuracy is not important here: what matters is the contrast between 
Germanicus’ words in the presence of bystanders and what he says without an 
audience, with the adverb palam used to denote when bystanders are present. The 
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example shows Tacitus understands the contrast between “open” and “secret” 
exchanges and expects his audience to do so too. The word he uses for 
confidential conversation is secretus, derived from secerno and with meanings 
which include separate, alone, solitary and hidden, and so “secret”. This word is 
used to describe someone going apart physically, as Otho does to write farewell 
notes when it becomes clear that his bid to become emperor has failed.
546
 It is 
also used to denote a conversation with an audience limited by invitation. When 
Pliny compares the freedom of speech under Trajan with the fear that remarks 
would be reported to Domitian, he wishes Trajan would overhear the confidential 
exchanges among family members: 
queri libet quod in secreta nostra non inquirant principes nisi quos 
odimus. nam si eadem cura bonis ac malis essent, quam ubique 
admirationem tui, quod gaudium exultationemque deprehenderes, 
quos omnium cum coniugibus ac liberis, quos etiam cum 
domesticis aris focisque sermones! 
We may well complain that it is only the rulers we hate who 
violate our privacy, for if good and bad were equally inquisitive, 
what universal admiration for yourself you would find, what 
delight and rejoicing, what conversations you would hear 
everywhere between us and our wives and children, and even 
before the hearths and altars of our homes.
547
 
These are conversations within the domus, taking place before the restricted, 
domestic audience. Tacitus provides an example of a contrast between 
information limited to a few persons and the extension of that knowledge to a 
wider audience: 
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quod postquam Sallustius Crispus particeps secretorum (is ad 
tribunum miserat codicillos) comperit, metuens ne reus 
subderetur, iuxta periculoso ficta seu vera promeret, monuit 
Liviam ne arcana domus, ne consilia amicorum, ministeria 
militum vulgarentur, neve Tiberius vim principatus resolveret 
cunta ad senatum vocando. 
The remark came to the ears of Sallustius Crispus. A partner in 
the imperial secrets — it was he who had forwarded the note to 
the tribune — he feared the charge might be fastened on himself, 
with the risks equally great whether he spoke the truth or lied. He 
therefore advised Livia not to publish the mysteries of the palace, 
the counsels of her friends, the services of the soldiery; and also to 
watch that Tiberius did not weaken the powers of the throne by 
referring everything and all things to the senate.
548
 
The adverb clam, meaning secretly, is also used to denote information restricted 
to a limited or privileged audience, as when Vespasian restricts his jibe against 
Licinius Mucius to a limited circle: 
Licinium Mucianum notae impudicitiae, sed meritorum fiducia 
minus sui reverentem, numquam nisi clam et hactenus retaxare 
sustinuit, ut apud communem aliquem amicum querens adderet 
clausulam: “ego tamen vir sum.” 
Though Licinius Mucianus, a man of notorious unchastity, 
presumed upon his services to treat Vespasian with scant respect, 
he never had the heart to criticize him except privately and then 
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only to the extent of adding to a complaint made to a common 
friend, the significant words: “I at least am a man.”549 
In this example, the expectation of privacy has been overturned, and the anecdote 
recorded, but the use of clam denotes that it was originally a quip made to a 
limited group and not intended for general circulation. 
If, in response to these examples, the definitions of “public” and “private” are 
adjusted so that the opposition is placed not between exchanges that are “public” 
and “private” but between ones that are “public” and “secret”, the tensions in the 
sources become far more explicable. This is why judging what could and could 
not be disseminated was a source of such anxiety among the Roman elite. 
Anxiety becomes especially acute at times of political turmoil, when the 
unscrupulous could report any conversation if it suited their purposes. The most 
notorious case was that of Titius Sabinus, encouraged to insult Tiberius by the 
seemingly friendly Latinius Latiaris while three senators hid and listened in the 
roof space above. Sabinus was denounced and executed; only his dog remained 
loyal. This conforms to the pattern we are starting to expect. In Tacitus’ account, 
Latiaris begins by encouraging Sabinus to express his hostility to Sejanus and 
Tiberius. He then meets Sabinus in the public setting of the street, and persuades 
him to return home and to enter a cubiculum as if he has fresh news to impart. 
There are echoes of comedy as Tacitus reports:   
tectum inter et laquearia tres senatores haud minus turpi latebra 
quam detestanda fraude sese abstrudunt foraminibus et rimis 
aurem admovent.  
Three senators thrust themselves into the space between the roof 
and ceiling, an ambuscade as humiliating as the ruse was 
detestable, and applied an ear to chinks and openings.
550
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We have seen that the move from the street to the cubiculum should have 
signalled that the conversation was intended to be secret. The conspirators offend 
against this code when they overhear and repeat what was said. The problem of 
how to define whether a conversation was secret or not resonates with Tacitus, 
and he concludes: 
non alias magis anxia et pavens civitas, tegens adversum 
proximos; congressus, conloquia, notae ignotaeque aures vitari; 
etiam muta atque inanima, tectum et parietes circumspectabantur. 
The anxiety and panic, the reticences of men towards their nearest 
and dearest, had never been greater: meetings and conversations, 
the ears of friend and stranger were alike avoided; even things 




No exchange can be safely categorised as “public” or “secret”, so it is best to 
keep quiet. In these circumstances, there was nowhere entirely safe from 
scrutiny. This brings us full circle back to the prosecutions of Antistius Sosianus 
and Clutorius Priscus, because it suggests why they did not anticipate the 
response to their poetry. They may have had confidence that the limited, invited 
audience and secluded setting meant they could speak more freely. Others 
present interpreted the situation differently and took the opportunity to disclose 
what they had heard.  
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how the status-conscious and hierarchical nature of 
Roman society affected response to insult and criticism. It has considered ways 
in which insult could be managed in order to avoid offence and allow social 
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relationships to function smoothly and with mutual benefits. Though the risks of 
offending someone with power and influence were severe, those of very low or 
very high status had more freedom of speech, because they stood apart from the 
structures which controlled the rest. The most humble lacked power and so posed 
no threat, while the highest had sufficient standing to rewrite social rules on their 
own terms. For the rest, this luxury was not available. The importance of relative 
status and patronage explains why a lesser friend can speak more openly than 
one of equal or superior status. The emperor’s position did not, in theory, differ 
greatly from that of other senior members of the elite. An emperor who 
successfully maintained that role faced fewer problems in interacting with the 
elite. 
Managing criticism required considerable finesse, and flattery was important for 
mediating negative remarks. Strategies were needed to avoid giving offence and 
to maintain the speaker’s own position as a well-intentioned man of good 
character. This was why ignoring or misinterpreting insults was an essential tool 
in elite Roman communications: if nothing to cause offence was recognised, then 
no difficulty existed. Relatively few cases of external control of insults are found 
in the sources, and it seems likely that this is because these strategies functioned 
automatically. Someone’s innate understanding of how to express insult or 
criticism safely, or how to respond, avoided offence. When someone failed to 
internalise these rules, or decided to ignore them, then the incident may leave 
evidence in the primary sources.  
The lack of clarity the sources reveal about whether insults were a matter for 
public suppression or private response stems from the nature of Roman society. 
The elite were surrounded by slaves and by an entourage of greater and lesser 
friends, and a domestic setting was not necessarily separate from the wider 
world. This meant that almost all communication was potentially exposed to an 
audience. Some exchanges might take place in secret, so that they were restricted 
to a limited and invited audience, but even then confidentiality depended upon 
the discretion of the participants not to broadcast the conversation. This is one 
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reason why the elite became particularly vulnerable to entrapment and 
denunciation at times of political stress. Moreover, little distinction was made 
between someone’s private behaviour and their innate moral character, which 
defined their fitness to play a role in public life. Individual moral conduct, of 
course, is defined and judged by the community’s standards. The evidence 
reveals constant tension between exchanges which are public and include an 
audience beyond the speakers’ control, and ones which are secret and meant only 
for those present. 
Chapters 2 and 3 have explored freedom of speech in elite Roman society, with a 
particular focus on the problems caused by humour, obscenity and insult, and the 
related problem of criticising someone without giving offence. They have 
demonstrated that everything an elite Roman said had the potential both to affect 
his own reputation and that of the person he spoke to or about. Strategies for 
managing communication were learned at a young age and became integral in 
adult life. Relationships were negotiated through constant awareness of where 
one was speaking, to whom, and in what company. No wonder the sources 
demonstrate such anxiety about appropriate speech. 
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4. Politics and freedom of speech: emperor and 
senate 
4.1 Introduction 
It is now time to consider political freedom of speech, particularly within the 
senate. Modern scholars reach widely disparate conclusions about the emperor’s 
position in regard to this. There are three broad groups of opinion. The first sees 
similarities between the Roman empire and a modern totalitarian state, with the 
emperor suppressing criticism in order to retain power.
552
 The second group 
argue that when freedom of speech was controlled, such as in maiestas trials, this 
was a legitimate response to threats against the emperor. They contend that the 
emperor ruled through and was himself subject to legal processes.
553
 The third 
group are more complicated and less cohesive, but share greater cynicism in 
regard to the effects of absolute power, which allowed the princeps to deal with 
the senate in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion if he chose to do so.
554
 These 
are deep waters and discussion of the constitutional nature of the emperor’s 
position is far beyond the scope of this study. For the purposes of the present 
discussion of freedom of speech, it is accepted that the emperor was an autocratic 
ruler with effective control of military and therefore civil affairs.
555
   
Talbert, in an exhaustive review, addresses the composition of the senate in the 
early empire, the developments in the career path for magistrates, and changes to 
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 The emperor’s patronage was necessary for political success, and 
Talbert argues that “in varying degrees all senators were no doubt conscious of 
the paradoxical nature of their status. On the one hand, they were supposedly 
exalted, independent leaders of the state; on the other they were servants of the 
emperor, totally dependent upon his favour both for individual advancement and 
for maintaining the position of the corporate body, indeed their class as a 
whole.”557 This “paradox” underpins the question of freedom of speech in the 
early empire: the senate is theoretically independent of the emperor, but in 
practical terms senators are subordinate to imperial whim.
558
  
Talbert notes the lack of surviving verbatim speeches, agendas for meetings, or 
records of proceedings in the senate.
559
 Some senatus consulta survive through 
inscriptions or legal texts. This means that it is mainly necessary to rely upon 
literary evidence. Talbert observes that Pliny describes his own direct 
experiences and that he, Tacitus and Cassius Dio had access to acta senatus and 
contemporary accounts which are now lost. However, care is needed when using 
literary sources. For example, Tacitus claims to use specific criteria for selecting 
which proposals he will record: 
exequi sententias haud institui nisi insignis per honestum aut 
notabili dedecore, quod praecipuum munus annalium reor ne 
virtutes sileantur utque pravis dictis factisque ex posteritate et 
infamia metus sit. ceterum tempora illa adeo infecta et adulatione 
sordida fuere ut non modo primores civitatis, quibus claritudo sua 
obsequiis protegenda erat, sed omnes consulares, magna pars 
eorum qui praetura functi multique etiam pedarii senatores 
certatim exsurgerent foedaque et nimia censerent.  
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My purpose is not to relate at length every proposal, but only such 
as were conspicuous for excellence or notorious for infamy. This I 
regard as history’s highest function, to let no worthy action be 
uncommemorated, and to hold out the reprobation of posterity as 
a terror to evil words and deeds. So corrupted indeed and debased 
was that age by sycophancy that not only the foremost citizens 
who were forced to save their grandeur by servility, but every 
exconsul, most of the ex-praetors and a host of inferior senators 




Tacitus says he will select the best and worst sententiae which provide exempla 
of good and bad conduct in the senate. On this occasion, what forms acceptable 
praise (laudatio) and what is disgraceful (adulatio) is made the theme of debate, 
whatever the topic. He will rank proposals in moral terms, so that bad ones 
become pravus, infamis, infectus, sordidus, obsequens, foedus. The result is that 
exercising libertas of speech may show that someone is a good man. The 
position is complicated, because this is not the case if what he actually says is 
dishonourable. This will be discussed in greater detail below.  
This formulation of libertas in moral terms is found in all the primary sources. 
For example when Suetonius weighs up the relative tolerance of each emperor, 
this is presented in terms of moral character.
561
 This moralising attitude is central 
to understanding political freedom of speech in the early Roman empire and will 
be explored in the course of the chapter. The first section will therefore set the 
scene, with an overview of how the sources present freedom of speech in routine 
senatorial affairs. This provides the context to consider praise and honours 
addressed to the emperor, and whether those were sincere or coerced. After that, 
how far criticism of the emperor and his policies was tolerated will be 
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investigated. Although, as Talbert notes, trial proceedings occurred as part of 
routine senatorial business and so are not necessarily distinguished in the literary 
sources, maiestas trials will be treated separately here because of their particular 
implications for libertas.
562
 Through this, we can consider the extent to which 
senators could speak freely to an emperor who, as Millar shows, acted “partly as 
a member of the senate and partly in disassociation from it”.563  
4.2 Debates in the senate 
It is difficult to assess freedom of speech in the senate because the sources make 
so little mention of routine business. Their interest generally lies in the 
exceptional, or with times of crisis. They describe Gaius’ megalomania and 
abuses, for example, but record almost nothing about day-to-day affairs.
564
 An 
account of a debate held in AD 16 illustrates the problem. There was a question 
over the timing of the vacation for the senate and law courts, because if this was 
arranged during the emperor’s absence, then Italians and provincials would still 
need to conduct legal business at Rome. Asinius Gallus opposed Gnaeus Piso’s 
argument that public business should be allowed to go ahead in the absence of 
the emperor. Tacitus says: 
Gallus, quia speciem libertatis Piso praeceperat, nihil satis inlustre 
aut ex dignitate populi Romani nisi coram et sub oculis Caesaris, 
eoque conventum Italiae et adfluentis provincias praesentiae eius 
servanda dicebat. audiente haec Tiberio ac silente magnis 
utrimque contentionibus acta, sed res dilatae. 
Forestalled by Piso in this show of independence, Gallus objected 
that business, not transacted under the immediate eye of their 
prince, lacked distinction and fell short of the dignity of the 
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Roman people; and for that reason the concourse of Italy and the 
influx from the provinces ought to be reserved for his presence. 
The debate was conducted with much vigour on both sides, while 
Tiberius listened and was mute: the matter was adjourned.
565
  
Tacitus suggests that both speakers want to make a “show” of independence, but 
that it is a sham because in reality both proposals praise the princeps. Either he 
permits business to proceed in his absence, or he is indispensable to it. Gallus 
does not speak from conviction, but since one form of flattery has been pre-
empted, he adopts the alternative. The senators debate the question vigorously, 
but Tiberius himself remains silent. This illustrates the assumption, found 
generally in the primary sources, that senators speak insincerely, and their 
attitude to the emperor is automatically sycophantic. It is not clear, however, that 
Tacitus’ accusation of a mere “show” of independence is justified. Tiberius’ 
silence was significant and implies that he is allowing debate.
566
 Suetonius 
describes Tiberius allowing senators to vote against his expressed opinion, to the 
extent that they did not feel obliged to follow him in the division.
567
 This must 
surely refer to events in the early years of his principate and calls into question 
Tacitus’ darker insinuations. As Talbert observes, emperors may technically have 
been able to veto proposals but in practice they had no need to do so; the mildest 
expression of disagreement was more than adequate.
568
 We may also ask whether 
Gallus fits the role he is assigned here. It may well be that as a consular and son 
of consuls, he felt genuine concern for maintaining the senate and the emperor’s 
dignity with regard to Italians and provincials.  
Tacitus next records a confrontation, where Gallus argued that a five-year term 
would be appropriate for magistrates. This does not seem to be informed by a 
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desire to play the sycophant and Tiberius refused it in categorical terms. Gallus 
also opposed suggested sumptuary laws, saying that hard-working senators 




Gallus, in fact, provides a further example of the way that Tacitus’ accounts of 
senatorial debates are filtered through hindsight and wider moral concerns. At the 
start of the Annals, Tacitus develops the theme of Tiberius’ dissimulatio by 
describing his professed anxiety about the burdens of the principate. Gallus 
responded by asking for which particular branch of government Tiberius would 
like to take responsibility. Tacitus says that Tiberius took offence because it 
exposed his insincerity. Tacitus then tells us that Gallus tries to retract and make 
amends, but without success: 
nec ideo iram eius lenivit pridem invisus, tamquam ducta in 
matrimonium Vipsania M. Agrippae filia, quae quondam Tiberii 
uxor fuerat, plus quam civilia agitaret Pollionisque Asinii patris 
foreciam retineret. 
[Gallus] failed however to soothe [Tiberius’] anger, he had been a 
hated man ever since his marriage to Vipsania (daughter of 
Marcus Agrippa, and once the wife of Tiberius), which had given 
the impression that he had ambitions denied to a subject and 
retained the temerity of his father Asinius Pollio.
570
 
There follows an account of a conversation between Tiberius and Augustus about 
potential rivals to the principate, whose fall Tacitus will recount in the following 
pages. As the narrative progresses, it becomes clear that Tacitus is not simply 
reporting the debate held in the senate. The exchange between Tiberius and 
Gallus illuminates Tiberian dissimulatio, and rivalry for the principate. It 
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foreshadows Gallus’ later imprisonment and death which came about through 
Sejanus’ enmity.571 This literary and moral agenda means the evidence needs to 
be assessed with great caution, making it almost impossible to tell how freely 
Gallus spoke and how far Tiberius resented his remarks.  
The sources note the senate’s increasing reluctance to take routine decisions 
without the emperor’s approval during Tiberius’ principate. For example, when 
they were asked to choose a suitable proconsul for the threatened province of 
Africa, they squabbled. Aulus Caecina Severus’ proposal that governors should 
not be allowed to take their wives was within the form of due process, as any 
senator was allowed to make a proposal when asked for his opinion.
572
 Its 
irrelevance to the question before them may reflect the fact that general debate 
was easier than making a decision that might upset the emperor. Tiberius, 
unimpressed by their procrastination, refused to take responsibility in their place. 
He wrote asking them to choose between Manius Lepidus and Junius Blaesus. 
Lepidus asked to be excused on the grounds of ill health and family 
commitments. At this point, Tacitus adds that it was not openly mentioned that 
Blaesus was Sejanus’ uncle, although this was the deciding factor in Lepidus’ 
reluctance and the senate’s decision.573 Here, the senators are influenced by their 
fear of offending Sejanus as well as the emperor. Tacitus presents Tiberius as 
duplicitous and the senate as powerless. Modern scholars have argued that this is 
not an accurate reflection of events and that Tiberius became frustrated by the 
senate’s passivity. In this interpretation, he genuinely wanted to encourage a 
more independent response, even moving to Caprae to force them to take more 
responsibility.
574
 That failed, perhaps because once Tiberius left Rome for 
Caprae, communication was limited to letters which passed through the 
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praetorian prefect. This is presumably why Tacitus’ description of meetings of 
the senate shifts for the most part to their role in trials, though he does record 
Tiberius’ response to misplaced suggestions about a senatorial bodyguard and 
alterations to seating regulations in the theatre.
575
  
The senate’s tendency to form factions and to seek their own individual 
advantage made consensus difficult. That had Republican roots, and Rutledge 
argues that factionalism developed during Tiberius’ and Gaius’ principates, as 
family enmities and loyalties became established, with the emperor’s role as an 
ultimate patron shaping his relationship with the senate.
576
 By the time of Gaius’ 
death, the senate cannot agree, even at so critical a juncture. Instead they indulge 
in what Suetonius describes as “tiresome bickering” (per taedium ac 
dissensionem diversa censentium). While they dithered, the Praetorians took 
Claudius to their camp, accepted a donative and proclaimed him as emperor.
577
  
When the city prefect Pedanius Secundus was murdered in AD 61, the senate’s 
decision to apply the law and execute all his slaves sparked a popular outcry. 
Modern authors have commented on the moral problem posed by the execution 
of the slaves, arguing that the mob shows greater humanity than the senate.
578
 
Distasteful as it may be to modern sensibilities, this is not the aspect that most 
interests Tacitus.
 
He records a speech by Gaius Cassius Longinus: 
saepe numero, patres conscripti, in hoc ordine interfui, cum contra 
instituta et leges maiorum nova senatus decreta postularentur; 
neque sum adversatus, non quia dubitarem, super omnibus 
negotiis melius atque rectius olim provisum et quae 
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converterentur [in] deterius mutari, sed ne nimio amore antiqui 
moris studium meum extollere viderer. simul quidquid hoc in 
nobis auctoritatis est, crebris contradictionibus destruendum non 
existimabam, ut maneret integrum, si quando res publica consiliis 
eguisset. 
I have frequently, conscript fathers, made one of this body, when 
demands were being presented for new senatorial decrees in 
contravention of the principles and legislation of our fathers. And 
from me there came no opposition — not because I doubted that, 
whatever the issue, the provision made for it in the past was the 
better conceived and the more correct, and that, where revision 
took place, the alteration was for the worse; but because I had no 
wish to seem to be exalting my own branch of study by an 
overstrained affection for ancient usage. At the same time, I 
considered that what little influence I may possess ought not to be 
frittered away in perpetual expressions of dissent: I preferred it to 
remain intact for an hour when the state had need of advice.
 579
  
Longinus’ attitude is pragmatic. It is best to agree with proposals made in the 
senate, and avoid dissent, so that disagreement is reserved for a major occasion 
when it will make an impact. He then justifies the execution of the slaves on 
grounds of ancestral custom, legal requirement, and as an example to others. 
According to Tacitus, no-one dared to make a speech arguing against him: 
sententiae Cassii ut nemo unus contra ire ausus est, ita dissonae 
voces respondebant numerum aut aetatem aut sexum ac 
plurimorum indubiam innocentiam miserantium: praevaluit tamen 
pars, quae supplicium decernebat. 
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While no one member ventured to controvert the opinion of 
Cassius, he was answered by a din of voices, expressing pity for 
the numbers, the age, or the sex of the victims, and for the 




It is necessary to treat this evidence with caution, since we cannot know how 
accurately Tacitus records what was actually said in the senate. None the less, the 
reluctance to answer Longinus formally raises questions. His argument was 
legally correct, and so difficult to counter, but Tacitus’ presentation suggests that 
there may be more to the episode. Nero supported the senate’s decree, issued an 
edict reprimanding the people and dispatched soldiers to enforce the penalty, but 
there is no indication that this would have been his decision. In fact, he vetoed 
Cingonius Varro’s further suggestion that freedmen who had been in the house at 
the time of the murder should be deported, a proposal which went beyond legal 
requirements. It seems that reluctance to make a formal response to Longinus 
was due not to fear of upsetting the emperor, but the greater auctoritas of a 
fellow senator. 
Pliny provides indirect evidence for why senators may have been so reluctant to 
speak individually against Longinus. He describes the senate’s reaction when 
Nepos, as praetor, issued an edict that the provisions of the lex Cincia forbidding 
payment for advocates would be enforced.
581
 The account of resulting praise and 
detraction shows the strength of feeling, and the risk that an unpopular statement 
would lead to criticism. While it was always necessary to avoid offending the 
emperor, the reaction of one’s fellow senators also had to be considered. Pliny’s 
second letter on the subject adds further information about relationships among 
senators.
582
 He records that Nigrinus, one of the plebeian tribunes, read sections 
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of relevant laws and decrees, and then urged the senate to plead with the “best of 
emperors” to settle the matter, since both the law and senatus consulta were 
being ignored. This raises the question of how far Nigrinus was acting at Trajan’s 
behest, but none the less, appealing to the emperor to arbitrate on whether the 
law should be upheld was clearly routine.
583
 Moreover, it was successful: 
pauci dies, et liber principis severus et tamen moderatus: leges 
ipsum; est in publicis actis. 
A few days elapsed and then a document came from the emperor 
which was austere but couched temperately. You will be able to 
read it for it is in the public records.
584
 
The final section of the letter makes clear that Trajan had said the Cincian law 
should be enforced and Pliny is able to report his friends’ congratulations on his 
own voluntary practice of not accepting payment for advocacy. Pliny’s 
presentation of this is in positive terms, the outcome any right-thinking person 
would expect. It is notable too, that although Trajan’s decision crystallised public 
opinion, it was not just the emperor’s judgement that mattered. The senators were 
concerned with their peers’ valuation and the point of the account is to show 
Pliny’s own honourable and admired conduct in a contentious matter.  
The evidence suggests that an individual’s self-interest was his greatest 
consideration. This meant that speech was constrained by fear of offending the 
emperor, upon whose patronage he relied for advancement. As a result, whether 
present in the senate, or communicating by letter, the emperor’s perceived or 
assumed wishes underpinned every debate. Equally important to controlling 
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speech was the concern senators felt over retaining the good opinion of their 
peers. This is, in fact, a recurring topic in Pliny’s letters.585 
The evidence also shows that senatorial libertas varied with different emperors 
and within individual principates.
586
 Rutledge, introducing a volume of essays on 
literature and politics, does not support this conclusion, dismissing it as a 
“trap”.587 He considers that libertas should be understood within a wider social 
dynamic which protected elite dignitas. His insistence that freedom of speech in 
the senate should be set in its social context is surely correct. It also needs to be 
acknowledged that the evidence for the senate’s relationship with the princeps 
reflects a wide range of different experiences. That is a salutary reminder that 
lived experience does not always align with theoretical or literary models. The 
timespan of this thesis is a period of over a century, or four generations. To put 
that into a modern perspective, someone born in 1970 could have great-
grandparents born in 1850. That perhaps makes it clearer that, while responses 
will be mediated by the social and cultural environment, individuals may behave 
differently, both from contemporaries and from their great grandparents. 
Augustus’ conversations with Pollio or Agrippa or Maecenas were not the same 
on every occasion. Nero’s relationships with Seneca, Lucan, Corbulo or Otho 
were diverse in themselves, and altered during his principate. Rather than 
dismissing individual differences as problematic, or trying to fit them into a 
single pattern, it may be more useful to see them as an integral part of the wider 
social framework governing how freely different people spoke at different times. 
4.3 Praise, imperial honours and freedom of speech 
Proposing honours was a normal part of senatorial business; individual senators 
received them to commemorate political or military achievements, and they were 
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routinely voted to the emperor. The question with regard to freedom of speech is 
whether these are sincere expressions, willingly given, or the result of 
sycophancy and fear. The sources themselves seem to find it difficult to answer 
this: Suetonius reveals his own assumptions when he describes honours voted for 
Augustus:  
omitto senatus consulta, quia possunt videri vel necessitate 
expressa vel verecundia.  
I say nothing of decrees of the senate, which might seem to have 
been dictated by necessity or by respect.
 588
  
The idea of necessitas – a sense of compulsion, fear of the consequences of 
opposition – is found frequently in the sources and is easily understood. 
Verecundia means feelings of shame or modesty and is a far more slippery 
concept.  
Examples of sycophantic honours occur frequently in the primary sources. For 
example when excessive numbers of festivals were proposed to commemorate 
Corbulo’s exploits in Armenia, Gaius Cassius Longinus urged a distinction 
between these and days when the gods might be worshipped and mundane 
business completed as well. Voting of honours had reached such unreasonable 
levels that it hampered normal life.
589
 However, the sources never clearly define 
laudatio, which does the speaker and recipient credit, and adulatio, which 
dishonours both parties. This lack of clarity allows Tacitus to tell us: 
[Tiberius] acerbeque increpuit eos qui divinas occupationes 
ipsumque dominum dixerant. unde angusta et lubrica oratio sub 
principe qui libertatem metuebat, adulationem oderat.  
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[Tiberius] sharply rebuked those who called his work “divine” 
and he himself “lord”. Consequently, speech was restricted and 




The emperor’s restriction of excessive praise is surely an attempt to limit 
sycophancy, but Tacitus presents it as an example of Tiberius’ dissimulatio and 
of senatorial oppression. This is less than fair, since there is other evidence of 
Tiberius refusing excessive honours for himself and his family.
591
 By 
emphasising Tiberius’ dissimulatio, the opposition between adulatio and libertas 
becomes confused, and freedom of speech itself is made slippery. There is a 
similar difficulty when Tacitus describes the first senatorial debate under 
Tiberius, over arrangements for Augustus’ funeral. Proposals are made that the 
procession should march through a triumphal arch. This is presented as 
sycophantic, but Augustus was an exceptional statesman with a unique position. 
Is it so extraordinary that the senate vote him funeral honours to mark this? There 
is no precedent for this situation, and the senate’s offer to carry Augustus’ bier 
and Tiberius’ refusal are probably both appropriate. It is as reasonable to 
interpret this exchange as a positive one as it is to read it as hostile. A similar 
attitude may be seen when the sources recount that the emperor entered the 
senate alone, and his exchanges with senators were almost too polite – “prope 
excesserat humanitatis modum”.592 Tiberius is demonstrating many of the 
qualities which Pliny praises in Trajan’s behaviour towards the senate, respecting 
their libertas and dignitas. Humanitas is a desirable quality, yet there is an 
implied criticism that Tiberius, unlike Augustus, had failed to judge relationships 
correctly. This consistently negative portrayal of Tiberius makes it hard to judge 
how his behaviour should be interpreted. 
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Tacitus’ account of the honours granted to Germanicus Caesar after his death is 
mainly positive, though he notes that many of the provisions quickly lapsed.
593
 
These remarks can be compared with the text of the original decree, in which 
Rowe notes that the senate are highly conservative; most of the decree 
summarises honours already voted, and they are careful to follow precedent 
when offering their own honours.
594
 Where there was no precedent, the senate 
sought the emperor’s advice and approval.595 Their reluctance to innovate 




The senate instructed that Tiberius’ speech about Germanicus, already read 
before the people, was to be inscribed on bronze and displayed: 
idque eo iustius futurum arbitrari senatum quod [animus Ti(beri)] 
Caesaris Aug[usti] intumus et Germanici Caesaris f(ili) eius non 
magis laudationem quem vitae totius ordinem et virtut<is> eius 
verum testimonium contineret aeternae tradi memoriae, et ipse se 
velle non dissimulare eodem libello testatus esset et esse utile 
iuuventuti liberorum posteriorumque nostrorum iudicaret. 
 And the senate regarded that as all the more appropriate to come 
to pass, because the [innermost thoughts of Tiberius] Caesar 
Augustus indeed contained not so much a laudatio of Germanicus 
Caesar, as the course of his entire life and a true witness to his 
virtue, to be handed down in eternal remembrance, and because he 
himself had testified in that same document that he wished not to 
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present matters other than as they were and judged it to be useful 
to the young of the next generation and those of our posterity.
597
 
They add that the document Drusus read before the senate should also be 
inscribed and made public.  
The speech concerned is a funerary oration, but the decree indicates considerable 
discomfort over what constitutes acceptable praise. It reiterates Tiberius’ claim 
that his speech was not just laudatio (non magis laudationem quam vitae totius 
ordinem et virtut<is> eius verum testimonium contineret) and that his praise of 
Germanicus was a testimonial to an exemplary life. This is, in itself, not unusual 
in panegyric – Pliny employs much the same procedure in his claim that Trajan’s 
achievements speak for themselves.
598
 It is a formula that removes any 
suggestion of insincerity from a speaker, who presents himself as a purveyor of 
facts rather than praise. It is this part of Tiberius’ speech that the senate thought 
important enough to reiterate, so that the decree emphasises that he praised 
Germanicus with integrity. It is the very ease of reinterpreting laudatio as 
adulatio that makes it so important for the senate to insist that Tiberius’ funerary 




That praise and honours could be judged demeaning and cause opprobrium is 
shown when Pliny describes discovering the inscription on the tomb of the 
freedman Pallas. This recorded that the senate had voted him a praetor’s insignia 
and 15 million sesterces. Pallas accepted the honours but not the money, and 
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Pliny declares it is better to laugh than be angry.
600
 Pliny returns to the subject 
after he has looked up the original decree, reporting that:  
inveni tam copiosum et effusum, ut ille superbissimus titulus 
modicus atque etiam demissus videretur.  
I found it so verbose and effusive that the supreme arrogance of 
the inscription seemed modest and humble by comparison.
601
 
Pliny affects to wonder whether the senate was being witty, but swiftly reflects 
on the underlying realities of the situation: 
ambitio ergo et procedendi libido? sed quis adeo demens, ut per 
suum, per publicum dedecus procedere velit in ea civitate, in qua 
hic esset usus florentissimae dignitatis, ut primus in senatu laudare 
Pallantem posset?  
So was it ambition or lust for advancement? But who is so lunatic 
as to desire advancement by way of personal and civic shame, in a 
city in which exploitation of the most illustrious distinction lay in 




quam iuvat quod in tempora illa non incidi, quorum sic me 
tamquam illis vixerim pudet! non dubito similiter adfici te. 
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How consoling it is that I had no experience of those times, of 
which I am ashamed as if I had lived during them! I have no doubt 
that your reaction is like mine.
603
 
There is an issue with appropriateness of honours and honouring here, since 
Pliny shows that the senators under Claudius are competing for the wrong thing: 
to honour a freedman, who cannot hold the office of praetor, with the insignia as 
if he had held it.
604
 Pallas, although a former slave, is encroaching on honours 
appropriate to the elite. This is, however, not the only problem that Pliny sees. 
He uses the inscription to distinguish the way he and his peers address a 
praiseworthy emperor from a senate whose adulatio for a freedman brought them 
shame.
605
 He omits to mention that it was the consul, Barea Soranus, who 
proposed the honours for Pallas.
606
 This is awkward, since Barea Soranus was 
forced to commit suicide under Nero, and is usually presented as an exemplum of 
courage and libertas. Tacitus links him with Thrasea Paetus and describes the 
two men as “virtue itself”.607 If the eminent Barea Soranus was responsible for 
the proposal, Pliny’s case for the shamefulness of the situation is considerably 
weakened. Not identifying him as a proposer allows Pliny to imply that he and 
his fellow senators do not run the same risk of dishonour when they speak in 
Trajan’s senate. We do not, unfortunately, have the inscription for comparison, 
but it would be interesting to know how verbose and effusive it was, and whether 
it differs significantly from Pliny’s own Panegyricus in style. We can surmise 
that Pliny’s problem is that it did not: the difference lies not in the way that 
praise is expressed, but in who praises whom. This is why Pliny is so concerned 
to draw a clear distinction between praising a freedman and an optimus princeps. 
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604
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605
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The former is, by Pliny’s definition, adulatio and the latter laudatio. It is, 
however, a definition that he is anxious to make sure his audience accepts, when 
he formulates Montanus’ response for him: 
ridebis, deinde indignaberis, deinde ridebis, si legeris, quod nisi 
legeris non potes credere. 
You will laugh, you will then be angry, but then you will laugh, 
should you read what you cannot credit unless you read it.
608
 
Pliny provides further evidence to help us understand senatorial views about the 
distinction between adulatio and laudatio by the early second century. He was 
appointed suffect-consul in AD 100, and gave the usual speech of thanks to 
Trajan. He then re-wrote it and held a recitatio. Not only the speech, but also two 
letters discussing it survive.
609
 Pliny’s public praise of Trajan must have been 
intended as a positive, acceptable model for both the immediate audience and the 
wider circle reading the published speech. However, that he sees adulatio as a 
problem is suggested when he begins with a prayer to Jupiter: 
[Grant, I pray] ut mihi digna consule, digna senatu, digna principe 
contingat oratio: utque omnibus, quae dicentur a me, libertas, 
fides, veritas constet: tantumque a specie adulationis absit 
gratiarum actio mea, quantum abest a necessitate.  
[Grant, I pray] that my speech prove worthy of consul, senate and 
princeps, that independence, truth and sincerity mark my every 
word, and my vote of thanks be as far removed from a semblance 
of flattery as it is from constraint.
610
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Pliny wants it understood from the outset that his speech reflects libertas and 
veritas. It is definitely not adulatio and he is not obliged to make it (a 
necessitate). It was noted in the introduction that modern scholars have discussed 
problems with the language of praise, arguing that it had become debased by 
misuse. Lendon stresses the importance of praise by the praiseworthy and notes 
that although the sources affect to despise coerced honours, these occurred 
frequently.
611
 Bartsch interprets the Panegyricus as an attempt to counter the 
problems of “linguistic bankruptcy”, the “loss of meaning suffered through value 
terms through their usage in the ideology of the victors”.612 In this interpretation, 
Pliny intends to use the Panegyricus to “reclaim” the language of honourable 
laudatio.
613
 Bartsch describes the Panegyricus as “an obsessive attempt to prove 
its own sincerity”.614 The great risk of praise that was seen to be forced through 
fear was that it left all expressions of praise sounding insincere.  
There is, clearly, merit in this. However, more recent studies have suggested that 
care is needed, because the Panegyricus is as much about Pliny as it is about 
Trajan.
615
 Gibson notes that much of the Panegyricus is expressed 
conventionally, despite Pliny’s assertions to the contrary, and draws close 
parallels with praise written for Domitian.
616
 Members of the elite routinely 
delivered panegyrics, so they were trained in the art. Pliny’s teacher, Quintilian, 
recommends praising someone’s character and physical endowments and merely 
mentioning his external circumstances. In the case of rulers, what matters is not 
their advantages and power, but the way they exploit these.
617
 So Pliny’s praise 
of Trajan’s character and his good conduct in office is predictable. Nor is there 
much originality when Pliny expresses his “sincerity” through drawing a contrast 
between Trajan’s admirable behaviour and Domitian’s appalling conduct. 
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Comparing present happiness with past struggles is a standard theme in 
panegyric. Tacitus used the same device when he described sovereignty and 
freedom (libertas) as previously irreconcilable but happily blended under Nerva 
and now Trajan.
618
 When Pliny reiterates the contrast between bad and good, old 
and new, true and false, he is concerned with his whole audience, not only the 
emperor. This speech is to be understood as laudatio rather than adulatio. 
Pliny’s audience consists of both the emperor and the rest of the senate. When he 
discusses Trajan’s response, he says that he had as much concern for correctness 
of tone as for content, not wanting to appear “presumptuous” or “superior” 
(arrogantia).
619
 He describes his role as a senator as not only to praise, but also 
to guide the emperor. He says that he acted for the greater good, because he 
wanted to encourage Trajan to continue upon his virtuous course and so provide 
a model for future emperors. Trajan’s conduct is presented in moral terms of his 
“virtues”: bravery, affability, accessibility, generosity, fairness, so that he 
represents a perfect “civilis princeps”.620 These may be conventional values, but 
they were key to the emperor’s good relationship with his fellow senators. This 
was not the only time when praise was used to create a model for the emperor’s 
future conduct. When the senate ordered Gaius’ speech on entering the 
consulship to be read annually, they intended to remind him of his promises.
621
 
Tacitus, describing the senate’s honours to Nero in order to mark Corbulo’s 
appointment as general against the Armenians, adds: 
praeter suetam adulationem laeti, quod Domitium Corbulonem 
retinendae Armeniae praeposuerat videbaturque locus virtutibus 
patefactus.  
                                                 
618
 Tac. Agr. 3.1. Morford 1992 argues for the Panegyricus as indirect guidance, though he 
probably overstates the originality of the speech. 
619
 Plin. Ep. 3.18.1. 
620
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Apart from the routine of sycophancy, they felt genuine pleasure 
at his appointment of Domitius Corbulo to save Armenia: a 
measure which seemed to have opened a career to the virtues.
622
 
The senate wanted their praise to encourage Nero to continue to make good 
decisions. This is how Pliny positions the Panegyricus: praise is a form of 
indirect guidance. A good emperor, as any good citizen, should value praise.  
Pliny is not just concerned with Trajan’s response. When he praises him in terms 
of his predecessor’s failings, he extends the contrast to the audience. This elite 
audience, instructed only to attend the recitation if it was convenient, stayed and 
listened over three days. According to Pliny, they now feel genuine interest. It is 
easy to be cynical and detect sycophancy, but Pliny emphasises the senatorial 
audience’s approval because it demonstrates the acceptability of this praise.  
Pliny’s letter of AD 107 advises Severus on delivering his own panegyric, but is 
more concerned with Pliny’s own approach to imperial praise.623 He tells 
Severus: 
dubito num idem tibi suadere quod mihi debeam. designatus ego 
consul omni hac, etsi non adulatione, specie tamen adulationis 
abstinui, … hoc tunc ego; sed non omnibus eadem placent, ne 
conveniunt quidem. praeterea faciendi aliquid non faciendive ratio 
cum hominum ipsorum tum rerum etiam ac temporum condicione 
mutatur. nam recentia opera maximi principis praebent 
facultatem, nova magna vera censendi. quibus ex causis, ut supra 
scripsi, dubito an idem nunc tibi quod tunc mihi suadeam. illud 
non dubito, debuisse me in parte consilii tui ponere, quid ipse 
fecissem. 
                                                 
622
 Tac. Ann. 13.8.1. 
623
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I am doubtful, then, whether I should advise you to pursue the 
method which I observed myself on the same occasion. When I 
was consul elect, I avoided running into the usual strain of 
compliment, which, however far from adulation, might yet look 
like it … Such was the method I then observed; but I am sensible 
the same measures are neither agreeable nor indeed suitable to all 
alike. Besides the propriety of doing or omitting a thing depends 
not only upon persons, but time and circumstances; and as the late 
actions of our illustrious prince afford materials for panegyric, no 
less just than recent and glorious, I doubt (as I said before) 
whether I should persuade you in the present instance to adopt the 
same plan as I did myself. In this, however, I am clear, that it was 
proper to offer you by way of advice the method I pursued. 
Pliny’s view that adulatio is hard to distinguish from species adulationis reflects 
the recurring concern over the acceptability of praise. Pliny suggests that it is the 
particular circumstances of place, time and persons that decide acceptability. We 
could formulate bluntly: Pliny presents his own speech as acceptable laudatio 
rather than adulatio because it was he, Pliny, who was speaking to Trajan, in a 
time when libertas was once again flourishing. He implies that Severus would do 
well to find a similar solution. 
This section has considered the problems of laudatio and adulatio. It is clear that 
the contemporary sources were deeply interested in this, and that praise and 
honours were routine senatorial business. The sources do not define acceptable 
praise, but show that laudatio and adulatio were closely related, often 
indistinguishable. At no time would a speaker admit to speaking sycophantically 
to avoid displeasing a hostile emperor, but where this was perceived, it was 
deeply resented. The key to acceptability was the speaker’s demonstration that 
his words reflected his own character and status, and those of the subject. When 
the audience considered praise to be inappropriate, or undeserved, that was 
adulatio. This was a subjective formulation, and one that made the speaker 
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vulnerable to the judgement not only of his immediate listeners, but also of his 
successors. This meant that praise intended as laudatio, reflecting honourably on 
speaker and recipient, could be reinterpreted as adulatio and bring disgrace, 
particularly if it was politically expedient to reach such a conclusion. This was 
why, by the early second century, Pliny took such care to position his 
Panegyricus as laudatio, and emphasised his audience’s acceptance that it 
expresses suitable praise for a deserving emperor.  
4.4 Protest, criticism and imperial response 
There is little evidence for serious political “opposition” in the senate. Boissier 
refers to “méscontents” and Rudich to “dissidents” but neither expression has a 
real equivalent in the imperial sources.
624
 It is generally agreed that there was 
little interest in a movement to “bring back” the Republic. Augustus’ personal 
auctoritas was sufficient to prevent serious opposition; the senate as a body was 
relieved by the relative calm and stability which the principate offered after the 
civil wars.
625
 Among his successors, the confusion after Gaius’ assassination is 




The emperor’s relationship with the senate was always ambivalent: “essentially 
the imperial addresses were not open to debate.”627 There are rare instances of 
the senate defying the emperor – Dio’s account of Augustus establishing the 
military treasury in AD 6 implies lack of cooperation, since the ex-quaestors and 
ex-tribunes had to be compelled to take posts as its aediles. Failure to raise 
voluntary revenues led to the imposition of the vicesima hereditatium et 
                                                 
624
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legatorum, a tax of five per cent on all inheritances except for those from near 
relations. It was felt necessary to present this as a measure found in Julius 
Caesar’s notes, surely an indication that it was unwelcome.628 There was also 
tension over Augustus’ marriage legislation, when according to Dio the senate 
made personal attacks on Augustus.
629
 These few incidents represent 
exceptionally strong feeling and it is necessary to go beyond the strict time span 
of this survey to the death of Hadrian to find another such conflict. The senate 
initially refused to deify him and Antoninus Pius was reduced to threatening to 
refuse the principate before the proposal was carried.
630
 As Talbert observes: 
“persuasion, rather than command was the tactful approach commonly adopted 
by considerate emperors. But it was hardly essential when from the beginning of 
the principate there could rarely be any question of rejecting imperial 
proposals.”631 
In the broadest terms, the primary sources present a “good” emperor as one who 
is tolerant of free speech. A “bad” emperor is an autocrat who represses people 
who speak against him. There is however, a real problem because this simple 
division into “good” and “bad” does not match the complex and varied response 
to criticism which is actually demonstrated. Augustus is usually presented as an 
emperor who allowed relative freedom and Suetonius preserves examples of 
political outspokenness. His description of Augustus leaving the senate rather 
than giving an angry response was noted in chapter 3.5. Suetonius concludes: 
nec ideo libertas aut contumacia fraudi cuiquam fuit. 
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no one suffered for his freedom of speech or insolence.
632
 
The problem is that this assessment of imperial tolerance does not hold true for 
times when political tensions ran higher. Suetonius does not appear to notice 
there is a contradiction when he describes Augustus reviewing the senate, 
wearing a sword and with armour under his tunic. He adds that the contemporary 
Cremutius Cordus portrays senators being searched before they were allowed to 
approach the emperor.
633
 Dio presents the senate as unable to speak out during 
the “settlement” of 27 BC, either through confusion or fear. Dio, who is writing 
in the early third century, assumes that the principate was the only possible, 
indeed the only desirable outcome of the civil war, but underlying his account is 
the assumption that speech in the senate is not free, but manipulated by 
Augustus.
634
 There is a similar contradiction when Dio, admittedly in an 
epitomised section, describes Vespasian’s lack of a bodyguard, cordiality, and 
general tolerance but then immediately mentions the downfall of Helvidius 




This contradiction is resolved if we understand that the sources do not isolate 
political interactions from social ones. Suetonius places the anecdote about 
Augustus among other examples of his modest conduct – a refusal to be 
addressed as Dominus, timing arrivals and departures so that people did not have 
to turn out to see him, and affability to petitioners at his salutatio. It is in this 
context that Suetonius adds his greeting senators by name, unprompted, and the 
list concludes with further examples of genial behaviour towards senators outside 
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 Exchanges in the senate are not discussed in isolation from 
other interactions, but form part of wider social relationships in which Augustan 
humanitas is demonstrated and criticism rendered unnecessary. It is possible to 
see that Augustus relies on his personal auctoritas for dealing with the senate. 
For example, in 9 BC, Cassius Severus prosecuted Asprenas Nonius for 
poisoning. Although not involved in the trial, Augustus sat silently in the senate, 
allegedly in order not to influence the outcome.
637
 It is easy to interpret this 
cynically, as an act of implicit repression, since Nonius was acquitted, but 
contemporaries may not have seen it the same way. Augustus’ action straddles 
the fine line between his official standing as princeps and his private role as 
amicus. It seems likely that the situation was more subtle than overt political 
coercion, not least because Quintilian criticises Severus’ tactlessness in revealing 
his love of a fight. If there had been serious risk of antagonising the emperor, it 
would surely be the focus of his story.
638
 Instead, Quintilian demonstrates that 
the new role of the princeps required renegotiation of relationships between the 
emperor and the elite.
639
 Feeney suggests that we should interpret such incidents 
as a response to a new situation, and sees a “developing and shifting 
relationship” between princeps and senate.640  
At times of tension, the veneer of civil communication is removed. Gaius’ abuses 
and megalomania led to a breakdown in the relationship between senate and 
emperor, to the extent that he refused to allow senators to meet him on his return 
from Germany, effectively a declaration of hostility towards the senate as a 
body.
641
 By the end of Gaius’ principate, there is complete paralysis, with the 
tribunes and praetors afraid to convene the senate in his absence in case the 
                                                 
636
 Suet. Aug. 53.3. 
637
 Suet. Aug. 56.3.  
638
 Quint. Inst. 11.1.57. 
639
 Feeney 1992: 8-9. 
640
 Feeney 1992: 8-9. 
641
 Suet. Calig. 26.2, 48, 49.  
  
                                                                                         202 
 
emperor thought they had acted in his place.
642
 Here there is no pretence of 
affability and the senators dare not address the emperor at all. There is no 
question of criticism in the senate: the emperor’s power and the senate’s 
powerlessness become manifest in a way that Augustus, Vespasian or Trajan 
took pains to avoid. Winterling suggests that Gaius’ failure to retain the 
appearance of respect for the senate led to his assassination.
643
 As Talbert notes: 
“the tragic consequences of a clash between a tactless emperor and the majority 
of senators are well known. In the end no ruler could seriously alienate the 
senatorial class and survive.”644 
One group of senators were found criticising the emperor, sometimes referred to 
as the “Stoic” opposition. They shared close familial and marriage links, and saw 
themselves as the heirs to Thrasea Paetus, who was forced to suicide by Nero.
645
 
When Tacitus records a debate about how Antistius Sosianus should be punished 
for maiestas, Thrasea Paetus’ role is presented in moral terms.646 Thrasea Paetus 
was the voice of libertas, encouraging the senate to vote for exile rather than 
execution, while a few imperial flatterers opposed him, led by Aulus Vitellius. 
Vitellius is represented as an abusive coward, the sycophants as wicked, the 
consuls feeble, and Nero petulant.
647
 Thrasea Paetus’ determination carried the 
day, and Tacitus notes his concern for his own gloria in the matter. This means 
that he cannot change his position without weakening the moral standing gained 
by defending senatorial rights. Tacitus does not mention until he describes 
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Thrasea Paetus’ downfall that Capito, Tigellinus’ son-in-law, had brought the 
original charge against Sosianus. Since Thrasea Paetus had acted as advocate for 
the Cilicians against Capito on charges of extortion, this rather alters the 
situation.
648
 It is hard not to see private enmity among Thrasea Paetus’ motives 
for speaking out. It does not necessarily undermine the concept of gaining moral 
credit for libertas; it does once again remind us that the situation is complicated, 
and filtered through the preconceptions and concerns of the sources. 
Criticism was made through actions, or their lack, as well as in words. Thrasea 
Paetus walked out of the senate after Agrippina’s murder, and avoided the senate 
altogether on the death of Poppaea. On both occasions, this was to avoid voting 
on proposals. After Agrippina’s death, the senate supported proposals to disgrace 
her memory and congratulate Nero on escaping her alleged plot. After Poppaea’s 
death the senate voted her divine honours.
649
 The final break in the relationship 
between Thrasea Paetus and Nero occurred when he was forbidden to attend the 
welcome ceremonies for King Tiridates of Armenia. This was a mark of personal 
disfavour; when Thrasea Paetus failed to back down, Nero’s inimicitia paved the 
way for prosecution in the senate.  
Tacitus reveals the problem of implicit criticism in a speech given by Capito. 
Capito urged that Thrasea ought to be charged with maiestas, not for what he had 
done, but for what he had not done: he had not sworn the annual oath of 
allegiance, attended public prayers, offered a sacrifice for the safety of the prince 
or for his voice, or attended the senate in three years – in fact he had put his 
clients before his own duty to attend the senate.
650
 Secessio meant turning one’s 
back on one’s proper duties as a senator. One of the charges brought against 
Herennius Senecio was his refusal to stand for office after the quaestorship, 
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despite a long career, and that has parallels with Thrasea Paetus’ secessio.651 The 
Roman elite were inculcated from a very young age with a sense of duty to the 
community, indeed of obligation to take part in public life. Leaving the senate, 
effectively refusing to communicate, is a rare form of protest. Under Tiberius, 
Marcus Coccius Nerva resolved to die and ignored Tiberius’ expostulations.652 
When Pliny describes gentlemen who live retired lives, it is in terms of their 
reward for their long service and something to be aspired to only when his own 
duties have been fulfilled.
653
  
Modern scholars follow Tacitus in seeking to interpret Thrasea Paetus’ actions in 
moral terms, as an assertion of his own virtus and criticism of Nero’s 
contumacia. Wirszubski describes Thrasea Paetus’ secessio as a considered 
policy of protest, and draws parallels with Caius Calpurnius Piso under Tiberius 
and Cicero during Julius Caesar’s dictatorship. He argues that such action should 
be seen not as “opposition” but as “protest – a demonstration of disapproval, an 
attempt to disassociate oneself from a regime which is condemned by their very 
association”. In this view, Thrasea Paetus’ high moral standing gives his protest 
significance.
654
 Rudich makes an alternative suggestion that Thrasea Paetus’ 
withdrawal from public life “was provoked by sheer moral outrage and was not 
intended as a practical manoeuvre or made for any utilitarian purpose”.655 This 
refusal to take part in public life is an attack on imperial auctoritas which 
becomes, by definition, an unpardonable insult.
656
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These responses are largely mediated through Tacitus’ account, which we have 
seen presents freedom of speech in terms of moral standing. That idea is found 
elsewhere. For example, it suits Pliny to be complimentary about Thrasea Paetus 
in order to link himself with his younger friends and relatives, who were 
suppressed under Domitian.
657
 Dio, too, considers the same issue of libertas 
versus necessitas and has the same interest presenting freedom of speech in terms 
of what it reveals about moral character: 
ὁ Πούπλιος δὲ δὴ Θρασέας Παῖτος ἦλθε μὲν ἐς τὸ συνέδριον καὶ 
τῆς ἐπιστολῆς ἐπήκουσεν, ἀναγνωσθείσης δὲ αὐτῆς ἐξανέστη τε 
εὐθὺς πρὶν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἀποφήνασθαι καὶ ἐξῆλθε, διότι ἃ μὲν 
ἤθελεν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἐδύνατο, ἃ δὲ ἐδύνατο οὐκ ἤθελεν. ἐν δὲ τῷ 
αὐτῷ τρόπῳ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διῆγεν: ἔλεγε γὰρ ὅτι ‘εἰ μὲν ἐμὲ 
μόνον ὁ Νέρων φονεύσειν ἔμελλε, πολλὴν ἂν εἶχον τοῖς ἄλλοις 
ὑπερκολακεύουσιν αὐτὸν συγγνώμην: εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐκείνων τῶν 
σφόδρα αὐτὸν ἐπαινούντων πολλοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἀνάλωκε τοὺς δὲ 
καὶ ἀπολέσει, τί χρὴ μάτην ἀσχημονοῦντα δουλοπρεπῶς 
φθαρῆναι, ἐξὸν ἐλευθερίως’ ἀποδοῦναι τῇ φύσει τὸ ὀφειλόμενον; 
ἐμοῦ μὲν γὰρ πέρι καὶ ἔπειτα λόγος τις ἔσται, τούτων δέ, πλὴν 
κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι ἐσφάγησαν, οὐδείς.’ τοιοῦτος μὲν ὁ Θρασέας 
ἐγένετο, καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔλεγεν ‘ἐμὲ Νέρων ἀποκτεῖναι 
μὲν δύναται, βλάψαι δὲ οὔ.’ 
Thrasea, like the rest, attended the meeting of the senate and 
listened to the letter, but when the reading was ended, he at once 
rose from his seat and without a word left the chamber, inasmuch 
as he could not say what he would and would not say what he 
could. And indeed this was always his way of acting on other 
occasions. He used to say, for example: “If I were the only one 
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that Nero was going to put to death, I could easily pardon the rest 
who load him with flatteries. But since even among those who 
praise him to excess there are many whom he has either already 
disposed of or will yet destroy, why should one degrade oneself to 
no purpose and then perish like a slave, when one may pay the 
debt to nature like a freeman? As for me, men will talk of me 
hereafter, but of them never, except only to record the fact that 
they were put to death.” Such was the man that Thrasea showed 
himself to be; and he was always saying to himself: “Nero can kill 
me, but he cannot harm me.”658 
It would be very interesting to know the original source of this information. 
Could it possibly have its origin in Arulenus Rusticus’ biography of Thrasea 
Paetus? If so, it would provide an insight into the “official” version of Thrasea 
Paetus’ attitude among his successors, the making of the myth as it were. Thrasea 
Paetus’ early career was a successful one and it is not until the murder of 
Agrippina that there is any clear sign that he may have wanted to criticise Nero. 
When he does, the sources present his senatorial libertas as a matter of his own 
self-respect, of defining himself as a free man and a Stoic. This attitude is found 
in the account of Thrasea Paetus’ last evening, with its philosophical 
conversation and audience of respectful friends. It is hard not to see an element 
of stage-management in this, a deliberate cultivation of an attitude to be admired 
by right-thinking posterity. This interpretation fits perfectly with Tacitus’ 
construction of libertas as a form of moral currency. 
There is, however, evidence that we should be wary of assuming that this “moral 
lens” provides the only way of looking at criticism in the senate. Dio describes 
Antistius’ response to a proposal made to honour Augustus:   
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Ἀντίστιος μὲν οὖν τοῦτό τε οὐκ ἀπὸ καιροῦ εἰπεῖν ἔδοξε, καί ποτε 
λόγων ἐν τῇ βουλῇ γιγνομένων ὡς χρεὼν εἴη τὸν Αὔγουστον ἐκ 
διαδοχῆς σφας φρουρεῖν, ἔφη, μήτ᾽ ἀντειπεῖν τολμῶν μήτε 
συγκαταθέσθαι ὑπομένων, ὅτι ‘ῥέγκω καὶ οὐ δύναμαι αὐτοῦ 
προκοιτῆσαι.’ 
This reply of Antistius was regarded as a happy one, as was also 
another remark of his, when it was said in the senate, on one 
occasion, that the senators ought to take turns in guarding 
Augustus, Antistius, not daring to speak in opposition nor yet 
willing to assent, remarked, “As for me, I snore, and so cannot 
sleep at the door of his chamber.”659 
This is not presented in the same moral terms we found used about libertas in 
Tacitus. This proposal was adulatio and direct refusal was impossible, so 
Antistius saved face through a witty response that made those supporting it look 
foolish. Neither Suetonius nor Dio imbue Antistius’ remarks with any particular 
moral significance; they are an adroit rejoinder in a difficult situation. Similarly, 
we find a contemptuous aside by Cassius Severus on a sycophantic speech “such 
frankness will be the death of the man” or an anonymous senator, frustrated by 
Tiberius’ dithering, muttering “let him take it or leave it”.660 There is no 
moralistic agenda in AD 69, when the uncertain outcome of civil war made it 
dangerous to pick sides. Tacitus describes a climate of paranoia in Rome, with 
fear of informers paralysing speech. In the senate itself, the situation is worse: 
coacto vero in curiam senatu arduus rerum omnium modus, ne 
contumax silentium, ne suspecta libertas … igitur versare 
sententias et huc atque illuc torquere … providentissimus quisque 
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vulgaribus conviciis, quidam vera probra iacere, in clamore tamen 
et ubi plurimae voces, aut tumultu verborum sibi ipsi 
obstrepentes.  
Moreover, when the senate had assembled in the chamber, it was 
hard to maintain the proper measure in anything, that silence 
might not seem sullen or open speech suspicious; … So the 
senators turned and twisted their proposals to mean this or that, … 
the most foreseeing attacked him only with ordinary terms of 
abuse, although some made the truth the basis of their insults. Still 
they did this when there was an uproar and many speaking, or else 
they obscured their own meaning by a riot of words.
661
 
Both praise and criticism have become impossible, and so moral credit is 
irrelevant. In this crisis self-preservation is all that mattered.  
The question of interpreting criticism through the “moral lens” becomes more 
acute when considering the remainder of the Stoic opposition, not least because 
the reason why they caused so much offence is opaque. Dio attributes their 
destruction to the charge of “philosophising” and the expulsion of philosophers 
from Rome.
662
 Suetonius also links the charges with the banning of philosophers. 
Some scholars have therefore suggested that their opposition arose from their 
philosophical beliefs. Both Wirszubski and Brunt have convincingly dismissed 
this idea, arguing that their actions should be interpreted as appropriate to Roman 
senators, with Stoic philosophy as a lesser interest.
663
 Their interest in 
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Republican heroes – Thrasea Paetus wrote a biography of Cato – should be 
understood in the context of acceptable veneration of Stoics of a past age, rather 
than as political statements or manifestos of intent.
664
  
This group of senators clearly took their own moral standing very seriously 
indeed. The problem is that their contemporaries did not necessarily accept them 
at their own valuation. Quintilian had close links with Domitian’s court and does 
not approve of those who “call themselves philosophers” withdrawing from the 
administration of the res publica.
665
 This must imply criticism of the next 
generation of the “Stoic opposition” and offers an alternative view to the one 
found amongst their admirers and biographers. The elder Helvidius Priscus’ 
attempts to settle old scores after Vespasian came to power both upset the 
emperor and irritated the senate. In fact, his peers seem to have found him so 
intolerable that his actions set himself outside the norms for civil dealings 
between them.
666
 This was a breach of etiquette as much as a political 
misjudgement.
667
 His determination to retain the moral high ground failed to 
make accommodation between the past and the present, or allow for the fact that 
despite the new emperor, the composition of the senate remained essentially 
unchanged. This problem with continuity among the senate under a new emperor 
recurs. For example after Nerva took power, Pliny has a story about a dinner 
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party, where the appalling conduct of the delator Catullus Messalinus under 
Domitian was mentioned. In reply to Nerva’s musings about what would have 
happened had he survived, Junius Mauricus observed he would be at the dinner 
party.
668
 Fabricius Veiento, also influential under Domitian, is named as another 
guest. This is why insisting on righting old wrongs was so tactless of the elder 
Helvidius Priscus and alienated both imperial and senatorial support.
669
  
There is still no scholarly consensus on how Tacitus’ account of suppression 
under Domitian, with books burnt in the forum, the senate complicit in judicial 
murder and liberty suppressed, should be understood.
670
 Freudenburg represents 
it as part of a contemporary fashion for “martyr tales” which characterises early 
second-century literature looking back at Domitian’s principate as a reign of 
terror.
671
 Rogers’ view is that these senators deserved execution for being an 
unmitigated nuisance.
672
 Rutledge has a similar conclusion.
673
 Others, more 
sympathetic, see them as martyrs for senatorial libertas.
674
The problem is that 
this still formulates the question in moral terms, where libertas equates with 
moral integrity, and complicity with its lack. It may be that this needs to be 
reformulated. Chapters 2 and 3 explored the intense anxiety that the Roman elite 
felt about their reputation. Even the mildest criticism could therefore give 
offence, and strategies were employed to minimise this. It was seen that 
considerable care had to be taken in addressing one’s senior friends – and the 
princeps was, by definition, the most senior of all. There is a link between the 
“Stoic opposition” and written criticism against Domitian – Helvidius Priscus 
was alleged to have implied criticism of Domitian’s divorce in a farce, Arulenus 
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Rusticus wrote a biography of Thrasea Paetus and Herennius Senecio of the elder 
Priscus. Historical exempla were an accepted way of “coding” criticism and a 
biography of Thrasea Paetus or the elder Helvidius Priscus invited the audience 
to make comparisons with their successors under Domitian.
675
 Lendon suggests 
that just as praise for moral qualities was valued, criticism of them could be 
damaging.
676
 In other words, the emperor was offended because these aristocratic 
biographies of Stoic heroes paraded his own shortcomings.  
This was not an appropriate way for a junior friend to behave. Saller argues for 
the importance of gratia in social interactions, which he believes should be 
understood as an attitude rather than an action.
677
 Gratia is the creation of “good 
will” between the parties. Saller conceives patronage as a personal, reciprocal 
relationship creating bonds between amici of different status.
678
 These ideas 
share some common ground with Lendon’s view of a network of “honour” 
binding the elite to one another, which the emperor both shared and 
manipulated.
679
 Roller has a slightly different formulation of the relationship 
between the emperor and the rest of the elite, in terms of a “gift exchange”, in 
which he includes speech.
680
 In this interpretation, the emperor asserted his 
authority by controlling what he gave and received. Roller argues that it was 
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important for the junior friend to show suitable gratia in unequal friendships. He 
quotes Cicero’s definition:  
[appellant] gratiam, quae in memoria et remuneratione officiorum 
et honoris et amicitiarum observantiam teneat. 
[They call it] gratia which keeps a deferential regard for dignity 
and friendships in the memory and repayment of services.
681
 
Seneca explains behaving inappropriately to one’s benefactor in terms of gratia 
and ingratia: 
non referre beneficiis gratiam et est turpe et apud omnes habetur 
… ideo de ingratis etiam ingrati queruntur … ingratus est qui 
beneficium accepisse se negat, quod accepit; ingratus est, qui 
dissimulat, ingratus qui non reddit, ingratissimus omnium, qui 
oblitus est. 
Not to return a favour is shameful, and is held by all to be so … 
That is why people complain about ingratitude, even when guilty 
of it themselves. … It is ungrateful to deny receiving a favour that 
one has received, ungrateful to pretend that one has not received 




Interpreted in the light of this, for senators to write biographies that could be 
interpreted as criticism of the emperor, the ultimate patron, and dispenser of 
favours, was an ultimate form of ingratia.
683
 In such a situation, the emperor 
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responded by declaring his inimicitia, which in turn made a senator an easy target 
for attack by political opponents. This is by no means a new state of affairs. In 26 
BC Cornelius Gallus offended Augustus, lost imperial friendship and was forced 
to commit suicide because of prosecution in the senate.
684
  
As was shown in chapter 3, this was not the only possible response to implied 
criticism. Domitian could have ignored the biographies, or answered them with 
humour. There must be surely be more to these events than appears, and 
underlying motivations and vested interests are no longer recoverable. There is, 
however, enough evidence to suggest that anger at ingratia was within the 
boundaries of normal elite response to insult. We should therefore be wary of a 
simple interpretation, where “good” senators defend libertas against a “bad” 
emperor, who suppressed it. This is a scenario which suits the purposes of later 
writers, who use association with the “Stoic opposition” to demonstrate their own 
lack of complicity with Domitian’s regime. For this to be effective, they had to 
acknowledge the moral integrity of the “Stoic opposition” and downplay any 
contemporary criticism of their actions. This retrospective adjustment explains 
why it is so difficult to understand the “Stoic opposition’s” offence against the 
emperor.  
It is not the only place where an adjustment to political reality is found. Although 
there are other martyrs under “bad” emperors – Seneca is an obvious example – 
senators who compromise with the emperor are judged favourably. So, for 
example, Marcus Terentius escaped prosecution by saying that he had merely 
followed Tiberius’ example and public opinion by favouring Sejanus.685 On 
another occasion, Domitius Afer mollified Gaius by representing himself as a 
lesser speaker.
686
 Pliny admires his uncle’s decision to write eight books on the 
dry subject of “Ambiguity” in order to avoid provoking Nero.687 Avoiding 
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conflict is as honourable as defending libertas. When Agricola returns to Rome 
from his successes in Britain, he enters Rome by night, avoiding ostentation, and 
cultivating retirement.
688
 A little later in the same text, Tacitus points the moral:  
sciant, quibus moris est inlicita mirari, posse etiam sub malis 
principibus magnos viros esse, obsequiumque ac modestiam, si 
industria ac vigor adsint, eo laudis excedere, quo plerique per 
abrupta, sed in nullum rei publicae usum ambitiosa morte 
inclaruerunt. 
Let those whose way it is to admire only what is forbidden learn 
from him that great men can live even under bad rulers; and that 
obedience and moderation, if animation and energy go with them, 
reach the same pinnacle of fame, to where more often men have 
climbed by perilous courses but with no profit to the state, have 
earned their glory by an ostentatious death.
689
 
Agricola has served the state in a manner impossible if he had sought mors 
ambitiosa. This is a different sort of moral justification, one that admires 
accommodation with the political realities of the principate.  
The sources do not draw a clear distinction between the way senators and the 
emperor communicated in the senate and on social occasions. Instead, they 
consider freedom of speech as both a political and social matter, and one that 
depends upon the personal relationship between the emperor and individual 
senators.
690
 The contemporary sources do not elucidate that in real terms 
senatorial libertas under a “good” emperor differed very little from that under 
“bad” emperors. Instead, they focus on the way the emperor managed the 
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relationship with the senate, presenting a “good” emperor as civil in his dealings 
with the senate and individual senators. This personal relationship makes 
criticism difficult, since it was ungrateful to criticise an emperor who had offered 
any form of patronage and certainly would not invite his future support. Where 
criticism does occur, it is usually presented in moral rather than political terms. 
Understanding why criticism caused offence is complicated by the sources’ 
strategy of viewing criticism through a “moral lens”. This creates a distance 
between a past situation, where criticism was justified, and a happier present 
where this is no longer the case.  
4.5 Maiestas trials in the senate 
When the senate met to hear criminal cases, with the consuls presiding, these 
were high profile accusations, made against the elite and with scandalous or 
political overtones. Legal processes for maiestas trials were discussed in detail in 
chapter 1; this section considers their impact upon political freedom of speech. 
At first sight, it may seem as if the question is redundant, since the charge of 
diminishing imperial majesty left no option but to condemn the defendant. Any 
opposition risked offending the emperor, and made a senator liable to maiestas 
charges himself.
691
 It is therefore not surprising to find minimal debate recorded 
in the senate, though there were pleas for mitigation of the sentence. Tacitus 
gives such speeches to Manius Lepidus on behalf of Clutorius Priscus and to 
Thrasea Paetus for Antistius Sosianus.
692
 These speeches are carefully couched 
to acknowledge the seriousness of the violation of imperial majesty, always agree 
that punishment is justly deserved, but attempt to assist the condemned. There 
were cases where intervention by influential friends or family members led to 
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charges being suppressed, but these reflected the relationship the emperor had 
with individuals rather than with the senate as a whole.  
Tacitus tells us that Agricola, by his timely decease, avoided the horrors of 
condemning fellow senators: 
non vidit Agricola obsessam curiam et clausum armis senatum et 
eadem strage tot consularium caedes, tot nobilissimarum 
feminarum exilia et fugas. una adhuc victoria Carus Mettius 
censebatur, et intra Albanam arcem sententia Messalini strepebat, 
et Massa Baebius etiam tum reus erat: mox nostrae duxere 
Helvidium in carcerem manus; nos Maurici Rusticique visus, nos 
innocenti sanguine Senecio perfudit.  
Agricola did not see the senate-house besieged, the senate 
surrounded by armed men, or in the same disaster, the butchery of 
so many men of consular rank, the flight and exile of so many of 
Rome’s noblest ladies. Mettius Carus was still rated at one victory 
only, and Messalinus was rasping away within the Alban citadel, 
and Massa Baebius was still, as before, on trial. A little while and 
our hands dragged Helvidius to prison, before we gazed on the 
dying looks of Mauricus and Rusticus, before we were soaked by 
the innocent blood of Senecio.
693
 
There are two problems here, both common in the ancient narratives of maiestas 
trials. Firstly, there is the issue of the “moral lens” as discussed in the section 
above. Events are reformulated to reflect well on the author and current political 
conditions. Secondly, the emotive language makes the evidence difficult to 
assess. Some modern scholars have therefore dismissed such accounts as 
exaggeration, reflecting hostility to a former emperor.
694
 The problem with this 
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interpretation is that the sources describe periods when maiestas trials created a 
climate of fear among the senatorial elite. They do this so clearly that Rudich is 
surely right to refuse to accept apologetic constructions of events.
695
 However, 
this moralistic and emotive presentation does not create any distinctions between 
particular maiestas trials and their impact on libertas. This may not reflect the 
more intricate political reality.  
The sources associate maiestas trials with accounts of imperial duplicity and 
immorality: Tiberius becomes reluctant to attend the senate because he may hear 
more than he wishes, and his deceitful nature makes it impossible to address 
him.
696
 Gaius confuses the senate with deliberate deception. He pretends to burn 
incriminating evidence and encourages denunciation of Tiberius but then uses 
that as the basis of charges.
697
 Domitian is damned for his hypocrisy.
698
 Once 
again, the sources present the issue in moral terms. Suetonius deals with maiestas 
charges in sequences dealing with imperial saevitia so that the question is closely 
linked to individual emperor’s characters.  
This formulation encourages the portrayal of all defendants as martyrs and the 
senate as passive victims of tyranny; in fact Tacitus sees the senate’s forced 
complicity in prosecutions as one of the outrages perpetrated against them.
699
 
This ignores the fact that the senate had been happy to accept the right of trials 
by their peers.
700
 Additionally, since there was no state prosecutor, charges were 
made by individual senators against one another.
701
 The first maiestas charges for 
defamation were brought against Titus Labienus and Cassius Severus. The legal 
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details are conspicuous by their absence, since the sources are more interested in 
condemning the extension of maiestas to defamation. Yet the implication in the 
elder Seneca’s account is that Severus himself initially accused Labienus, before 
he himself faced the same charge. We know that the two men were bitter 
enemies.
702
 This is much more complicated than suppression by a tyrannical 
emperor. Senatorial enmities and personal feuds played a significant role. 
When Clutorius Priscus is presented as a foolish poet, or Libo Drusus as a young 
man led astray by unwise friendships, their trials are presented in terms of the 
emperor’s cruelty and the senate’s coercion. This persists into modern 
discussions, but describing Clutorius Priscus as “a victim of his own stupidity” 
makes assumptions which the evidence does not support.
703
 Levick argues that 
his prosecution was motivated by factional and dynastic interests, so that the 
senate actively pursued the case.
704
 Even more striking is the senate’s rejection of 
Libo Drusus: he is turned away from their homes when he seeks supporters. They 
vote for severe penalties after his suicide, including damnatio memoriae and the 
anniversary of his death was made a festival. The precise details are not 
recoverable, although it has been suggested that it should be seen against the 
background of a dynastic plot against Tiberius.
705
 The evidence implies that the 
senate supported Tiberius in these cases, and that the presentation of the 
defendants as innocent victims obscures political reality. 
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The literary sources portray a reign of terror during the later part of Tiberius’ 
reign, with an increase in the number of maiestas trials particularly after the 
death of Sejanus. They present “good” senators as the victims of “bad” delators, 
but the reality is not so straightforward. Tacitus sees the death of Drusus and the 
rise of Sejanus as a “tipping point” for the regime becoming repressive.706 Dio 
puts that a little later, with the death of Germanicus. Both authors show that as 
the emperor withdrew from public life, a desire to curry favour with Sejanus 
increased delation. Modern scholars have suggested that the trial of Aulus 
Cremutius Cordus in 25 marks a change of approach, with Bauman arguing that 
Sejanus exploited the defamation category of maiestas so that it became “a 
remarkable instrument of repression”.707 Rutledge notes that it is the first 
“factional” attack under Sejanus and that until this point, Tiberius had intervened 
to request clemency. Levick interprets it as a new type of maiestas charge 
relating to the deified princeps.
708
 She suggests that “Tiberius’ attitude towards 
the offences of 15, 17 and 25 is not inconsistent; there is more to the charges than 
the sharpening intolerance of an established autocrat. He meant to establish 
words and actions intended (hostis animo) to insult the deified princeps and to 
depreciate his achievement from unintentional discourtesies of no political 
import.”709  
This is helpful, because it insists on treating each case on its own terms. The 
literary accounts do not do that, because the formulation of “good” senators 
charged under “bad” emperors, obscures any distinctions between trials. If that is 
restored, it reveals that it is Sejanus’ rise to power and the senate’s readiness to 
turn on one another that leads to the increase in maiestas trials during the rest of 
Tiberius’ principate. Division in the senate and factions centred around imperial 
favourites recurs when there are “clusters” of maiestas trials, for example after 
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the fall of Sejanus in AD 31, after the Pisonian conspiracy in 65, or after 
Saturninus’ revolt in 89. In fact, this becomes a circular process, because 
instability creates a climate conducive to maiestas charges. Rutledge says he 
does not know if the series of prosecutions become the “cumulative sum of a 
greater evil”.710 This may overlook the context, since these “cumulative” trials 
occur at times of crisis and revolt. Not all emperors permitted this situation to 
arise – we find Titus dining with alleged conspirators to show there would be no 
revenge taken, for example.
711
 When maiestas charges were brought, the 
emperor was not solely responsible. This is something the sources gloss over, 
preferring to portray a senate forced into condemning their peers.  
So, for example Pliny presents a complete breakdown in the relationship between 
Domitian and the senate, so that being loved by the senate was “fatal” and their 
real feelings about someone had to remain secret to keep them from harm.
712
 He 
describes the senate cowed under Domitian:  
idem prospeximus curiam, sed curiam trepidam et elinguem, cum 
dicere quod velles periculosum, quod nolles miserum esset. Quid 
tunc disci potuit, quid didicisse iuvit, cum senatus aut ad otium 
summum aut ad summum nefas vocaretur, et modo ludibrio modo 
dolori retentus numquam seria, tristia saepe censeret? eadem mala 
iam senatores, iam participes malorum multos per annos vidimus 
tulimusque; quibus ingenia nostra in posterum quoque hebetata 
fracta contusa sunt.  
We then looked to the senate but a senate which was fearful and 
speechless because it was dangerous to express your convictions 
and humiliating to repress them. What was it possible to learn at 
that time or what point was there in having learnt such things 
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when the senate was summoned to be wholly wicked, wholly idle, 
when it was kept in being to be now a laughing stock and now 
ripe for grief? Once we became senators for many years we 
witnessed and endured the same evils in which we then took part 
so that our talents were blunted, broken and bruised by them, 
affecting even our later days.
713
 
This allows him to emphasise that this is now in the past: 
breve tempus (nam tanto brevius omne quanto felicius tempus) 
quo libet scire quid simus, libet exercere quod scimus. 
There has been only a brief period (for every era of greater 
happiness is shorter) when it has been our pleasure to come to 
know our identity and apply that knowledge.
714
  
The second part of Pliny’s letter describes the senate’s joy in resuming their 
duties after this repression. This does not directly deal with maiestas since Pliny 
is asking for advice on correct senatorial procedures, allegedly lost under 
Domitian. In fact, that is an excuse to affirm the renewed importance of the 
senate’s role and praise the emperor’s moderation. This contrast between then 
and now, good and bad, moral and immoral is deliberately made. The fact that it 
is necessary for Pliny to do this speaks volumes about the underlying tensions 
within the senate. 
In conclusion, maiestas trials are a sign of wider political problems, rather than 
the cause. Normal business was in complete disarray, and the effects were felt 
beyond the immediate hearings. They formed a background to all other business 
in the senate, and coloured the senate’s dealings with one another and with the 
emperor. This frightening and dangerous situation should not be minimised, and 
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left a strong impression on those present. Tacitus considers ways in which 
communication is affected by these events, reflecting on the enforced silences of 
Domitian’s reign and its lasting effect on people’s ability to speak out.715 This 
should, however, be balanced with awareness of widespread senatorial 
complicity even in times of crisis. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered freedom of speech in the senate, and shown that 
imperial tolerance varied both within and between principates. Freedom of 
speech was affected by the relationship between the emperor, individual senators, 
and the senate as a body. There were always individual variations and the 
relationship changed and evolved during the first century AD. This cannot be 
categorised solely as a “political” matter, since the emperor and senators met on 
social occasions as well as in the senate. In any setting, the emperor’s position as 
ultimate patron set him apart, and so themes that emerged from the earlier 
discussion of etiquette, status and insult in chapters 2 and 3 have recurred. When 
the emperor acted as a tactful superior in his dealings with the senate, it allowed 
civil relations to be maintained with senators who had a vested interest in 
remaining on good terms with him.  
The same social strategies that allowed those with unequal power to 
communicate with a superior govern the senate’s relationship with the emperor. 
Since political and social standing were so closely entwined, individual speakers 
were concerned that proceedings in the senate enhanced their own reputation, 
and that of the senate as a whole. This was why it was so necessary to distinguish 
honourable praise of a deserving emperor from shameful sycophancy. From 
Pliny’s efforts to position his own remarks as honourable laudatio, it becomes 
clear that this was a continuing concern. The distinctions between laudatio and 
adulatio were extraordinarily fine and never made absolute, so that there was a 
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real danger that any speech might end up being interpreted as adulatio. A speaker 
therefore represented all praise as honourable; even this precaution could not 
always ensure that later judgements would be favourable. Retrospective 
assessments were dangerous because they could be used to reinforce the current 
speaker’s own libertas and another emperor’s affability. This means that care is 
needed in interpreting praise as contemporaries intended it.  
In political as well as social circumstances, fear of giving offence affected what 
was said. At times of crisis, when the emperor was not dealing tactfully with the 
senate, it was necessary to speak carefully to avoid giving dangerous offence. 
While we should be aware that there was a climate of fear when maiestas trials 
occurred frequently, it should also be noted that this happened at times of wider 
political problems. It is helpful to understand individual maiestas trials on their 
own terms, so that some may have been justified against guilty defendants, and 
that all of them represent charges brought by senators against senators. The 
primary sources are inclined to treat all such trials as the result of imperial 
oppression, which obscures the extent of delation among senators. This situation 
was exacerbated by dynastic and political faction, which manipulated the 
relationship between the emperor and the senate for individual advantage. Once 
again, retrospective assessments deliberately contrast an oppressive past with a 
happier present, whether or not that is justified. While we should not 
underestimate the effect of clusters of maiestas trials, they should be understood 
as symptoms rather than the cause of suppression. 
Tacitus’ claim that the principate and libertas are reconciled under Nerva and 
Trajan needs to be interpreted carefully, with an understanding that political 
freedom of speech was always at the emperor’s discretion.716 What Tacitus 
describes is a resolution of the emperor’s paradoxical position with regard to the 
senate, which employs many of the wider protocols for social relationships 
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between inferiors and a superior. A successful equilibrium has been reached, in 
which the emperor demonstrates his humanitas and permits the senate their 
dignitas. As an optimus princeps, Trajan allows the senate to keep their own 
house in order and to speak openly, if not freely, while they do so. In return, the 
senate can have confidence that they enhance their own status when they address 
an honourable emperor.  
 
  
                                                                                         225 
 
5: Popular protest and freedom of speech 
5.1 Introduction 
Elite accounts of “popular” protest in the early principate are partial and 
prejudiced, either ignoring popular freedom of speech or presenting it in relation 
to elite manners and morals.
717
 So, for example, when Quintilian observes that a 
certain coarseness (sermo lasciva) is not unseemly for humble persons (humiles), 
this is meant to emphasise the contrast with more appropriate behaviour among 
the elite, revealing far more about elite attitudes than those of the humiles.
718
 
Tacitus says that the city populace (plebs urbis) responded with delight to Nero’s 
stage performance: 
crederes laetari, ac fortasse laetabantur per incuriam publici 
flagitii. 
You might have supposed them to be rejoicing; and possibly 
rejoicing they were, without a care for the national dishonour.
719
 
Their behaviour provides a contrast with that of visitors from the country, but 
Tacitus tells us singularly little about the reason why the plebs responded as they 
did. Mentioning them permits him to moralise about imperial misbehaviour. In 
this literary evidence, the voices of the non-elite majority are filtered through the 
elite minority. 
Another difficulty is that elite sources are not concerned with making distinctions 
among the non-elite, portraying them as a homogeneous and often contemptible 
mass.
720
 Modern scholars have sought to distinguish more clearly between rural 
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and urban poor, slave and free, artisan and beggar.
721
 The observation that 
society is made up of individual members, with their own role and plans is a 
helpful one, emphasising that someone’s concerns and loyalties may not 
necessarily be consistent, but alter with circumstances and the company kept.
722
 
Recent attempts to distinguish between levels of poverty and aspiration among 
the non-elite are beyond the scope of this enquiry, but they demonstrate that, 
where possible, the non-elite should be considered on their own terms.
723
 The 
elite sources present an undifferentiated turba shouting in the amphitheatre or οί 
πολλόι posting rude notices on walls. This evidence needs to be assessed to see if 
it can be determined whether such protests were genuinely “popular” or whether 
they remained the domain of a limited section of society, albeit a wider one than 
the senatorial and equestrian classes.  
Since most of the literary evidence for popular protest refers to events at Rome, 
this study will focus on the urban non-elite. There are three areas where there is 
sufficient information to draw meaningful conclusions – popular demonstrations, 
rumour and gossip, and graffiti and pamphleteering. The chapter will begin by 
considering freedom of speech in demonstrations at theatres, amphitheatres and 
the Circus. At times, these need to be differentiated – for example, seating was 
not arranged hierarchically at the Circus. When it is not necessary to distinguish 
a particular venue, they will be referred to as “shows” for convenience, 
encompassing all the locations where entertainments were provided – gladiatorial 
games, theatrical performances and chariot racing. Next, the role of rumour and 
gossip in political life, and whether there is evidence for manipulation or control 
of these will be discussed. The final section of the chapter will investigate 
informal written protests, by which is meant the use of graffiti, dipinti and 
pamphleteering for political comment. 
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Popular protest was made against the emperor and the elite and occurred at 
venues where the elite were also present, so that it is not possible or desirable to 
discuss the non-elite in isolation. So, for example, it is sometimes suggested that 
demonstrations at shows are best considered as a form of festival licence.
724
 If 
this is to be explored, then imperial presence at those shows needs to be 
examined, as does the emperor’s reaction to protests. The role of patronage raises 
the further question of whether popular demonstrations were manipulated by 
those with vested interests or whether they were spontaneous expressions of 
public discontent. The final question to be addressed is whether there is evidence 
for the control of popular protest. This chapter will investigate the intention and 
impact of non-elite political protest at Rome, and the response to it. 
5.2 Theatre, circus and games 
Theatres, amphitheatres and circuses are mentioned frequently in the early 
imperial sources; modern studies have examined their importance in Roman 
culture and their role in establishing Roman identity.
725
 Recently, scholars have 
discussed the experience of attending shows in terms of “watching the watchers”, 
noting that interaction extended beyond stage or arena so that the emperor and 
the crowd played their own role in a kind of meta-performance.
726
 However, care 
should be taken that interpretation does not become so removed from the 
spectators’ experiences that it obscures practical questions about how far 
freedom of speech operated and whether there was any form of control. There is 
a particular difficulty, because studying shows through the medium of written 
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texts and archaeological evidence does not recreate the experience of a live 
performance. For example, since shows were given on designated holidays, when 
normal business was suspended, this affected the spectators’ mood and 
encouraged boisterousness.
727
 Seneca describes being swept up in the games and 
losing sight of his philosophical principles, effectively becoming part of the 
crowd, where individual opinions become subsumed in a mass response.
728
 His 
snobbery needs to be taken into account because it typifies the dominant elite 
attitudes, which regarded enthusiasm for shows as the province of the lower 
classes, but none the less, the anecdote underlines that a show was not a static 
event or a theoretical exercise. The vast crowd who gathered were affected by the 
occasion.
729
 More mischievously, Ovid reminds us that different people had 
different agendas when they attended shows, to see and be seen, to place bets, to 
meet their friends, and pick up girls.
730
  These factors create the circumstances 
for spontaneous, unscripted remarks, which will vary from one show to the next.  
In terms of freedom of speech, shows provided a venue where those with 
political power were accessible to a wide cross-section of the population. The 
exact size and nature of the audience varied. Theatres had smaller capacity, while 
at the amphitheatre and Circus, the crowds were far larger. The Coliseum could 
accommodate some 40,000 to 45,000 spectators, the Circus Maximus 250,000.
731
 
Modern studies have shown that these venues were “political” in that they 
provided an opportunity for princeps and people to meet, effectively replacing 
the comitia and contiones of Republican Rome.
732
 In this context, political 
communication could be explicit, taking the form of a direct announcement, 
appeal or response from the emperor (or presiding magistrate) to the crowd or 
through appeals from the crowd to the emperor. Communication could also be 
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implicit, made through the occasion or behaviour at the show. The very provision 
of a show demonstrated continuity with the magistrates of the Republic, and 
showed that imperial wealth and political stability allowed performance to 
flourish. The theatre could be used as a venue to mark particular honours – 
Augustus named a theatre after Marcellus and had a golden image of him, a 
crown, and a curule chair set amongst the officials in charge.
733
 Dio notes 
Tiberius’ exceptional dedication of a statue to Sejanus in the theatre during his 
lifetime.
734
 The audience would understand these gestures had political 
implications, even though they were not directly part of the show. Less subtly, 
Augustus led Parthian hostages through the middle of the arena and seated them 
prominently above his own seat.
735
 The effectiveness of this kind of political 
performance is suggested when Suetonius includes Tiridates’ entrance into the 
city among the shows given by Nero.
736
 
The emperor’s highly visible position in the audience provided an opportunity 
for political display. Augustus countered criticism of his laws on marriage reform 
by appearing with the children of Germanicus.
737
 Claudius took a similar 
opportunity when he freed a gladiator in response to the pleas of the man’s 
sons.
738
 He had a placard carried around pointing out the benefits of having 
children, even for a gladiator. Claudius also took Britannicus on his lap in a show 
of support for his son’s position as heir.739 Hierarchical seating arrangements 
underlined this unspoken message. The theatre and amphitheatre represented 
Roman society in microcosm with the emperor in his rightful place amongst the 
people.
740
 Implicit communication mattered sufficiently that the sources give 
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details not only of the shows the emperors staged, but also of their behaviour 
during them.
741
 Providing shows allowed the emperor to demonstrate that he 
understood and shared the crowd’s enjoyment of spectacle. Failing to pay full 
attention was criticised.
742
 Augustus and Trajan were praised for appearing at and 
openly enjoying shows. At the games held to celebrate victory at Actium, 
Augustus sent Agrippa as a deputy when he was too unwell to attend.
743
 Otho 
and Vitellius are both alleged to have attended theatres to gain favour with the 
masses; despite his notorious reluctance to spend money, Vespasian gave 
generous subsidies to actors.
744
  
The crowd used applause to express their views of the presiding magistrate as he 
entered the venue. This had republican precedents, and for example Cicero 
specifically asks Atticus about the crowd’s response as a measure of gauging the 
extent of popular support.
 745
 Gaius executed Ptolemy allegedly because his 
purple cloak attracted so much attention when he entered the theatre. This may or 
may not be based on fact, but it is clearly considered believable, and 
demonstrates that the crowd’s response to someone as they entered or left the 
show enhanced or diminished status.
746
 Protests could be more explicit, through 
demands for increases in the wheat ration or for the abolition of particular taxes, 
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and the evidence suggests that they tested an emperor’s ability to respond.747 
Augustus’ quick wit stood him in good stead, but even he remarked on the 
problems of popular pressure.
748
 Tiberius disliked this so much that he avoided 
shows altogether.
749
 Gaius responded with force and tried to silence the crowd 
through intimidation and on another occasion withdrew from the games 
completely.
750
 Domitian had a herald order silence when the crowd begged him 
to restore the banished orator Palfurius Sura.
751
  
Modern scholars disagree over how extensive and how “political” these protests 
were.
752
 It is clear that disorder was a recurring problem, since soldiers were 
stationed at the theatre and the suppression of riots and the banning and 
restoration of actors is a constant theme in the sources.
753
 It may be that by 
isolating one element in the crowd’s response, as “political”, there is a risk that 
we are still viewing protest in elite terms. Purcell points out that the whole of 
Roman society, not just the elite, was status-conscious. “The benefits which the 
plebeians enjoyed were not charity to keep them alive, but a bonus to denote 
their status. Part of that status-symbolism was a degree of political licence, which 
stood beside the lavishness of the games and the grandeur of the buildings.”754 
Horsfall suggests that the crowd could, when they wanted, disrupt a show to 
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embarrass the sponsor through irrelevant or impossible demands.
755
 This 
provides a useful reminder that the crowd are participants in a shared experience, 
rather than passive recipients of imperial largesse, and they have their own 
perspective on events. Shows provided a venue to complain about unpopular 
measures, but it is not clear that was a reason to attend in the first place. Graffiti 
provide evidence for the popularity of gladiators and actors, with score cards of 
gladiatorial victories and “tagging” of favourite actors.756 The audience at shows 
contained passionate fans, just as dedicated supporters of today follow their 
chosen teams or go to a particular singer’s concerts. The evidence suggests that 
actors, like chariot racers and occasionally gladiators, stirred up strife, even 
physical violence among their fans both inside and outside the show. Conflict 
was more likely to be related to the show or the performers than to imperial 
policy. This is a public order problem, destabilising and dangerous, but it is not a 
direct political protest.  
In fact, political protests at shows may be opportunistic and reflect wider 
difficulties. Tacitus reports that Tiberius took measures to control actors’ 
behaviour during the transition from Augustus’ principate, a time of political 
instability.
757
 Dio records controls imposed in AD 23, as Sejanus’ influence grew 
after Drusus’ death.758 When the crowd demonstrated against Tigellinus, that 
occurred against a background of unrest after the death of Nero.
759
 In such 
circumstances banning actors and taking measures for control are a response to 
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avoid stirring a volatile crowd to trouble.
760
 This is why the banning of actors 
and suppression of shows often coincides with times of general uncertainty.  
Interpreting imperial attempts to control actors, especially banishing them and 
suppressing shows, is complicated because of the ambiguous social position 
occupied by performers. Dupont discusses their “star” status which gave them 
fame and often fortune; no wonder the elite authors are suspicious and frequently 
criticise the excessive influence of actors or chariot-drivers.
761
 It does not help 
our understanding that the source evidence, while entertaining, is more suited to 
a tabloid newspaper than serious history. Actors are found having affairs, 
sometimes unwillingly, with empresses and other elite ladies. They are seated in 
places of honour at imperial dinner parties and caught up in political intrigues.
762
 
It seems clear that such performers exerted influence far beyond the stage and the 
immediate support of the crowd at shows. Imperial disapprobation is always 
expressed in moral rather than political terms – seducing women, causing riots, 
encouraging drunkenness – but banning people from visiting actors or gathering 
around them suggests that the problem was not only with behaviour at the shows 
themselves, but with the performers’ influence beyond the theatre or Circus.  
Tacitus reports that Percennius, who encouraged rebellion in the Pannonian army 
after Augustus’ death was: 
dux olim theatralium operarum, dein gregarius miles, procax 
lingua et miscere coetus histrionali studio doctus.  
                                                 
760
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in his early days the leader of a claque at the theatres, then a 
private soldier with an abusive tongue, whose experience of stage 
rivalries had taught him the art of inflaming an audience.
763
  
Tacitus is, of course, a hostile witness, but Percennius’ early behaviour is not 
described in political terms. Instead, the skills he learnt about “stage rivalries” 
are only later turned to the more serious business of rebellion. Horsfall suggests 
that the plebs might learn chants and songs at collegia dinners so that claques had 
practised by the time they came to the theatre.
764
 There is no real evidence but 
this speculation is a reminder of our limited knowledge of plebeian life. The role 
of a dux theatralium operarum remains opaque, but it was clear it was influential 
and not necessarily centred on political protest. There is other evidence of 
“claques” dictating audience response, for example under Nero.765 On this 
occasion, the organisation of the claques is officially sanctioned, and soldiers 
encourage appropriate support for the emperor. This is a problematic example, 
because the emperor’s presence on stage distorts the normal relationship between 
crowd and emperor. Tacitus asserts that seeing Nero perform pleased the 
crowd.
766
 It is hard to know how accurate this representation is, since it is 
informed by Tacitus’ disapproval. The sources universally condemn public 
performances by the elite, although taking part in local festivals was considered 
acceptable.
767
 Dupont describes elite attitudes as “schizophrenic” because they 
encompassed a fascination with performance, even a desire to take part, with 
distaste which extended as far as severe legal penalties. One appearance was 
enough to damn someone as infamis.
768
 Moral attitudes and growing fascination 
with performance are beyond the scope of this study, but we may note that in 
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terms of freedom of speech, when the elite, and particularly the emperor, take an 
active part in performance, it creates a problem for the non-elite audience’s 
response. When an emperor performs, he must, by definition, be the best, and so 
the normal enthusiasms of the crowd have to be altered to accommodate that 
role. When the emperor acts on stage, that becomes more important than the 
show as a whole and any response is automatically politicised. This is shown 
when honest rustic visitors are not able to keep up with the complicated forms of 
applause for Nero and get in trouble as a result.
769
  
In fact, the most overtly “political” form of crowd response in the theatre was 
taking up a line of a play and treating it as commentary on a current political 
situation. Modern scholars have noted that the allusion need not be intentional – 
for example when Galba was newly appointed emperor, all the spectators joined 
in with a verse of an Atellan farce “Here comes Onesimus from his farm”.770 
There is no suggestion that this was written for the occasion; the crowd saw their 
chance for comic effect. Allusion and crowd response have been discussed by 
modern scholars in terms of its impact upon authors. It is suggested that they 
“lost control” of their work when the crowd interpreted lines against authorial 
intention, and that there was thus a danger that they would give offence when 
none was intended. However, suppression occurs extraordinarily rarely in the 
context of the show itself. Augustus reacted angrily when the people applauded 
him at the line “O just and gracious Lord!” (dominus) though they must have 
intended a compliment.
771
 Gaius objected to being hailed as a “Young 
Augustus”.772 Gaius also burned a writer of Atellan farces for “a line of 
ambiguous meaning” and Nero exiled the actor Datus for implying a reference to 
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the deaths of Claudius and Agrippina by blatant miming.
773
 One of the charges 
against the younger Helvidius was that he wrote a stage farce implying criticism 
of Domitian’s divorce from his wife.774 These represent extraordinarily few 
reported incidents over a period of more than a century, when shows were held 
on at least 65 days a year. The very fact that shows retained their importance, 
that theatres and amphitheatres were built and restored and the number of festival 




Dio preserves an anecdote about Claudius where he thinks the emperor showed 
surprising licence: 
τοὺς μέντοι ἀλλοτρίους ἀπελευθέρους ὁ Κλαύδιος, εἴ που 
κακουργοῦντας λάβοι, δεινῶς τιμωρῶν, τοῖς ἰδίοις οὕτω 
προσέκειτο ὥσθ᾽ ὑποκριτοῦ τινος ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ ποτὲ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ 
θρυλούμενον εἰπόντος ὅτι ‘ἀφόρητός ἐστιν εὐτυχῶν μαστιγίας,’ 
καὶ τοῦ τε δήμου παντὸς ἐς Πολύβιον τὸν ἀπελεύθερον αὐτοῦ 
ἀποβλέψαντος, καὶ ἐκείνου ἐκβοήσαντος ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς μέντοι 
ποιητὴς εἶπεν ὅτι ‘βασιλεῖς ἐγένοντο χοἱ πρὶν ὄντες αἰπόλοι,’ 
οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτὸν εἰργάσατο. 
[Claudius] was very lenient with his own [freedmen], as the 
following incident will show. Once when an actor in the theatre 
recited the well-known line, “A prosperous whipstock scarce can 
be endured,” and the whole assemblage thereupon looked at 
Polybius, the emperor’s freedman, the latter shouted out: “Yes, 
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but the same poet said: ‘Who once were goatherds now have royal 
power.’” Yet Claudius did him no harm.776 
In her discussion of this incident, Bartsch suggests that the audience are creating 
allusions which go beyond the stage or the text. This gives them a distinct and 
alarming role in creating hostile subtexts to attack the emperor or the elite.
777
 
However, it is not at all clear that this incident shows more than unscripted 
repartee, appropriate to the normal routine of the theatre. On another occasion, 
Dio reports that the crowd were fed up with Messalina keeping Mnester away 
from the theatre and that:  
οὕτω γάρ που δεινὸς σοφιστὴς ἐν τῇ ὀρχήσει ἦν ὥστε τοῦ ὁμίλου 
μεγάλῃ ποτὲ σπουδῇ δρᾶμά τι αὐτὸν ἐπιβόητον ὀρχήσασθαι 
δεομένου, παρακῦψαί τε ἐκ τῆς σκηνῆς καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι ‘οὐ δύναμαι 
τοῦτο ποιῆσαι: τῷ γὰρ Ὀρέστῃ συγκεκοίμημαι.’  
Indeed he was such a clever actor that once, when the crowd with 
great enthusiasm begged him to perform a famous pantomime, he 
put his head out from behind the stage and said: “I cannot comply, 
for I am abed with Orestes.”778 
This was clearly taken as no more than an excellent joke and even when he found 
out about the affair Claudius was inclined to spare Mnester. On another occasion, 
Claudius almost caused abandonment of a show, when he replied to the 
gladiators’ traditional greeting: “Hail, emperor, those who are about to die salute 
thee”, by saying “Or not.” The gladiators promptly claimed this meant they had 
been freed.
779
 The point of the anecdote is Claudius’ foolishness in his reply, 
effectively mishandling the repartee between gladiators and president. These 
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various incidents suggest that witty, even barbed, exchanges between the 
participants in a show and the audience or emperor were so normal as to be 




Dupont suggests that the popular nature of shows meant that literary “high” 
culture was reserved for private theatricals and recitations, creating a split 
between popular spectacle and literary culture.
 781
 This may perhaps overstate the 
case, but it is notable that when Maternus refuses to tone down his Cato and 
promises a worse Thyestes or when Mamercus Aemilius Scaurus causes offence 
with his Atreus, these are works intended for an elite audience.
782
 In this more 
exclusive context, authorial intention, audience interpretation and response take 
place in a more intimate setting and among people with political influence. If 
recitatio before an invited, elite audience is distinguished from more public 
performance, that helps to explain why there was more licence at public shows. 
At shows, a more helpful comparison may be made with a modern football 
crowd whose unscripted chants veer between the witty, the politically astute and 
the offensive.
783
 The crowd were making the most of their day out, and a frisson 
of danger may have added to the atmosphere. This cheerful attitude is attested 
when Claudius celebrated Secular Games in AD 47, on the grounds that 
Augustus had miscalculated in holding them in 17 BC. The crowd, some of 
whom had been present then roared with laughter at the invitation to games 
“which no one had ever seen or would ever see again”.784 Interpretation must be 
made in the context of the occasion because the crowd and performers encourage 
one another’s responses and react spontaneously. Such comedy need not be 
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verbal – Datus made gestures of swimming and choking at lines about “goodbye 
mother, goodbye father”, so turning them into a popular joke against Nero.785 
This was misjudged and led to his exile, but it is not enough to show that it was 
premeditated as deliberate political protest. Equally, when modern scholars note 
the problems with “uncontrollable subtexts” or “theatricalization” of Roman 
political life, it is far from clear that these ideas reflect the situation found at an 
actual performance. These ideas are more appropriate to smaller scale, more 




During any show, there was very little that could be done about crowd reaction 
without appearing tyrannical. That negated the benefits of appearing at or 
sponsoring the show in the first place. The more frequent references to emperors 
punishing or banishing actors, or issuing edicts to curb insults against the elite 
may represent an attempt to impose control through appropriate measures outside 
the context of the actual performance.
787
 One of the measures of a “bad” emperor 
was tyrannical behaviour with regard to shows, suggesting that imposing control 
during the show itself was resented. Gaius throwing members of the crowd into 
the arena, and refusing to have awnings drawn for shade is an obvious example, 
and Suetonius sees rioting caused by his deliberate disruption to the allocated 
seating as equally disgraceful.
788
 The problem is not only with such arbitrary 
actions in themselves, but that they spoil people’s normal enjoyment of the show. 
The relationship between the crowd and the emperor and imperial court is a 
complicated one, and the plebs did not see themselves as passive partners. 
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Modern scholars suggest that where they show gratitude for a show, or cheer the 
emperor or his family, there is a strong element of self-interest, even deliberate 
manipulation, to encourage even more generosity towards the crowd.
789
 Shows 
provided an opportunity to confront the emperor, or cheer for a popular decision, 
but the show itself was important to the non-elite. Non-elite demonstrations at 
shows reflect non-elite concerns, which were not always those of the elite 
minority.  
5.3 Gossip, rumour and popular demonstrations 
Modern anthropological and sociological studies define gossip as “informal” 
communication, subject to its own rules and moral code. One of its functions is 
to define socially acceptable behaviour for a group and Hunter stresses that: 
“private as its subject may appear, gossip requires a public setting to be effective. 
For gossip is about reputation. While asserting the common values of the group, 
it holds up to criticism, ridicule, or abuse those who flout society’s or the 
community’s accepted rules.”790 This has obvious relevance for early imperial 
Rome, where hierarchical structures and concern for reputation underlie social 
relationships. Toner suggests that preoccupation with status was not restricted to 
elite circles. Instead, it was shared across social boundaries, and Toner draws 
upon anthropological evidence to assert that “gossip served to keep people in 
their place, at bay and conforming to what was expected of them”.791 He includes 
in this category the risk of being named in derogatory graffiti and “charivari” 
(rough music) through which neighbours would punish perceived misbehaviour. 
These are attractive suggestions for the role of gossip in plebeian culture.  
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In the context of early imperial Rome, gossip and rumour had a particular 
“political” function, especially during times of crisis. Tacitus tells us that after 
Galba’s death in AD 69: 
trepidam urbem ac simul atrocitatem recentis sceleris, simul 
Othines mores paventem novus insuper de Vitellio nuntius 
exterruit, ante caedem Galbae suppressus ut tantum superioris 
Germaniae exercitum descivisse crederetur. tum duos omnium 
mortalium impudicitia ignavia luxuria deterrimos velut ad 
perdendum imperium fataliter electos non senatus modo et eques, 
quis aliqua pars et cura rei publicae, sed vulgus quoque palam 
maerere. … erant qui Vespasianum et arma Orientis augurarentur. 
Rome was in a state of excitement and horror-struck not only at 
the recent outrageous crime, but also at the thought of Otho’s 
former character. Now it was terrified in addition by news with 
regard to Vitellius, which had been suppressed before Galba’s 
death, so the citizens believed that only the army of Upper 
Germany had mutinied. Then the thought that two men, the worst 
in the world for their shamelessness, indolence and profligacy had 
apparently been chosen by fate to ruin the empire caused open 
grief not only to the senators and knights who had some share and 
interest in the state, but even to the common people. … Some 
were speculating on Vespasian and the armies of the east.
792
   
Tacitus portrays this crisis through rumours, which operate across all social 
levels. It would be easy to dismiss this as a literary device, especially when 
Tacitus puts words into people’s mouths, but it is more likely to reflect a world 
where people relied on informal communication to navigate difficult political 
situations. Official announcements cannot be trusted – Galba had suppressed 
                                                 
792
 Tac. Hist. 1.50. 
  
                                                                                         242 
 
news of mutiny – and there are few reliable ways of finding out what is going on. 
There is no media to report events and communications outside the capital are 
difficult and slow. The confusion creates a perfect situation for rumour to spread 
because people wanted to know what was happening and lacked alternative 
sources. These are “political” matters but they affect the safety of all levels of 
society. Tacitus tells us that one of his own motivations in writing history was to 
correct ill-informed gossip.
793
 He criticises credulous people who enjoy 
widespread and unlikely stories (divulgata atque incredibilia), and assumes the 
role of the informed source, the man with authoritative answers. The cumulative 
effect of Tacitus’ use of “gossip” reveals its importance in a city where news was 
fuelled by rumour. There are hints of this process in Pliny’s letters when he 
represents himself as a concerned observer, recording events in Rome for his 
friends elsewhere.
794
 It is part of their role as senators and men of letters to repeat 
and evaluate gossip.  
A letter from Tiberius to the senate shows he thought political gossip occurred in 
circuli and at convivia.
 795
 Convivia are a natural setting for gossip about current 
affairs, and freedom of speech at dinner parties was discussed in chapter 2. It is 
less clear whether Tiberius was considering gossip solely among the elite, or if 
convivia should be interpreted more widely. Collegia held formal banquets, and 
it would be surprising if politics was not discussed there.
796
 The precise nature of 
circuli is even more obscure. Boissier’s suggestion that groups regularly gathered 
to gossip on street corners, encouraged by the beaux climats of the 
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Mediterranean, is a sensible one which other scholars have followed.
797
 It may 
even suggest informal meetings of collegia where people gathered outside.  
O’Neill reviews evidence for circuli at Rome and amongst the military and 
suggests that large, informal gatherings were frequent.
798
 O’Neill argues that the 
authorities saw these as a focus of political protest, because fortune tellers and 
astrologers, along with other entertainers, found an audience there. His 
implication is that gossip in circuli gave rise to threats against the emperor, and 
caused demonstrations. However, the evidence suggests that circulus was 
something of a catch-all term, as the word is used for any informal group where 
news was exchanged.
799
 Circulatores may simply have seen a business 
opportunity to entertain the crowd. That does not necessarily equate to deliberate 
political manipulation and O’Neill himself acknowledges the difficulty in 
drawing conclusions from the available evidence.
800
  
Tacitus describes people talking in circuli after the death of Agricola: 
vulgus quoque et hic aliud agens populus et ventitavere ad domum 
et per fora et circulos locuti sunt. 
The people and this busy population came repeatedly to his house, 
and talked of him in public places and in private circles.
801
 
O’Neill believes this indicates the political nature of circuli but Tacitus’ point is 
rather that people were so concerned for Agricola that they talked about him 
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wherever they met, in the forum or informally in groups. It would be 
extraordinary if casual conversations did not touch on politics, probably 
frequently becoming heated, but that is not the same as gatherings specifically 
designated for political purposes. Those were seen as a threat and controlled, as 
when Claudius closed clubs and prohibited gatherings in taverns, or Trajan 
refused Pliny permission to set up a collegium of firemen at Nicomedia because 
of factional disturbances.
802
 The gossip about Agricola may have its origins 
among the elite, but it is intended as a compliment to his reputation that it 
spreads among the vulgus as well. It also illustrates that elite and plebeians 
shared common concerns. The same topics interest all levels of society. A further 
method for dissemination of gossip may have been through subrostrani – idlers 
who hung about the forum and gossiped about the courts and senate.
803
 It is not 
clear if these men had some kind of status as purveyors of informed gossip about 
political events, or if they were bystanders who liked to know what was going on 
and spread the news.
804
 At present, there is not enough evidence to decide.  
Some modern scholars suggest that the mob was generally apathetic and 
apolitical, others that demonstrations were frequent and potentially 
destabilising.
805
 However, as Yavetz observes, emperors rarely needed to use 
force to suppress popular unrest. He quotes examples of Tiberius ordering the 
suppression of a riot at the funeral of Pollentia, Gaius sending troops against the 
crowd in the Circus, and Claudius’ rescue from a mob in the forum.806 Yavetz 
contends that fear of military force was, in normal circumstances, enough to 
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discourage popular violence. The elite sources present demonstrations as the 
responses of a politically naïve, impulsive mob, but it may rather be that where 
violence does occur, it signals that the plebs have a particular investment. They 
felt especially strongly about events that touched directly on the unfair treatment 
of a member of the imperial household. According to Tacitus, “the whole nation” 
was fascinated by the death of Germanicus.
807
 Tiberius, agreeing to act as judge 
in Piso’s trial for poisoning Germanicus, is aware that the normal popular interest 
in imperial words and actions is intensified. Gossip has created its own political 
agenda –not only the emperor’s reputation is at risk, but wider political 
institutions. The people mobbed the senate-doors, shouting that if Piso escaped 
judgement there they would see to it themselves. His statues were dragged to the 
Gemonian Stairs, and broken. This was too much for Tiberius, who ordered them 
to be rescued and replaced and sent Piso home with a military escort. There are 
other examples – the death of Tiberius saw mobs running around shouting 
“Tiberius to the Tiber” and Gaius’ accession was greeted by demonstrations of 
support.
808
 The reaction to Nero’s divorce of Octavia showed how rapidly 
rumour and counter-rumour could lead to mob violence.
809
 A false rumour that 
Nero had restored her led to such hysterical demonstrations that the military had 
to restore order. The demonstrations against the execution of the slaves of 
Pedanius Secundus in AD 61, similarly, show intense feeling among the plebs on 
behalf of the condemned slaves.
810
 Yavetz argues that they are motivated by 
moral concerns, and occasions where they approve imperial clementia reflects 
their innate sense of justice.
811
 Elite concerns are understandable – as the frantic 
demands for the death of Tigellinus or Otho show, these protesters could swiftly 
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become violent and dangerous mobs.
812
 However, that does not mean that the 
plebs were unreasonable in agitating for what they thought was right and 
violence was not an automatic result. The evidence suggests that the plebs were 
genuinely concerned for members of the imperial family, feeling a connection 
with the imperial court, perhaps not entirely dissimilar to the current popular 
interest in the royal family.
813
 When the plebs’ demands for the recall of Julia 
annoyed Augustus, he addressed an assembly of the people. He refused to do as 




τοῦ δὲ δήμου σφόδρα ἐγκειμένου τῷ Αὐγούστῳ ἵνα καταγάγῃ τὴν 
θυγατέρα αὐτοῦ, θᾶσσον ἔφη πῦρ ὕδατι μιχθήσεσθαι ἢ ἐκείνην 
καταχθήσεσθαι. καὶ ὁ δῆμος πυρὰ ἐς τὸν Τίβεριν πολλὰ ἐνέβαλε: 
καὶ τότε μὲν οὐδὲν ἤνυσεν, ὕστερον δὲ ἐξεβιάσατο ὥστε ἐς γοῦν 
τὴν ἤπειρον αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς νήσου κομισθῆναι. 
The people urged Augustus very strongly to restore his daughter 
from exile, but he answered that fire should sooner mix with water 
than she should be restored. And the people threw many 
firebrands into the Tiber; and though at the time they 
accomplished nothing, yet later on they brought such pressure to 
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This suggests great strength of feeling, but it is possible that it should be taken in 
the same spirit as repartee at shows or political lampoons, so that though humour 
is acerbic, it still informs the exchange. That it was considered expedient to make 
a concession may be a rare example of an emperor’s response to political gossip. 
Tacitus provides a hint that low-level agitation was safer and more usual than 
open confrontation:  
comitante opinione [Agricola] Britanniam ei provinciam dari, 
nullis in hoc suis sermonibus, sed quia par videbatur. haud semper 
errat fama; aliquando et eligit.  
There accompanied [Agricola’s] recall the rumour that Britain 
was in store for him as his province, not that his conversation was 
ever directed to this goal, but simply because he was judged 




Rumour is a normal accompaniment of a man in Agricola’s position, so it is a 
mark of Agricola’s merit that he makes no attempt to influence it. This implies 
that he could have done so, and that an emperor’s decision in turn might be 
influenced by “the word on the street”. Toner suggests that the plebs used gossip 
as a way of manipulating responses to get what they wanted: “trying to create a 
moral imperative for the elite to help by gossiping, moaning and generally 
making it clear that public opinion was against the rulers.”817 In this 
interpretation, gossiping becomes a “strategy” to try and force a desired outcome.  
That raises the question of how far gossip was a matter of people expressing 
opinions, informed or otherwise, and how far there was manipulation by people 
seeking their own advantage. As Paine observes: “Sometimes a good gossip 
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plans on certain of his ‘confidences’ being passed on.”818 Laurence takes a top-
down approach, suggesting that patrons could prime their clients with particular 
information. He acknowledges problems with accuracy as information spreads 
out from its originator, observing that as people add their own surmises and 
opinions, information changes.
 819
 So, for example, reports of Gaius’ death were 
followed by a counter-rumour that they were a test of people’s loyalty to the 
regime, surely the result of fevered speculation as the story spread.
820
 There are 
frequent references to uncontrollable rumour-mongering, as for example when 
Galba adopted Calpurnius Piso, and attempts to suppress the news only 
encouraged its spread.
821
 This is a salutary reminder that influencing gossip was 
not necessarily easy. Trying to manipulate a mob is not the same as using gossip 
as a weapon in the closed world of dynastic intrigue. That may have been no less 
dangerous but it was more easily controlled and worked through known 
participants whose reactions could be anticipated.  
This is why the best evidence for gossip to manipulate people’s response is not 
among the plebs, but as part of power struggles within the imperial household. 
The relatively small size of elite society and the importance of personal 
relationships in brokering power meant that gossip played a key part in court life. 
Anecdotes about imperial habits that make their way into the historical sources 
may well have their roots in gossip about imperial preferences and interests. The 
intense interest in the emperor and his doings is more than the “celebrity culture” 
that dominates the modern media. When Tacitus alleges that Sejanus used gossip 
to discredit Agrippina, he reveals a palace culture where gossip is rife, used for 
                                                 
818
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political ends, and highly dangerous.
822
 The accuracy of rumours from eighty 
years previously may be doubtful, but such accounts show the level of malice 
that was considered credible. This was a unique social environment, and one that 
operated by its own rules.
823
 
The exile of the elder and younger Julia, the downfall of Agrippa Postumus and 
Messalina, and the death of the younger Agrippina all occurred against a 
background of constant gossip and rumour.
824
 The detail is not recoverable, 
though the hostile accounts that the sources retain probably owe their origin to 
rumour and show how vicious the world of the court became – alleging that the 
Julias and Messalina were sex-mad adulterers, Agrippa Postumus a crazed brute, 
and Agrippina tried to retain power through incest. This is damaging beyond its 
immediate victims, because it creates a climate of irrationality and confusion 
which makes it hard to distinguish truth from falsehood. Writing about the 
senate, Pliny perceives that gossip and rumour obstruct genuine expressions of 
opinion; they veer from one conclusion to another. Actions are judged not by 
merit or intention, but by outcome: 
tales ubique sermones, qui tamen alterutram in partem ex eventu 
praevalebunt. est omnino iniquum, sed usu receptum, quod 
honesta consilia vel turpia, prout male aut prospere cedunt, ita vel 
probantur vel reprehenduntur. inde plerumque eadem facta modo 
diligentiae modo vanitatis, modo libertatis modo furoris nomen 
accipiunt.  
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That is how people are talking everywhere, and there will be no 
majority for one side or the other till it is known how the matter 
will end. It is very deplorable, but it is the accepted rule that good 
or bad counsels are approved or condemned according to whether 
they turn out well or badly. The result is that we find the self-same 
deed ascribed sometimes to zeal, sometimes to vanity, and even to 
love of liberty and downright madness.
825
 
Manipulating facts for self-advantage is paramount. As a result, it is not clear 
what information is dependable and what is presented for the speaker’s own 
ends. This is a looking-glass world where nothing is expressed with genuine 
conviction and everything becomes unreliable. This is a peculiar form of control, 
but none the less, it inhibits open speech in court circles.  
Informal communication operated on different levels in early imperial Rome. It 
seems to have been a normal element in political life, encouraged by the paucity 
of channels for official news. Gossip could be exploited to influence opinion, and 
moved across social boundaries. The plebs were not passive recipients of gossip, 
but had their own opinions. On occasion, they held these forcefully enough to 
lead to demonstrations in an effort to impose their views. Unsurprisingly, the 
crowd at these demonstrations was volatile, often becoming violent, and so was 
not tolerated by the imperial authorities because of the threat to public order. 
5.4 Graffiti, dipinti and libelli  
This section is concerned with informal writing on political topics, rather than 
literature composed for recitation and publication. This informal writing was 
originally created as graffiti, dipinti and libelli, but surviving examples are 
mostly preserved in Suetonius, Dio, Tacitus, and Plutarch. This creates an 
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immediate tension, because these authors write for the elite and their reasons for 
including examples of graffiti are literary ones. For example, Suetonius tells us: 
statuae eius a vertice cirrus appositus est cum inscriptione Graeca; 
nunc demum agona esse, et traderet tandem. alterius collo ἀσκὸς 
praeligatus simulque titulus: “ego egi quod potui. sed tu cullum 
meruisti.” ascriptum et columnis, etiam Gallos eum cantando 
excitasse.  
A curl was placed on the head of [Nero’s] statue with the 
inscription in Greek: “Now there is a real contest and you must at 
last surrender.” To the neck of another statue a sack was tied and 
with it the words: “I have done what I could, but you have earned 
the sack.” People wrote on the columns that he had stirred up even 
the Gauls by his singing.
826
  
This preserves witty criticism of Nero and adds interest and variety by 
representing the voice of the “man on the street”. However, because it is 
mediated through Suetonius’ wider literary concerns, it needs treating with 
caution. As Zadorojnyi notes, there is a lack of precision in the sources, so that 
they conflate written lampoons with those that circulated orally, and even include 
symbols such as covering Agrippina’s statue, in a generalised category of 
“protest”.827 He concludes: “Graffiti, pamphlets, oral couplets and non-verbal 
signs coalesce into a language of mockery and antipathy that harks back to but 
exceeds the licence of ritual abuse.”828 Zadorojny’s suggestion that the sources 
are not interested in distinguishing form over content when they discuss informal 
written protest is surely correct. The idea that this was intrinsically an elite form 
of protest, or “excessively” abusive bears further exploration. 
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Writing on walls was not necessarily a subversive action in the ancient world. 
Studies of graffiti inside houses at Pompeii show that this was a way of 
exchanging greetings.
829
 On external walls, notices range from announcements to 
advertisements, from election slogans, to toilet humour and boasts of sexual 
conquests.
830
 It seems reasonable to assume that this was the same elsewhere, but 
that the ephemeral nature of the evidence means it has not survived. Graffiti are 
sometimes found relating to one another, as at Pompeii, giving a glimpse of the 
writers behind the words. Academic theories consider the significance of creating 
dipinti and graffiti as an act of “writtenness” (sic).831 This can become 
complicated and inward looking, and it needs to be remembered that this is an 
alien culture and language. For example, Mary Beard discusses the graffito 
“Cucuta a rationibus Neronis”, sometimes translated as “Cucuta, Nero’s 
accountant” and used to prove Nero and Poppaea visited Pompeii.832 She offers 
the alternative translation, “Poison is Nero’s accountant”, suggesting that this is a 
joke which has been misunderstood. This exemplifies the need for caution, and 
perhaps also common sense. We cannot, of course, ever know for certain, but 
whoever scribbled about Nero using poison to settle his “accounts” is unlikely to 
have been plotting revolution. 
Mouritsen suggests that the election slogans which survive at Pompeii were not 
spontaneous political expressions. They were organised by the candidates and 
posted by professional painters, using a conventional script.
833
 Other examples 
show that the standard form of words could be parodied. “The little thieves ask 
for Vatia as aedile” was surely not officially endorsed by the candidate.834 Vatia, 
in fact, also receives support from “the late drinkers”, and “all those asleep and 
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Macerius”.835 Other candidates have the allegiance of “all the run-away slaves” 
and “dice throwers”.836 These mock election slogans are funny, and humour and 
playfulness are not restricted to “political” graffiti. When we find a scrawl on a 
wall which says “Lovers, like bees, lead a honeyed life” and, in different hand 
writing, “I wish”, it may not be helpful to over analyse the joke.837 A number of 
walls at Pompeii have inscriptions similar to one found in the Large Theatre – “I 
admire you, wall, for not having collapsed at having to carry the tedious 
scribblings of so many writers.”838 Playfulness can be visual, since there are 
examples of word squares which can be read in all directions: 
 R O M A 
 O L  I  M 
 M I  L O 
 A M O R
839
 
There is a Minotaur in a Labyrinth and a snake-shaped graffito commending 
Sepumius’ success in the “snake game”.840 A parody of Virgil’s Aeneid on the 
house of the fuller Marcus Fabius Ulutremulus is a complicated joke. It puns on 
his name, and traditions about fullers, but it also exploits the painting on the 
façade of the house, showing Aeneas carrying Anchises.
 841
 Milnor points out 
that a quote from the Aeneid is posted against a notice supporting Gaius Cuspius 
Pansa, so that it plays on the letters DIDO from the formulaic D.I.D.O.V.F 
(duumvirum iure dicundo oro vos faciatis – I ask that you make so-and-so 
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duumvir for supporting the law).
842
 The evidence from Pompeii suggests that 
making use of visual cues was a normal element in informal writing. It parallels 
the examples found in Suetonius, where statues, sacks and curls are used to make 
political jokes about Nero, but raises the question of how exceptional and indeed 
how abusive this should be considered. Exploiting visual opportunities for 
humour appears to be a normal element in informal writing.  
Some modern scholars have suggested there was widespread illiteracy among the 
urban poor and rural slaves. For example, Harris argues that “there was no mass 
literacy” in the Roman world.843 This view has been challenged, and Horsfall 
argues for more widespread “functional” literacy, as required by an army clerk or 
small businessman.
844
 Harris is surely correct to assert that considerable erudition 
was required to compose and comprehend Roman literature, and that this kind of 
education required resources in terms of materials, tutors and leisure for study. 
However, it is not clear that the same is true of graffiti – political or otherwise. 
Fragments of a painted frieze from the house of Julia Felix show scenes from the 
forum. They have been restored and the original order is not preserved, but they 
do give a lively impression of forum life – bargaining at market stalls, dealing 
with recalcitrant toddlers and mules, a school boy beaten while the rest of his 
class look busy.
845
 One scene shows a group standing in front of a noticeboard 
fixed horizontally across the base of a portico in front of three equestrian statues: 
846
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Forum Scene from the house of Julia Felix, Pompeii. 
Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Napoli, 9068.  
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Four men are reading the notices – a man and a child together and two other men 
standing a little apart. What is remarkable about this is its ordinariness. The 
painter has depicted people pausing to read notices as they go about their 
business in the forum, and while it is not possible to draw firm conclusions, it 
does suggest that people routinely came to the forum and read official notices. 
While they were there, they could also read graffiti and dipinti on columns and 
statues. 
It is sometimes suggested that the literate would read aloud to others, and this 
scene has been used as an example.
847
 This shows the difficulty in interpretation, 
but all four figures are looking at the notices, not at one of the others, as would 
be natural if someone was reading to them. The evidence is not conclusive but it 
does suggest that the men are reading for themselves. It is also worth noting that 
most graffiti and dipinti are short and simple, in form if not content, and so easily 
read even by someone whose literacy is limited. Woolf discusses the need for 
practical literacy in the Roman world, where documents were routinely used, but 
many of the texts encountered in daily life were short and formulaic.
848
 He makes 
a comparison with computer literacy today, where most people can use 
technology without necessarily fully understanding it or exploiting all its 
functions. His idea of “specialized literacy” whereby someone could understand 
abbreviations and codes – such as labels on amphorae – without necessarily 
being able to read a literary text is helpful, since it postulates a wide audience for 
graffiti. More pragmatically, graffiti are worth taking the trouble to decipher, 
because the reader knows they will probably be funny or scurrilous.
849
 Once 
read, they are memorable, and as discussed in chapter 2, a witty verse is easily 
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repeated. Lampoons scribbled in the forum and read by passers-by could easily 
have a wide circulation around Rome. Conversation in popinae or at collegia 
dinners might reasonably include “a funny thing read on the way to the forum”. 
The apparently sophisticated content of informal writing raises further questions 
about its authorship and audience. For example, graffiti appeared on Domitian’s 
plethora of triumphal arches (arci) saying, in Greek, “it is enough” (άρκει).850 
Anonymous lampoons appeared about Tiberius’ bloodthirsty nature, and Drusus’ 
birth three months after Livia’s marriage, while references to Greek myths were 
used to insult Nero.
851
 Horsfall argues that attendance at the theatre, and perhaps 
story telling by circulatores, meant that these allusions would be widely 
recognised.
852
 Milnor notes that at Pompeii, the quotes from canonical poets tend 
to be limited to opening lines or frequently repeated phrases, while references to 
prose are rare.
853
 This suggests that the references in graffiti are popular 
commonplaces which would be generally appreciated, and if necessary could be 
explained to those who failed to get the joke. These jokes have much in common 
with the repartee described at shows, since some is appreciative, some is not, but 
all of it is funny.
854
 The literary sources preserve only political examples, and 
probably the most memorable and daring ones at that. Evidence from graffiti 
found at Pompeii suggests that these should be seen in a wider context, where 
political topics are only one element in people’s humour. Just as at the theatre, a 
political target may simply have given the joke an edge without real malice 
behind it, or subversive intention. Exceptions occur in exceptional circumstances, 
as for example after the death of Germanicus, when there was an outbreak of 
graffiti saying “Give back Germanicus!” This was posted at night and was not 
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limited to inscriptions, as the words were shouted aloud. When Nero’s reign was 
in terminal decline, not only was there an outbreak of graffiti, but also people 
pretended they were arguing with slaves and kept shouting out for a 
“defender”.855 Apart from any cynicism we may feel about the pun on Vindex’s 
name – surely a rather literary kind of a joke – the point is that these occasions 
represent an abnormal situation when “populist” graffiti leads to popular protests. 
They are a symptom rather than a cause of wider turmoil. The only references to 
“bulletins” being used to stir mass protest are in AD 6 when Rufus’ name was 
used and in AD 24 when Titus Curtisius posted manifestos (libelli) to encourage 
a slave revolt near Brundisium.
856
 Although an argument from silence needs to 
be treated carefully, it does seem that this was unusual. 
The evidence suggests that there was often a marked lack of official reaction to 
graffiti and pamphleteering. In this sense, they can reasonably be described as a 
form of “licensed abuse”.857 For example, Suetonius records that: 
mirum et vel praecipue notabile inter haec fuerit nihil eum 
patientius quam maledicta et convicia hominum tulisse, neque in 
ullos leniorem quam qui se dictis aut carminibus lacessissent 
exstitisse. multa Graece Latineque proscripta aut vulgata sunt 
It is surprising and of special note that all this time [Nero] bore 
nothing with more patience than the curses and abuse of the 
people, and was particularly lenient towards those who assailed 
                                                 
855
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him with gibes and lampoons. Of these many were posted or 
circulated both in Greek and Latin.
858
 
Suetonius assumes that lampoons were posted (proscripta sunt) and then 
circulated (vulgata sunt) as a matter of course. Nero’s refusal to allow informers 
to name the anonymous composers may be a pragmatic response when there was 
little real threat. They were difficult to police, especially if they were posted 
anonymously, routinely, and by night.
859
 As to where they were circulated, Toner 
speculates that despite elite prejudices, collegia were essentially a way of 
copying elite society through organised, hierarchical associations.
 860
 It may 
therefore not be a major leap to speculate that satirical verses formed part of the 
routine entertainment at collegia dinners.
861
 Horsfall suggests that these could be 
“sometimes contemporary, political, topical and irreverent, if not grossly 
abusive”.862 This is an attractive suggestion, as evidence for topical, abusive 
verses at elite dinners is definite. It is less clear that repeating these lampoons 
risked inciting political unrest, any more than a modern comedian telling acerbic 
jokes would do today.  
In contrast, the occasions when the emperor was moved to act against libelli are 
when they threatened unrest. In chapter 1, it was shown that the lex Cornelia de 
iniuriis was almost certainly extended by senatus consulta to include cases of 
anonymous and pseudonymous defamation during the early principate.
863
 Some 
pamphleteering was suppressed, with copies actively sought out and destroyed 
and authors punished.
864
 This suggests that they should be distinguished from the 
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type of lampooning discussed above, presumably because they because they 
involved the elite and so posed a political threat which had to be contained.  
5.5 Conclusion  
The evidence suggests that interaction between the widest sections of society 
took place at shows. This was a two-way process, because the emperor used the 
opportunity to make his own political points and to gain popular favour. The 
crowd, in turn, made demands of the emperor. On occasion, these could become 
embarrassing, even angry or violent. There seems to have been an element of 
manipulation in audience response, since claques were formed to encourage 
applause and there is evidence of fighting between factions. Support for actors, 
gladiators or Circus factions could also lead to demonstrations, even riots.  
The evidence suggests that astute, witty topical references were enjoyed as a 
normal aspect of the entertainment. This is why responding to allusion should be 
seen in context of an acceptable and expected part of the performance, where 
risqué or barbed repartee adds to the excitement of the occasion. This conclusion 
is strengthened by the reluctance to impose controls at shows themselves. The 
increase in the number of venues and performances during the first century 
reinforces the idea that shows were not considered a threat. Almost always, 
attempts at suppression are centred on controlling the performers, not the 
performances themselves. 
The surviving evidence about gossip mainly describes it as a force in the dynastic 
and political faction which interests elite sources. However, there is also 
evidence that gossip about political matters, especially with regard to food prices 
and public security, affected the urban plebs. It is not clear if popular 
demonstrations were fuelled by rumour-mongering, deliberately started for 
political purposes, or were spontaneous. However, to demonstrate at all, 
individuals had to be engaged at a personal level and feel strongly enough to risk 
imperial anger. This need not escalate to violence, as the stand off with Augustus 
over Julia’s exile shows. In fact, the emperor’s ability to quell demonstrations 
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with military force was enough to restrain all but the most ardent protests and 
seems to explain why demonstrations happened relatively rarely.  
There are plenty of examples of informal written protest, but the elite sources are 
far more interested in describing content over form and so they conflate accounts 
of graffiti, dipinti and libelli. They record them collectively, in order to entertain 
their audience through witty criticisms of the emperor. The emperor himself 
seems to have had a much clearer awareness of what constituted a hazard. 
Informal writing was part of the fabric of normal life, and political jokes were 
only one element of popular humour. It was best left alone, since suppression 
was difficult and even counter-productive. Pamphlets, often pseudonymous or 
anonymous, which originated from and circulated among the elite threatened 
wider unrest. These were not tolerated.  
A wide section of society made their voices heard in protests at theatres, 
amphitheatres and circuses, through demonstrations, gossip and graffiti. It seems 
that individual plebeians had a strong sense of justice and sincere concern for 
particular political events, though their interests were not always identical to 
those of the elite. They should not be seen as disengaged from politics or 
unwilling to express their views.  
  
  
                                                                                         262 
 
Conclusion 
Tacitus formulates the problems he claims to have encountered over freedom of 
speech as he searched for historical truth. He identifies them as the rise of the 
principate, fear, flattery and hatred and asserts that only the present, felicitous 
age lets him speak with real freedom, rather than the falsa species libertatis of 
the toady or coward. He demonstrates great delicacy of touch, positioning 




In the course of this study, it has been shown that we need to approach such 
remarks – and similar statements in other early imperial writers – on their own 
terms. Tacitus reflects a world of complex horizontal and vertical pressures upon 
freedom of speech. So what he says about libertas and what he fails to say about 
the similarity between the different principates – whether he was writing about 
Augustus, Domitian or Trajan – are crucial to understanding contemporary 
experiences of freedom of speech.  
That freedom of speech was controlled by the hierarchical, intensely status-
conscious nature of Roman society. It was essential to demonstrate libertas – the 
free speech befitting a free man – but always with one eye on how others might 
respond. The reactions of a man’s peers as well as his junior and senior friends 
needed to be considered. They would decide whether someone spoke with real 
freedom, or merely its false appearance. Their judgement affected the social 
standing of a member of the Roman elite and there was no appeal. 
The pressures of deciding relative status were complicated by the emperor’s 
position. In theory, the princeps shared in the same social conventions as the rest 
of the elite, but in practice, he held a position of supreme power. This meant that 
the emperor’s behaviour with regard to freedom of speech varied. Each emperor 
                                                 
865
 Tac. Hist. 1.1. 
  
                                                                                         263 
 
could behave differently both in terms of his reaction to certain individuals and at 
different times during the same principate. The result was that protocols for how 
to speak to – and about – the princeps were never fully defined. Practices 
developed from those appropriate to addressing Republican aristocrats, but it was 
an evolutionary process without firm rules. This explains some apparent 
discrepancies in the sources, and adds to the anxiety the elite experience with 
regard to appropriate speech. It also means that Roman elite society is subject to 
unique pressures, so that comparisons with other cultures need to be employed 
cautiously to ensure their relevance. 
Understanding Roman concepts of freedom of speech is further complicated 
because expectations about what constituted private speech differed radically 
from modern ideas. An elite Roman would almost always be in the presence of 
an audience – family members, amici, clients, freedmen and slaves. As a result, 
all speech would normally take place in a setting which we would recognise as 
“public” – in other words, it was subject to evaluation, and wider circulation. 
“Public” matters reflected the role of the individual within his community so that 
the divide between political and family life does not parallel that of modern 
society. In fact, it fits better the model of a medieval city state where dynastic 
marriages, property divisions and legacies all impacted upon political life rather 
than being a concern for the family alone. “Privacy” was obtained only by 
physical withdrawal, a deliberate seclusion, and by an understanding that the 
conversation should not be shared. This means that there is little trace of such 
exchanges and evidence for them survives only where they have been overheard, 
or one party has broken silence.  
Contemporary concern with appropriate speech in such a status-conscious 
society is underpinned by the knowledge that mistakes could cause lasting 
disgrace. The ambiguity between “social” errors and “political” prosecutions for 
defamation arises from the nature of Roman society. Social and political 
advancement are closely linked and mediated through a network of patronage. 
The evidence suggests that we should be wary of imposing modern expectations 
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of “due process” upon the law courts of the early Roman empire. Rather, they 
should be understood on their own terms and in their own social and political 
context. The emperor’s perceived wishes were therefore crucial to the course of 
trials in the senate, and this had far greater significance than strict legal 
processes. At times of political confusion, maiestas trials could be used either to 
settle personal scores or in the hope of gain. These circumstances created a 
situation of irrationality and fear, where freedom of speech was almost non-
existent. These periods have left an understandable bitterness in the elite sources, 
and their impact should not be understated. None the less, the portrayal of whole 
principates as reigns of terror, and of all those prosecuted for maiestas as victims 
should be resisted. Some maiestas charges were justified, since they were 
brought against individuals who had acted against the emperor’s interests. The 
“clusters” that occur at times of particular tension reflect wider political turmoil, 
where factions were allowed to run out of control.  
When the emperor decided not to permit maiestas charges, this did not mean 
there was a sudden change in the nature of libertas but an alteration in the way he 
was managing his relationship with the elite. If he was offended, he had recourse 
to other options – ignoring difficult exchanges, humour, renuntiatio amicitiae – 
and prosecution was not automatic or necessarily desirable. This also explains 
apparent inconsistencies and the rehabilitation of persecuted works under later 
principates: insult could be dismissed, sometimes as a way of demonstrating that 
greater clementia was operating in the current regime. These strategies for face-
saving formulae to manage insult and avoid damage to status were shared by the 
elite generally: harmonious social relationships could be maintained by ignoring 
offensive remarks, or asking pardon while making clear that offence was 
misplaced.  
Concern over relative status became particularly acute in circumstances where it 
might be challenged. Occasions where licence was allowed for insults, 
obscenities and humour therefore became especially fraught for the Roman elite. 
The difficulty was that the rules governing freedom of speech became even more 
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fluid at times of licence. This explains the intense anxiety around “festival 
occasions” and with regard to satire and light verse. There is scope for further 
investigation of these discrepancies and fears, especially with regard to literary 
culture. It would be particularly interesting to look at the material culture of 
Roman literature and to examine the assertion that the lack of printing press 
made literary control irrelevant.
866
 This is widely assumed, but the mechanisms 
of censorship – or their lack – have not been explored. Further examination of 
literary control in early imperial Rome would usefully complement the present 
investigation into freedom of speech. 
Freedom of speech in the senate was complicated by awareness of the emperor’s 
anomalous and ill-defined position. Evidence with regard to the emperor’s 
dealings with the senate as a body and with individual senators tends to cast 
earlier events negatively in order to reflect the current situation as different and 
preferable. This needs to be treated carefully – especially with regard to 
distinguishing adulatio from laudatio and where criticism of the emperor is 
recorded. However, if political freedom of speech is understood in terms of 
personal relationships between emperor and individual senators, the focus 
becomes clearer. An emperor was evaluated in terms of how civilly he treated the 
elite. When imperial tactlessness forced an acknowledgement of his greater 
power, the senate turned against the emperor. When the emperor dealt 
diplomatically with the senate, they reciprocated. In fact, tactful dealings brought 
their own advantage since it was bad form to show ingratitude to someone who 
had given a favour. That made it difficult to criticise a civilis princeps without 
that reflecting badly upon the critic’s social judgement. It seems that by the early 
second century, an accommodation had been reached between the princeps and 
the elite, and a mode of comfortable interaction established. This allowed the 
senate to maintain a semblance of freedom of speech, broadly within the 
conventions that allowed junior friends to address seniors.  
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Conventions regarding patronage, status and others’ evaluation also affected the 
urban plebs. Popular demonstrations arose from especially strong feeling, and 
were often associated with support for particular members of the imperial family. 
Their rare occurrence is explained because military force was used to suppress 
them. A wise emperor acknowledged plebeian interests, while a tactless one 
imposed his views by force. The urban plebs enjoyed considerable licence at 
shows and in posting graffiti. The impact of political humour should probably 
not be overstated: the elite sources preserve examples only when it suits their 
purposes. In fact, the evidence from Pompeii suggests that political jokes were 
only one aspect of popular humour. It seems they were usually tolerated as 
normal and unthreatening. Only when an emperor perceived a direct political 
danger, especially when anonymous or pseudonymous pamphlets circulated, did 
vigorous suppression follow. There is no question that such works were 
reinstated at a later date and we should understand that they were seen as a threat, 
possibly inciting revolution, and were dealt with on that basis.  
In the course of this study, we have, in Veyne’s terms, taken “a journey” into the 
“otherness” of a past society.867 That journey, through the surviving literary 
sources, the preserved inscriptions and graffiti, has shown that it is necessary to 
be very careful about assuming that “suppression” or “censorship” operated as it 
is understood in the modern, western world. Even taking into account the 
concerns and biases of the literary narratives, it can be said with certainty that 
there were times which we would recognise as periods of suppression, so that 
speech was constrained through fear of incurring imperial displeasure. These 
attract historians’ attention because of the drama with which they are described, 
but that should not obscure the fact that they are exceptional and represent a 
breakdown in normal relationships. Speech was always controlled among the 
Roman elite. In usual circumstances that operated through concern for how one’s 
social status would be affected by the judgement of one’s friends and patrons. 
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This, of course, included the emperor as ultimate patron. It was not a static 
position because it evolved throughout the first century AD, was subject to 
individual variation, and depended upon the emperor playing his part as senior 
partner properly. It had stabilised by the end of the period of this study. This is 
why the literary sources operate a kind of automatic self-censorship when 
contemporary freedom of speech is discussed. For example, Tacitus can say: 
quod si vita suppeditet, principatum divi Nervae et imperium 
Traiani, uberiorem securioremque materiam, senectuti seposui, 
rara temporum felicitate ubi sentire quae velis et quae sentias 
dicere licet. 
Yet if my life but last, I have reserved for my old age the history 
of the deified Nerva’s reign and of Trajan’s rule, a richer and less 
perilous subject, because of the rare good fortune of an age in 
which we may feel what we wish and may say what we feel.
868
 
This does not mean there is unrestrained licence. It means that the protocols that 
govern freedom of speech are operating properly, to the advantage of both the 
emperor and the elite. Similarly, when Pliny tells Trajan: 
iubes esse liberos: erimus 
You order us to be free, and so we shall be
869
 
this is not intended as irony, or obsequiousness, but as a statement of fact. Pliny’s 
courtesy is impeccable. He was an elite Roman, possessing libertas by virtue of 
his free birth. That required him to speak appropriately to his inferiors, equals 
and superiors, as he expected that they would to him. This is why the elite 
sources can claim convincingly that Domitian’s failure to play his part meant that 
libertas was interrupted by fear and the res publica harmed, and that Nerva and 
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Trajan restored the correct balance. This may be a fragile construction, but in a 
world where admitting an inability to speak freely was deeply damaging to social 
status, it mattered. The distinction between libertas and falsa species libertatis 
was always a fine one. Pliny, Tacitus, Suetonius – the voices that survive to tell 
us what it was like to live under the early empire – express a profound conviction 
that libertas is always subject to multiple threats, but that it is once again 
flourishing. As members of the Roman elite, part of the complex network of 
Roman social and political relationships, they would struggle to express 
themselves otherwise. Their attitudes and experiences are not ours, but we should 
try, as far as we are able, to meet them on their own terms. 
This study has examined differences between ancient and modern, Roman and 
western views of freedom of speech. It has attempted to understand this in 
Roman terms as a complex social and political phenomenon, profoundly affected 
by the hierarchical nature of their society. Yet freedom of speech is an issue that 
extends beyond these present concerns. Constraints on freedom of speech vary 
greatly with different circumstances, cultures and times, but they are a perennial 
human concern. Understanding differences and similarities between the ways in 
which societies engage with and experience control of speech is important. It 
assists our understanding of the sources that provide our knowledge of past 
events and informs our own lived experiences.  
I would like to end this study by returning to our contemporary world, with an 
observation made a mere fifty years ago:  
We will have to repent in this generation not only for the hateful 
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The gulf between Birmingham, Alabama in the 1960s and imperial Rome of the 
first century is vast, but it is not unbridgeable. Tacitus or Pliny or Suetonius 
would not necessarily have recognised Luther King’s “good people” as viri boni 
but I think that they would have understood the central tenet of his message. 
Freedom of speech is not a topic for long ago and far away, but contemporary 
and vital. We are left with a final question about whether this journey into 
“otherness” took us as far from our modern world as first appeared. 
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Appendix to Chapter 1: Processes and penalties for cases touching on defamation 27 BC to 
AD 117 
This list is not exhaustive but lists the main cases chronologically.  
 
Date Case and Sources Possible charge/ 
legal process  
Penalties and notes Rewards for accusers 
     
Augustus 
     
BC  
By 26  
C. Cornelius Gallus 
 
Cass. Dio 53.23.5-7; 24.1-4 
 
Reports that the senate voted for 
conviction in the courts (an 
instruction to the praetor, as was 
done for Cn. Calpurnius Piso?) 
 
Suet. Aug. 66.1-2 
 
Servius’ commentary on Virgil, 
Eclogue 10, Georgic 4. 
Prosecution under ? 
lex Julia de maiestate 




renuntiatio amicitiae by Augustus, 
including ban from the emperor’s 
provinces. 
 
Exile, confiscation of estates (given to 
Augustus). 
 
Gallus committed suicide before the 
decree took effect.  
Valerius Largus 
becomes influential and 
feared as a result of the 
case. 
     











Sen. Controv.10.5.22  
 
Sen. De Ira 3.23.4-7  
 
Barred from the emperor’s house but 
welcomed by C. Asinius Pollio and 
freely received elsewhere 
 
 
renuntiatio amicitiae   
 
Burnt own books in protest. 
N/A  
     
6 Anonymous pamphlets – Publius 
Rufus?  
 
Cass. Dio 55.27.1-3 
 
Reports Rufus was not believed 
capable of the plot and rewards were 
offered for information. 
 
Suet. Aug. 55.1 





Offer of reward brings 




     
6 – 8 Titus Labienus  
 
Sen. Controv.10, pr.4-8 
 
Seneca says these are the first 
maiestas charges for defamation. 
 
Suet. Calig. 16.1 
lex Julia de maiestate 
 
Works burnt, circulation and reading 
banned. 
 












     
6 – 8 Cassius Severus 
 
Tac. Ann. 1.72.2-3 and 4.21.3 
 
The earliest example of maiestas 
charges for defamation according to 
Tacitus. 
 
Sen. Controv.10, pr.7-8 
 
Jer. Chron. 202 
 
Suet. Calig. 16.1 
lex Julia de maiestate Severus was banished to Crete. 
 
Works burnt, circulation and reading 
banned. 
 
In AD 24 banished to Seriphos and 
suffered interdictio aquae et ignis, 
property confiscated. 
Possibly gained from 
the confiscation of the 
estate in 24; Tacitus 
does not specify. 
Cass. Dio 56.27 is usually associated with Severus and Labienus but I believe this is an unnecessary conflation because a) Dio dates it to AD 12 
b) Dio does not name them c) Dio refers to anonymous book burning. The problem here is that the names of the defendants were perfectly well 
known. 
     
8 P. Ovidius Naso  
 
Ov. Tr. 2; 3.1 
 
Imperial edict renuntiatio amicitiae 
 
Ovid was relegated to Tomis but 
retained his property. 
 
Ars Amatoria (and all his works?) 
banned from imperial libraries. 
None recorded. 
     
? Corvus (Rhetorician) 
 
Sen. Suas. 2.21 











     
Tiberius 
     
15 M. Granius Marcellus  
Tac. Ann. 1.74 
 
Tiberius refuses use 
of lex Julia de 
maiestate 




     
16 M. Scribonius Libo Drusus  
 
Tac. Ann. 2. 27-32  
 
Cass. Dio 57.15.4-6 (very brief) 
 
Fasti Amertini AD 16 
lex Julia de maiestate 
 
 
Libo commited suicide, supervised by 
soldiers.  
 
Damnatio memoriae: Libo’s effigy 
should not accompany family funeral 
processions and the surname Drusus not 
to be used by his family.  
 
Public thanksgivings, votive offerings, 
anniversary of Libo’s suicide to be a 
festival.  
 
Astrologers and magicians were 
expelled from Italy and two executed. 
Property divided among 
the accusers. 
 
Offices granted – 
extraordinary 
praetorships for those 
of senatorial status.  
 
     
17 Appuleia Varilla  
 
Tac. Ann.2.50 
Tiberius refuses use 
of lex Julia de 
maiestate 
Acquitted of defamation. Acquitted of 
defamation. 
     
  







20 Cn. Calpurnius Piso  
 
Tac. Ann. 3.10-19  
 
Cass. Dio 57.18.9-10 (very brief)  
 
Suet. Tib. 52.3 
 
SC de Cn. Pisone Patre 
lex Julia de maiestate 
 
(for military treason, 
not defamation, but 
the case provides 
valuable evidence for 
maiestas trials) 
Piso committed suicide before 
conviction. 
 
Damnatio memoriae:  No women to 
mourn Piso’s death according to 
ancestral custom, public and private 
portraits of Piso to be destroyed, Piso’s 
image not to be displayed at funerals or 
in family atria, Piso’s name to be 
removed from Germanicus’ statue (set 
up by the sodales Augustales on the 
Campus Martius). Praenomen Cnaeus 
not to be used in the family in future. 
Additions to private houses made by 
Piso to be destroyed. 
 
Piso’s property was confiscated and a 
land grant by Augustus retained as 
imperial property. Remaining property 
was divided between his two sons and 
granddaughter. 
Priesthoods for P. 
Vitellius, Q. Veranius, 
and Q. Servaeus. L. 
Fulcinius Trio promised 
imperial support, in 
seeking office. 
     
21 Clutorius Priscus  
 
Tac. Ann. 3.49-51  
 
Cass. Dio 57.20.3-4 
Highly confused. Not 
lex Julia de 
maiestate? 
 
? lex Cornelia de 




     







23 C. Cominius  
 
Suet. Tib. 28  
 
Tac. Ann. 4.31.1 




Acquitted of defamation. Acquitted of 
defamation. 
     
23 Aelius Saturninus  
 
Cass. Dio 57.22.5 
lex Julia de maiestate 
 
 
Executed. None recorded. 
     
24 Votienus Montanus  
 
Tac. Ann. 4.42 
lex Julia de maiestate 
 
 
? Executed and property confiscated. 
 
“suffered the penalties of treason” 
None recorded. 
     
?24/5 and 
34 
Mamercus Aemilius Scaurus 
 
Sen. Controv. 10, pr.2-3; Suas. 2.21 
 
Tac. Ann. 6.29.3-4 
 
Cass. Dio 58.24.3-5  
 
Tacitus and Dio claim Tiberius was 
angered by Scaurus’ play Atreus but 
this did not form part of the charges 
in 34. 
 
Suet. Tib. 61.3 (though the poet is 
not named) 
? lex Cornelia de 
sicariis et venaficiis 
 
? lex Julia de 
adulteriis coercendis 
 
?lex Julia de 
maiestate 
Seven of Scaurus’ orations were burnt 
by senatorial decree, probably in 24.   
? Other works burnt in 34. 
 
Suicide (with his wife) before the 
verdict. 
None recorded. 







     
25 A. Cremutius Cordus 
 
Tac. Ann. 4.34-35  
 
Cass. Dio 57.24.2-4 
 
Suet. Tib. 61.3 
 
Sen. Ad Marciam 1.3  
 
Suet. Calig. 16.1 
 
Quint. Inst. 10.1.104 
lex Julia de maiestate Suicide before the verdict.  
 
Cordus’ Annales was burnt and aediles 
(at Rome) and magistrates (elsewhere) 
sought out private copies for 
destruction. 
 
Circulation and reading of the Annales 




     
  







28 Titius Sabinus  
 
Cass. Dio 58.1.1-3. 
 
Tac. Ann. 4. 68-71  
 
Plin. HN  8.61  
 
A letter from Tiberius on Capri 
instigated immediate condemnation. 






Executed and body thrown down the 
Gemonian steps into the Tiber. 
 
His slaves are executed (and his loyal 
dog perishes as well). 
Ex-praetors Latinius 
Latiaris, M. Porcius 
Cato, Petilius Rufus, 
and Marcus Opsius 
bring charges to gain L. 
Aelius Sejanus’ support 
for seeking the 
consulate. 
     
35 Sextus Paconianus  
 
Tac. Ann. 6.3.4; 6.39.1  
 
Charges were instigated by a letter 
from Tiberius on Capri. 
? lex Julia de 
maiestate 
Strangled in prison. Unpopularity recorded 
but no information 
about accusers/rewards. 
     
Gaius 
 Carrinas Secundas  
 
Cass. Dio 59.20.6 
? lex Julia de 
maiestate 
Banished. None recorded. 
     
 Writer of Atellan farces 
 
Suet. Calig. 27.4 
Unclear – imperial 
edict? 
 
Possibly no pretence 
at due process 
Executed. None recorded. 
     








     







Suet. Ner. 39.3  
Unclear – imperial 
edict? 
Exiled.  None recorded. 
62 Antistius Sosianus  
 
Tac. Ann. 14.48-9 
lex Julia de maiestate Relegated (P. Clodius Thrasea Paetus 
persuaded the senate to vote against 
execution). 
None recorded but 
Tacitus alleges 
Cossutianus Capito acts 
to curry favour with 
Nero. 
     
62 A. Didius Gallus Fabricius Veiento  
 
Tac. Ann. 14.50 




Relegated from Italy. 
None recorded. 
     
63 Claudius Timarchus  
 
Tac. Ann. 15.20-22.1  
Unclear 
 
? lex Julia de 
maiestate 
Thrasea Paetus moves for exile but 
without support from the consuls cannot 
proceed. 
None recorded. 
     




Suet. Ner. 39.3 
Unclear – imperial 
edict? 





    







64/5 M. Annaeus Lucanus  
 
Cass. Dio 62.29.4 
 
Tac. Ann. 15.49.3, 70.1 
 
Vacca, Vita  
 
Suet. Vita Luc. 
 









renuntiatio amicitiae  
 
Lucan was banned from writing poetry 
and possibly from the law courts. 
 
Lucan forced to suicide in the aftermath 






     
65                 Aftermath of the Pisonian Conspiracy includes a number of literary victims or allegations of insults avenged.  
     
 L. Annaeus Seneca  
 
Cass. Dio 62.25  
 
Suet. Ner. 35.5  
 
Tac. Ann. 15.60.2-4.4. 
  renuntiatio amicitiae  




     
 Afranius Quintianus  
 
Tac. Ann. 15.49.4 
 ? Forced to suicide. None recorded. 
 
 
    







 Vetinus  
 
Tac. Ann. 15.68.2-3 
 
Suet. Ner. 35 
 Forced to suicide. None recorded. 
     







Relegated from Italy. None recorded. 
     
 G. Petronius Arbiter 
 
Tac. Ann.16.18-20 
 renuntiatio amicitiae  
Held under house arrest and forced to 
suicide. 
None recorded. 
     
66 Curtius Montanus  
 
Tac. Ann.16.28-9, 33.2 
 
lex Julia de maiestate 
 
Acquitted of defamation, provided took 
no further public office. 
Acquitted of 
defamation. 
     
  








     
75 Diogenes and Heras  
 
Cass. Dio 65.15.5  
? Imperial edict 
 
Diogenes was flogged and Heras beheaded. None recorded. 
     
79 C. Helvidius Priscus 
 
 Tac. Hist. 4.5   
 
Dial.  5.7 
 
Cass. Dio 66.12 
 
Suet. Vespasian 15 
? lex Julia de maiestate Relegated and later executed. None recorded. 
     
Domitian 
     
Soon after 
81 
Hermogenes of Tarsus  
 
Suet. Dom. 10 
? lex Julia de maiestate Executed. 
 
Slaves who copied his History were 
crucified. 
None recorded. 
     




Cass. Dio 67.12.2-4 
? lex Julia de maiestate Relegated to Corsica and later executed. None recorded. 
     








91 Maternus  
 
Cass. Dio 67.12.5 
? lex Julia de maiestate 
 
Executed. None recorded. 
     
93 Q. Junius Arulenus 
Rusticus 
 
Herennius Senecio  
 
Tac. Agr. 2: 1-2 
 
Suet. Dom. 10.3-4 
 
Cass. Dio 67.13.2 
 
Plin. Ep.7.19.4-6 
lex Julia de maiestate 
 
 
Books burnt in forum. 
 
Executed. 
None recorded. 
 
 
 
 
 
